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**Fall 2013**

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Cover: Mosaic of a pregnant woman, Santiago, Chile.  
(Photo by Carolina Macaya.)
Comment

Inequality is an issue resonating across the Americas. “Growing inequality and lack of upward mobility,” President Obama said in a widely cited speech on December 4, 2013, “... is the defining challenge of our time.” In fact, the United States has become the advanced industrial economy with the least equality of opportunity, the very essence of the American dream.

Javier Couso looks at these issues and more in a Chilean context in the opening article in this issue of the Review, “The End of Privatopia?” He poses a fascinating paradox for an economy often hailed as a model for Latin America: growing economic success coupled with growing social discontent. He also sparks a fascinating debate with comments from two Berkeley professors: political scientist Paul Pierson and economist J. Bradford DeLong.

The Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) and the Berkeley Law School were honored to host Guatemalan Judges Yassmin Barrios, Pablo Xitumul, and Patricia Bustamante for a week-long visit. These three distinguished jurists, who convicted former General Ríos Montt of genocide in May 2013, discussed the challenges that this trial posed for the Guatemalan judicial system. Although the verdict was overturned ten days later on a legal technicality, it has been widely hailed as precedent setting, and the case will return to trial in January 2015.

CLAS also presented a screening and discussion of “Rape in the Fields,” a riveting expose of the sexual abuse of undocumented farmworkers. Bernice Yeung and Andrés Cediel write about their experiences researching and producing the film, whose executive producer is award-winning investigative journalist Lowell Bergman.

CLAS has also begun an historic collaboration with the News Division of Univision and its new English-language offspring, Fusion, a partnership between Univision and ABC News that targets millennials. This collaboration has resulted in a Univision/Fusion news bureau on the UC Berkeley campus, bringing campus research and cultural activities to a much broader audience.

— Harley Shaiken
In 2011, hundreds of thousands of students took to the streets of cities across Chile, demanding not just a better — and more equal — educational system but the replacement of the country’s neoliberal economic model and the introduction of a new constitution. The student demonstrations went on for months and then paused, only to erupt again in 2012 and 2013. The students sparked a series of protests by other social movements that demanded a vast array of social, economic, and political transformations.

The scale and persistence of the recent upheaval is unprecedented in Chile — at least in the last 25 years. Indeed, not since the demonstrations leading to the electoral defeat of the military dictator, Augusto Pinochet, in 1988 has the country witnessed this kind of social protest. This time, however, the demonstrations have taken place during a democratic period in which Chile has exhibited strong economic growth (around 5 percent), low unemployment (6.5 percent), moderate inflation (2-3 percent), and one of the lowest poverty rates in its history (13 percent).
What explains this paradox of economic prosperity coupled with social discontent? This was the puzzle we set out to analyze in our book, *El Otro Modelo: Del Orden Neoliberal al Régimen de lo Público* (The Other Model: From the Neoliberal Order to a Regime of the Public), a collective work published by a team of social scientists, jurists, and economists (including the author of this article), which was launched last July in an event with President Michelle Bachelet.

When the student protests began, Chile was still recovering from the effects of the February 2010 earthquake, which registered 8.8 on the Richter scale and devastated the central area of the country. In spite of its force, the natural disaster did not throttle the pace of the overall economy and, in fact, had largely disappeared from most Chileans’ radar screens.

Then, suddenly, the student protests erupted as if from nowhere. The demonstrations were so unexpected that, for a few months, neither the right-wing administration led by Sebastián Piñera, nor the main opposition coalition — the Concertación, which held power between 1990 and 2010 — knew how to react. At first, the Piñera administration thought that it was just a matter of pouring more money into the educational sector. They soon realized that the students were not merely demanding more spending but instead a complete overhaul of the structure of the educational, economic, and political systems. By openly challenging the radical, neoliberal model imposed by the military regime, the student movement of 2011 marked a turning point in Chile’s ideological debate.

Given that the Concertación is a left-of-center coalition, few observers outside Chile are aware that it did not fundamentally overhaul the radically conservative policies implemented during the dictatorship. Indeed, due to barriers inscribed in the constitution by Pinochet, as well as the ideological hegemony of neoliberal thinking among the country’s policy-making elites, the Concertación administrations left the former dictator’s economic policies largely intact.

The motto “market solutions to public problems” sums up the radical nature of Chile’s neoliberal model. Market-based policies continued to be put in place, even after the return to democracy. Thus, for example, when the Socialist administration of Ricardo Lagos (2000-06) overhauled Santiago’s public transportation system — the so-called Transantiago — the program did not include a single public bus line, something that would later prove to be a regulatory nightmare. When an author of *El Otro Modelo* asked one of the experts involved in the design of the Transantiago about the reasons behind this peculiar policy, he explained that “it would have been considered ideologically ‘leftist’ to even suggest the introduction of a public bus line to run public transportation.”

The trust in the power of markets to deliver public goods has been so powerful among Chile’s technocratic elites that, over the last several decades, schools and universities, health care, and the prison system have been increasingly turned over to for-profit corporations with little regulatory oversight.

The ideological dominance of neoliberalism is also apparent in the attitude that both the Concertación and Piñera administrations have exhibited toward unions...
and collective bargaining. Indeed, although the military regimen left in place some of the world’s most anti-union legislation, the democratic governments that followed did not fundamentally alter Chile’s neoliberal labor law. The proportion of the labor force engaged in collective bargaining actually dropped after the dictatorship: from 14 percent in 1990 to 7 percent in 2010.

In contrast with the adherence of technocratic elites to neoliberal policies, regular Chileans are deeply uneasy about the economic model. As early as 1998, a series of studies undertaken by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reported widespread discontent among the general population towards the radical brand of neoliberalism prevalent in the country. The problem, however, was that the failure of the model was experienced by individuals in isolation, which often led them to blame themselves for their failure to make ends meet rather than faulting the rules of the game. Thus, a typical Chilean response when asked about the state of the nation was: “The country is doing well, but I am not.”

The disjunction between the general assessment of the economic performance of the country and that of the average worker can be explained by the coexistence of Chile’s macroeconomic success during the last two and a half decades and the enormous income inequality that has characterized the country ever since the imposition of the neoliberal model in the late 1970s. Even though Chile has dramatically reduced the poverty rate and more than doubled its GDP per capita since 1990, economic inequality remains among the highest in the world, with a Gini coefficient ranging between .52 and .54 over the last decade. As a result of these parallel realities, even though Chileans are persistently told by the media that the country is doing very well economically, most of the population feel the stress of living in a system in which everything important — the quality of their children’s education, access to good health care, the amount of their pensions, etc. — is almost entirely dependent on how much they earn.

Although this harsh reality has been in place for more than 25 years, the 2011 student movement helped older generations to come together and share their discontent with Chile’s development model. Consequently, instead of continuing to blame themselves for the hardships of daily life, many started to realize that it was the structural features of the system that were at fault. This realization led to a re-politicization of Chilean society, expressed in a more critical attitude toward political
and economic structures and a willingness to mobilize that had been almost completely absent in the previous two decades.

Against this backdrop, *El Otro Modelo* attempts to, first, provide an account of the factors that explain the resurgence of social protest in contemporary Chile and, second, offer a blueprint for an alternative model of social, economic, and political development.

With regard to the first task, the book underscores the radical nature of Chile’s neoliberal socio-economic and political model to show that better alternatives are available. The book examines how the military regime introduced its new economic model, which had been devised by “the Chicago Boys,” a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago between 1955 and 1975 as part of a CIA-sponsored program to counter Marxist economic thinking in Latin America. A centerpiece of their model was a policy of “providing private solutions to public problems.” This approach, we argue, completely undermined the concept of citizenship by transforming social rights (like education, health care, and social security) into individual problems.

Furthermore, the first section of the book shows how the military junta’s legal advisers (in particular, Pinochet’s chief constitutional aid, Jaime Guzmán) embarked on a constitutional design explicitly aimed at protecting the neoliberal model from what was seen as the inevitable return of democracy. The 1980 Constitution — which is still in force — is characterized by a series of authoritarian “enclaves” that ensure that no meaningful change can be introduced to the core of the model without the assent of the political heirs of the military regime: the two rightwing parties, Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN).

After demonstrating the radically neoliberal nature of Chile’s path to development, as well as the constitutional obstacles to changing it, the volume articulates a blueprint for an alternative model, one that replaces the neoliberal order with “a regime of the public.” In this system, the conception of citizenship is dramatically expanded to include fundamental social rights such as education, health care, and public pensions. Continued on page 9 >>
Commentaries by Berkeley professors Paul Pierson and J. Bradford DeLong on Javier Couso’s article, which was based on the book El otro modelo (The Other Model), underscore the relevance of the Chilean experience to critical issues in the United States and the other way around. They begin a conversation that CLAS looks forward to continuing in the Review and on the Web.

THE OTHER MODEL

Chile’s Inequality — And Ours

by Paul Pierson

For an American audience, reading Javier Couso’s excellent commentary on the efforts to shift Chile away from its long neoliberal experiment generates a strange mix of familiarity and puzzlement. Despite the vastly different political experiences of the two countries, there is much in his depiction that resonates here. In both countries, inequality has reached alarming levels. Indeed, measures of inequality suggest that we are moving away from the family of rich democracies and towards the more oligarchic income structures prevalent in much of Latin America, as well as in countries like Russia. We, too, have seen the growth of an elite culture that often treats the private sector’s highly skewed distribution of rewards (even when they are a result of political favoritism) as “natural” and fair. Here, as in Chile, we have a political system that, despite its democratic institutions, has mostly reinforced that growing inequality rather than serving to moderate it. And here, as in Chile, the political system has institutionalized strong protections against economic populism — in our case, the filibuster and an aggressively conservative Supreme Court — that effectively limit the potential for reform even in the absence of conservative electoral victories.

The puzzlement comes from the apparent energy behind current pressures for reform in Chile. Nothing like it appears on the horizon here. Circumstances in

continued on page 8 >>
Market Means to Social Democratic Ends

by J. Bradford DeLong

As a card-carrying neoliberal the way that word is used in North America, or as we might say today, as a “progressive,” I think that market means can provide a route to social democratic ends. With this in mind, I offer a few comments on Professor Javier Couso’s article.

Properly regulated and properly structured, there are wide areas of economic life in which a market economy is the regime of the public sphere in its best form. It is, or rather it can be, a better implementation of the regime of the public sphere then any mass movement choosing a maximum leader or set of wise ministers.

That is the fear I have when I read Javier Couso. I fear that he underweights the possibility that the best road to the regime of the public sphere often involves using market means for social democratic ends. I fear he overweights the likelihood that market means will, instead, be used for oligarchical ends. And, indeed, because in Latin America market means have been so often used for oligarchic ends and market ideologies have been so often used to justify violence in defense of maximum inequality, it is understandably difficult for those in Latin America to the left of center to see when they would be better served by pulling this market strand out of the Gordian knot of Latin American-style neoliberalism and trying to make use of it.

Now, how does all this apply to the task of the New Majority in Chile today — if it does?

I think of contemporary Chile as a country roughly halfway between Mexico and Portugal in terms of economic development, a country with four major problems:

• Maldistribution of wealth;
• Maldistribution of education;
• Tremendous vulnerability to the world economy’s commodity cycles; and
• Its political past.

The political past of Chile remains something that can only be mastered across the generations. The country’s tremendous vulnerability to the world’s commodity cycles

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the United States might seem conducive to the kind of political movement that Couso describes. When the economic crisis hit in 2008, it thoroughly discredited nostrums that markets were automatically efficient and that the spectacular payouts going to those on Wall Street yielded benefits for all Americans. For a moment, a reform window opened, but the moment was brief. Even though the economic strains remain severe (although not for corporate profits or Wall Street bonuses), concern about job creation is largely absent from Washington. Instead, government now pushes for budgetary changes that will pinch even more severely on the incomes of Americans struggling to get by.

Americans are frustrated and angry with their politics and their economy. That frustration, however, lacks any effective target. Occupy Wall Street, which sought to bring attention to the disturbing decline of economic opportunity for average Americans, had little lasting effect. The highly fragmented American political system obscures accountability and facilitates obstruction. It advantages the already organized — which mostly means those who have been on the winning side of mounting inequality. This political system generates governmental ineffectiveness, and the resulting distrust and alienation creates a vicious circle where elections become a series of “I’m mad as hell” moments lacking the staying power to generate meaningful change. In an atmosphere of intense polarization and distrust coupled with gridlock, it is hard to sustain the political momentum that would be necessary to make government once again an effective tool for promoting economic opportunity and shared prosperity.

Couso reminds us, hopefully, that Chile’s movement seemed to come out of nowhere. But if such a movement were to emerge in the American context, it would need to recognize that economic and political reform is a long-term project and develop the appropriate combination of intensity and patience.

Paul Pierson is the John Gross Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and the author of Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class.

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is now being handled about as well as it can be handled — only Norway, I think, has anything to teach Chile. The key is to make sure this wealth is held in trust for the long-run well-being of society and that its existence is not allowed to warp the economy. It is the maldistribution of wealth and of education that are the proper tasks of the New Majority. And here there are two and only two historical-comparative lessons:

• Hitherto, no country has managed to overinvest in primary and secondary education, but higher education is a very complicated case.
• There is no reason to think that more progressive tax systems impose any sort of growth penalty on modern industrial economies. Those who have looked for such an effect in cross-country and cross-era comparisons have uniformly failed to find it.

And recall that, back in 1946, the economic future of Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, of Germany — even of Belgium and Holland — looked very depressing indeed. The years from 1913 to 1946 had seen catastrophic wars, class conflict, deep depressions, near-hyperinflation, devaluation, implicit government repudiation of debts, the emergence of larger and larger gaps between national standards of living and the world’s best practices, and a political system incapable of producing equitable growth but only of waves of redistribution backed by violence and threats of violence. And yet 1946-1973 saw 30 glorious years that made continental Western Europe the relatively prosperous set of social democracies that it has been since. They are countries that still have problems, but different problems, and problems that are an order of magnitude less serious than the problems of poverty, growth, and inequality that still beset Chile.

There is no reason why Chile’s 30 glorious years, starting in 1990, cannot be 50 such and end as well as those of Europe did.

J. Bradford DeLong is a professor of Economics and the chair of the Political Economy of Industrial Societies major at UC Berkeley. He is also a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
What is original about the regime of the public is that it is not a plea for state-provided entitlements; it allows for the private provision of social rights, provided that they are delivered under a public regime — that is to say, one that ensures that citizens are treated as such and not simply as consumers. Thus, even if a private entity is allowed to deliver a social right, it should do so under strict conditions that guarantee that the social rights being provided will not be undermined or distorted.

Although the case for a regime of the public is made at length only regarding education, the book asserts that it is applicable to all the social rights that a society decides to recognize. Then, the book applies the rationale that underlies the regime of the public to the economic domain, asserting that the public good of increasing workers’ productivity — Chile’s stagnating productivity has been masked over the last decade by a boom in the country’s most important export commodity, copper — demands the expansion of the regime of the public to include the development of a modern industrial policy.

Finally, the book offers a strategy to eliminate the constitutional hurdles that Pinochet’s legal advisers left in place to protect the dictatorship’s neoliberal policies. After describing how a number of these constitutional provisions have worked to block democratic majorities from transforming Chile’s radical version of neoliberalism, the volume shows a way out of these constraints, so that the country can embark on a new development strategy unhindered by the last shackles of the dictatorship.

Javier Couso is a professor of Public Law and the director of the Constitutional Law Program at the Universidad Diego Portales. He co-authored El Otro Modelo: Del Orden Neoliberal al Régimen de lo Público with Fernando Atria, Guillermo Larraín, José Miguel Benavente, and Alfredo Joignant.
It was a tense moment in the packed Guatemalan national courthouse. But despite the crackle of anticipation in the air, the president of the court, Judge Yassmin Barrios, was calm as she read the court’s final statement. She and her fellow judges, Patricia Bustamante and Pablo Xitumul, found the 87-year-old former general and head-of-state, José Efraín Ríos Montt, guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity for his treatment of the Ixil Mayan indigenous population. The May 10, 2013, verdict was 30 years in coming. During his rule, which lasted from March 1982 to August 1983, the general had overseen horrendous acts, the worst atrocities of the Guatemalan Civil War. The genocide trial focused on the 1,771 Ixil Maya killed during his presidency, and the witness testimonies were gut-wrenching. “Soldiers ripped out their hearts, piled them into a house, and set it ablaze,” recalled one survivor.

The eyes of the world were on Judge Barrios and her colleagues as she uttered the words: “We, the judges, consider that the accused, José Efraín Ríos Montt, had knowledge of everything that was happening and did not stop it, despite having the power to prevent these acts.” Then, taking off her glasses and looking up from her script to the courtroom, Barrios added, “We truly believe that in order for peace to exist in Guatemala, justice must come first.”

Moments later, Barrios handed down a sentence of 80 years in prison to the aging former dictator. A deafening applause rang out. The judge straightened and briefly closed her eyes before looking out again across the courtroom at the hundreds of observers, on their feet, cheering ecstatically.

The news of the verdict spread instantly throughout the world. It was a truly historic moment for a country that had seen its justice system both corrupted and placed...
under extreme coercive pressures. And it was an historic moment for the world in that, for the first time in history, a former head-of-state, a dictator, was charged and convicted of genocide in his own country.

But many politicians from Guatemala’s Conservative Party decried the ruling. Otto Pérez Molina, the country’s current president and a former general under Ríos Montt, issued a written statement soon after the trial began, claiming that proceeding with the trial would only serve to disturb the country’s hard-won peace. Indeed, the ruling was annulled by Guatemala’s highest court just 10 days after the judges’ historic decision, under what many see as questionable circumstances. A retrial has been set for January 2015, in which a different set of judges will once again review testimony and evidence against the former general.

But the precedent has been set, and the people of Guatemala have renewed hope and determination in seeking justice for their country.

Recently, the three judges spoke about the trial, for the first time in the United States, at an event hosted by UC Berkeley’s Center for Latin American Studies and the Berkeley Law School. As the three entered the packed auditorium, the entire audience rose to deliver an extended standing ovation in recognition of the judges’ achievement. “We only sometimes remember to celebrate great feats of courage and great feats of stamina,” said acting dean of Berkeley Law, Professor Gillian Lester. “It’s fitting that we’re hosting this event here, in a law school classroom... It’s here, as law students, that future lawyers first learn that learning the rules is not the same thing as learning about justice.”

Over the next hour, the judges spoke of the challenges they faced struggling for justice in a country where, in years past, lawmakers often ignored victims of political conflict.

The year 1960 was the beginning of a civil war in Guatemala that spanned more than three decades. In March 1982, Ríos Montt led a successful coup against the government and proceeded to rule the country ruthlessly for 17 brutal months. It was during his administration that the most egregious attacks occurred against the Ixil. Villages were bombed. Men, women, and children were killed indiscriminately. “They considered the Mayan communities to be subversive, enemies, and they needed...”

A woman protests the annulment of Rios Montt’s conviction.
thirty years later, many Guatemalans rejoiced to see the dreaded dictator put on trial. From March to May, the court presided over the testimonies of expert researchers and more than 100 Ixil witnesses. But Ríos Montt’s bank of lawyers also put up a strong resistance, seeking to disrupt the proceedings, according to the judges. In addition, the Ríos Montt defense team continuously sought to disrupt the trial. Every day, they lodged a complaint, giving the judges 24 hours to respond. This meant that, after a long day of intense deliberations, the three would return to the courthouse to spend more hours responding to the complaint. “It was an effort to wear us down,” Judge Barrios said. At one point, the defense team stormed out of the courtroom, saying it was not within the court’s jurisdiction to try Ríos Montt. But the judges were undeterred and, days later, compelled the defense team to return. In the end, a verdict was handed down that reverberated across the country and throughout Latin America and the world. It was against these enormous odds — and in the face of failed genocide trials worldwide — that the judges brought their country one critical step closer to realizing justice.

In the halls of Berkeley Law, the judges appeared calm and collected. They were resolute in their continuing belief in the lawfulness of their verdict, despite efforts by Ríos Montt’s supporters to delegitimize their decision. The invitation to Berkeley, in many ways, held a resonance for the judges. The universities in their own country had not yet extended the same invitation, despite the enormous significance of the trial. Indeed, the political risk of hosting the judges remains high in Guatemala. Pressure from the Conservative Party, led by many individuals formerly involved in the Ríos Montt dictatorship, has intimidated some who would have otherwise supported the judges. While they received international acclaim throughout the trial, the judges often had to tread carefully to avoid accusations of judicial bias at home. Yet, they remained unyielding in their resolve, saying the trial restored faith in justice. “It’s a precedent for all of Latin America and, I dare say, not just for Latin America but for the entire world,” Barrios said in closing. “As citizens of the world, when a population is harmed, when they do not respect children and the elderly of a civilian population, then all citizens of the world need to engage to help bring justice.” The entire audience rose again in yet another standing ovation.

The following day, the judges visited a class on “The Southern Border,” taught by Professor Harley Shaiken. “Anyone familiar with what took place in the early ’80s would never have imagined,” Shaiken said in his introduction, “that Ríos Montt would be in front of that court.” He opened the class by mentioning others who, in the past, had spoken out and consequently made history. He talked about Rosa Parks, who, by refusing to give up her seat to a white person on a crowded
bus in the southern United States on December 1, 1955, made a courageous stand against segregation. In 1988, Ricardo Lagos spoke out against the Pinochet regime on national television, breaking 15 years of silence under the dictator's rule and changing the course of Chilean history. And finally, Shaiken referenced the young Chinese man who stood in front of the tanks near Tiananmen Square on June 5, 1989, stopping them for a moment. “What might it be to talk to them four or five months after the fact?” Shaiken asked. He then invited the jurists to the stage.

The atmosphere in the 400-person class was one of expectancy as the judges settled into their chairs. For the next hour, students were able to ask the judges about their experience. Some, no doubt wondering about their own futures, asked them everything from how they had decided to become judges to what it felt like to be responsible for such an historic moment. To the latter question, Bustamante responded, “To administer justice is to give to each person what belongs to them. We simply fulfilled our responsibility. We feel at peace.”

Shaiken concluded the class saying, “In your courtroom, as three judges, you exhibited exceptional skill, commitment to the law, a real empathy for human values and human beings. We are well aware that in this process, there were very dark nights and very cold moments. You saw it through, and you have changed the world.”

Yassmin Barrios, Patricia Bustamante, and Pablo Xitumul are the Guatemalan judges who presided during the Ríos Montt trial. They spoke for the Berkeley Law School and CLAS on October 7, 2013.

Steve Fisher is the Univision News Fellow at the Center for Latin American Studies and a student at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism.
Immigration has always been a formidable engine of economic and demographic growth for the United States. During the last decades of the 19th century, immigrants contributed substantially, providing labor for the industrialization and electrification of the country. That wave of immigration was ended by the very restrictive immigration laws passed in 1929. While the “Immigration and Nationality Act” of 1965 abolished national quotas and allowed the flow of immigrants to resume, it has only been during the last 30 years that the mobility of the world’s people has increased significantly. Young, motivated, and often highly educated people are on the move, and many of them would like to come to the United States. With its 41 million immigrants, the United States is by far the largest magnet for international migrants. Moreover, according to Gallup World Polls, there are about 150 million more people who say that they would migrate to the United States (from every country on the planet) if they had the opportunity.

While immigration flows, if managed efficiently and flexibly, would bring strong opportunities for economic growth, U.S. immigration laws remain outdated, cumbersome, and rather restrictive. These laws have substantially limited immigration for work-related reasons, both among the highly educated (scientists and engineers) and the less educated (construction, agricultural, and personal service workers). The misalignment between restrictive laws and economic incentives has also caused the population of undocumented immigrants to expand rapidly. Attracted by employment, but unable to secure a legal permit, 11 million people work and have set down roots in the United States, despite great uncertainty and little protection.
On June 27, 2013, the U.S. Senate seemed set to change all that, by passing Senate Bill 744, the “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act.” The bill is the result of compromise, and is therefore imperfect. Still, it could become the most important piece of legislation on immigration of the last 50 years. It addresses most of the relevant issues plaguing the U.S. immigration system and deals with the problem of undocumented immigrants. As of today, however, due to political polarization, it seems unlikely that the House will pass the bill, despite its potential benefits for the U.S. economy.

Who Migrates to the U.S. for Economic Reasons?

Abundant research, based on comprehensive data on net migration to rich countries, has shown that two groups have a much higher propensity to migrate internationally. The first group consists of the highly educated, in particular, college-educated individuals. They have emigration rates four to five times higher than workers with no college education, and in poor countries, they are 10 to 12 times more likely to migrate. The second group is made up of the young: individuals between 20 and 40 years of age have the highest propensity to migrate. After 45, few people choose to leave their home countries.

Looking at the United States, a very large group of immigrants (as a percentage of the native population with similar skills) is made up of young, highly educated workers, mainly scientists and engineers. Another large group consists of young workers with little education who are employed in highly manual-intensive occupations. Figure 1 shows that ordering schooling levels from low to high and reporting the percentage of foreign-born workers for each skill group reveals a clear, U-shaped distribution. The percentage of foreign-born workers, as of 2011, was very high among workers with no degree, mainly employed in manual-intensive jobs. It was also very high among highly educated science, technology, engineering, and math workers (STEM). The percentage of foreign-born workers was much smaller for intermediate levels of education. The group of immigrants with very little education included a large part of the undocumented workers. This was due, in part, to the fact that there are very few legal ways for foreign workers with low schooling levels to enter the United States, despite there being significant demand for them. The current composition of U.S. immigrants follows the labor market logic. Adapting immigration laws to reflect this logic, as the proposed reform would do, makes perfect sense and would improve efficiency.

The Economic Effects of Immigrants

The very simple logic of demand and supply implies that, other thing being fixed, an increase in the labor supply reduces wages as workers compete in an increasingly crowded economy. While correct on its face, this is “partial equilibrium” reasoning. Since partial equilibrium models rely on the assumption that other things are kept fixed, they do not account for the series of adjustments and responses of the economy to immigration. Still, that simple logic is often pushed to its Malthusian implication that more workers in an economy mean lower wages and lower incomes. These partial equilibrium implications are likely to be incorrect, theoretically and empirically, in “general equilibrium.” The workings of four important mechanisms attenuate — and often reverse — the partial effects of an increased supply of foreign workers on the demand for native workers.

Investments

First, as a consequence of the availability of more workers, firms invest: they expand their productive capacity and build more establishments. The productive capacity (capital) per worker has grown in the U.S. economy at a constant rate during the period from 1960 to 2009. If anything, capital per worker was higher when immigration was at its peak in 2007 than it was in 1990 before the immigration boom began. Investments, that is, were responsive to the predictable inflows of workers. Hence, immigrants did not crowd out existing firms over the long run. Rather, they increased the size and number of firms providing investment opportunities.

Educational Composition of Immigrants

Second, workers are not all the same. In terms of their labor market skills, there is a large difference between workers with tertiary education and those with a secondary education or less. It makes sense to distinguish between these two groups because they do different jobs. A modified version of the wage-depressing effect of immigrants is that, if the relative supply of less-educated workers among the foreign-born is larger, their inflow would depress the wages of less-educated natives relative to highly educated natives. In the U.S., however, because of the combination of immigrants at the top and the bottom of the schooling distribution (as seen in the chart on the next page), immigrants have had a balanced distribution. The overall proportion of college-educated immigrants has been very similar to that of natives. So, their inflow did not significantly alter the relative supply of those two broad groups. Labor economists consider the split between...
the tertiary and non-tertiary educated as the most relevant factor for understanding the effects of relative supply on relative wages. Since immigration did not alter the relative supply of these two groups, it is unlikely to have changed their relative wages. At the national level, immigration cannot explain the observed increase in the relative wage of college-educated workers versus high-school graduates observed in the 1980s and 1990s, simply because it did not much affect that relative supply.

**Specialization and Technology: Job Upgrades**

It is even more interesting to consider the differentiation of skills and productive characteristics between natives and immigrants within each of the two education groups. One tendency among immigrant workers with little schooling is to concentrate predominately in manual jobs. They tend to work as farm laborers, construction workers, roofers, drivers, food preparers, housekeepers, and caregivers for children and the elderly. Similarly educated natives, on the other hand, tend to work in jobs that require more intensive communication and interaction skills; they are cooks, construction supervisors, farm coordinators, and clerks.

In a study I conducted with Chad Sparber (“Task Specialization, Immigration and Wages,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1:3, July, 2009), we show that, due to the limited knowledge of the language, immigrants specialize in manual jobs. As a consequence, firms and sectors that hire immigrants generate higher demand for jobs requiring coordination, communication, and interaction — jobs that are typically staffed by natives, whose language skills are superior. This dynamic specialization according to skills pushes natives to upgrade their jobs to better paid, communication-intensive occupations and protects their wages from competition from immigrants. By taking the manual jobs that natives progressively leave, immigrants push a reorganization of production along specialization lines that may increase the effectiveness and efficiency of labor. A related line of research by Ethan Lewis at Dartmouth shows that, in markets with many immigrant workers, firms adopt techniques that are particularly efficient in the use of less-educated, manual-intensive workers. Hence, they are able to absorb a large number of less-educated manual workers without a loss in productivity and wages.

**Mobility of Immigrants**

Finally, immigrant workers, both newcomers and those already working in the United States, are more...
willing than natives to move in order to find jobs. Immigration, as a consequence, has served to smooth out local booms and busts; by moving away from declining regions and into booming areas, immigrants help stabilize the economy and reduce the “mismatch” between local demand for labor and its supply. Immigrants’ willingness to move helps slow wage decline in stagnant regions and contributes to economic growth in booming ones. Combined with the complementarity of immigrants to natives, this mobility helps reinforce productivity growth in strong labor markets.

In summary, investment, the specialization of natives, the complementarity between natives and immigrants, and the technological response of firms are the local economy’s margins of response to immigration. They all attenuate and may overturn the depressing effect of increased labor supply. These factors explain why a long line of empirical economic studies (first summarized by Friedberg and Hunt in 1995, and then by Longhi et al. in 2005) has found that immigration has, at most, a very small effect on native wages and employment at both the local and the national level. My recent studies on U.S. employment and wages (in particular “Rethinking the Effect of Immigration on Wages,” Journal of the European Economic Association, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(1), written with Gianmarco Ottaviano), found very small — a few fractions of a percentage point — positive effects of immigration on the wages of less-educated natives. Only a few studies (e.g., Borjas 2003, 2006) have found negative wage effects on less-educated workers at the national level. These effects amounted to a roughly 3 percent decline over the period from 1980 to 2000. Even those studies, however, found positive wage effects of 1 to 1.5 percent for workers with an intermediate to high schooling level.

Other Economic Effects of Immigrants

In the United States — and in many European countries — the foreign born have become a large and growing presence in the home services sector. Home services include cleaning, food preparation, and gardening, as well as personal services such as child and elderly care. These jobs are often characterized as “household production” services. The increased presence of immigrants in this sector has made home services more affordable, which in turn has allowed more native-born women — especially highly educated women — to join the labor force or to...
increase their hours worked. A study by Patricia Cortes at Boston University shows that the inflow of less-educated immigrants reduced the cost of household production services by almost 10 percent over the period from 1980 to 2000. Moreover, native women increased their work week by about half an hour because of less-expensive home-care services. Low-skilled immigrants thus allowed the productive potential of highly educated women to be used in the labor market by performing some of their household production tasks.

Highly Educated Immigrants: Contribution to Innovation

Highly educated immigrants are a huge asset for the U.S. economy, which attracts scientists and engineers from all over the world. One-quarter of the U.S.-based Nobel laureates of the last 50 years were foreign-born, and highly educated immigrants account for about one-third of U.S. innovation. In 2006, immigrants founded 25 percent of new high-tech companies with more than $1 million in sales, generating income and employment for the whole country. Innovation and technological growth are the engines of economic growth in technologically advanced countries like the United States, where attracting and training new scientists and engineers is key to continued economic success. In a recent paper I wrote with Chad Sparber and Kevin Shih, we show that the inflow of STEM workers driven by H-1B visas during the period 1990-2010 explains up to 30 percent of the productivity growth in U.S. cities. This growth has increased per capita income in the United States by 8 percent over the last 20 years.

Immigration Reforms

In light of these findings, I would like to emphasize that the Senate’s reform proposal would constitute a strong economic stimulus for the U.S. economy. First, the bill increases the quota for H-1B (highly skilled) temporary visas, from 65,000 to 110,000 a year, and it allows the quota to grow up to 180,000. If current and past experience is any guide, most H-1B visas will go to scientists and engineers working in fast-growing sectors of the economy. Their innovations, entrepreneurship, and discoveries will be a powerful engine of economic productivity and wage growth.

Second, the reform introduces temporary visas for less-educated workers as well. The initial quota for these W visas is 20,000, and it can be increased up to 200,000 after four years, if demand from employers is sufficiently high. W visas are meant to ensure an adequate workforce in
sectors where many jobs don’t require a college degree. In recent decades, the high demand for these services and the pressure to keep their cost low have generated incentives to hire undocumented workers. The reform creates a legal channel for employers to fill these jobs at competitive wages after they’ve been advertised to native workers.

The long-run demographic and educational trends in the United States suggest that there will be a decreasing supply of natives for these occupations because the population is aging and becoming more educated. By hiring immigrants for manual jobs, companies create new jobs for natives as production expands overall and complementary workers are needed.

Finally, the bill envisions a path to permanent residence for 11 million immigrants who are without proper documents. While the path is long and demanding, it sets the right economic incentives for the undocumented to continue working and contributing to the U.S. economy. First, it will allow workers to be more mobile and to find jobs that best match their abilities, likely increasing their productivity and wages in the short and medium run. Most studies identify wage gains of between 5 and 15 percent from acquiring legal status. Second, legal status will provide immigrants with incentives to invest in human capital and training. Young individuals will be more willing to get an education, which will further increase their productivity and wages. Older individuals will be more willing to train and acquire U.S.-specific skills, such as better language skills. Third, as the undocumented become more productive, their tax-paying ability will also grow. The Congressional Budget Office calculated that the increase in wages associated with legal status would generate a net increase in government revenues.

If Congress can set political bickering aside and pass this reform, certainly the U.S. economy would benefit, its citizens would be better off, and the country’s immigration system would finally be ready to meet the needs of the 21st century.

Giovanni Peri is a professor of Economics at UC Davis. He spoke for CLAS on November 4, 2013.
Slavery and the Siege of Havana

by Raphael Murillo

In June 1762, a British force consisting of nearly 13,000 soldiers, 17,000 sailors and marines, 23 ships of the line, 19 auxiliary warships, and 160 transports arrived in Havana in the midst of the Seven Years’ War. By mid-August 1762, the British expedition had conquered the city. The jubilation of Britons and British Americans was immediate. One New York preacher likened the British triumph to the victory over the Armada in 1588. For Spain, the cost of losing Havana was immense: in the 1763 Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded Florida to Britain in exchange for the return of Cuba.

Why, asked Professor Elena Schneider of UC Berkeley’s Department of History, was the capture of Cuba a source of such joy and devastation? Why would Spain give up Florida for the return of Cuba? For Schneider, the answers are found in Cuba’s role in the Atlantic world of the mid-to late 18th century as revealed by the British occupation of Havana and the subsequent Spanish reform of Cuba.

Long marginalized as “stagnant” by historians, Cuba was, in fact, an essential interest for Spain, Britain, and Britain’s colonies in the New World throughout the 18th century. Situated along both the Old and New Bahama Channels — important deep-water sea lanes — Cuba was “the key and gateway of the Americas,” where the Spanish silver fleet gathered at Havana’s immense port. Unsurprisingly then, both Cuba and Havana had been the target of several assaults since 1537. As recently as 1741, Britain had occupied Guantanamo Bay for some eight months during the War of Jenkins’ Ear.

Beyond its strategic importance, Cuba was a vital economic interest in the Atlantic World.

By the mid-18th century, Havana had become the third most populous city in Spain’s New World colonies and an attractive market for British goods. With Cuba’s high demand for slaves, flour, cloth, and luxury items and its wealth of silver, tobacco, hides, and livestock to trade in return, Havana was immersed in vibrant Atlantic commercial networks. Cuba’s trade with British merchants was of particular importance, as nearly half the nation’s products left the island through contraband channels, which were primarily British, by mid-century.

Rather than marking a dramatic opening of a stagnant Cuban economy, then, the British occupation of Havana represented a continuation of existing trade patterns between Cuban elites and British merchants. Indeed, the ties between these two groups were essential during the brief period of British governance, as elites quickly acquiesced to the occupation and cultivated trading opportunities with their new rulers.

Following the restoration of Cuba to Spanish rule, the lessons for Charles III were abundantly clear. While Cuba was of vital importance to the Spanish empire, the Crown found the loyalty of its elites wanting. To discourage future accommodation with the British, the Crown disciplined wayward elites through treason trials. More importantly and rather surprisingly, however, the Crown realized that freed and enslaved Africans had been essential in defending Cuba.

The tradition of Cubans of African descent participating in the defense of Cuba was not entirely novel in 1763: Afro-Cuban volunteers had been defending the Crown since the beginning of the 17th century. In 1762, however, these volunteers were a vital component of the defense of Havana. In anticipation of a likely British
proclamation that slaves who fought the Spanish defenders would be granted freedom, the Spanish Captain General of Cuba issued a similar decree in order to bolster the defense of Havana, leading thousands of slaves to join the ranks of the defenders. One particularly enthusiastic slave, for example, recalled that he “ran 150 leagues” to present himself as a volunteer. These companies of defenders distinguished themselves in battle, gaining payment for capturing attackers, awards for their white commanders, and freedom for the volunteers themselves.

Yet the national narratives of the defense of Havana have long omitted the role of Afro-Cuban volunteers, instead emphasizing traditional figures. Cuba’s governor in 1762, Juan de Prado, is widely known for his role — or lack thereof — in the defense of Havana, for which he was court-martialed and sentenced to death. In contrast, Luis Vicente Velasco de Isla, the commander of one of Havana’s fortresses, is remembered as a hero for his valiant efforts in defense of the city. To this day, a memorial in Westminster Abbey commemorates his actions. Likewise, José Antonio Gómez y Pérez de Bullones (known as “Pepe Antonio”), the mayor of Guanabacoa, has been commemorated as a creole hero even in post-revolutionary Cuba.

Professor Schneider revises this traditional narrative by emphasizing the place of African slaves and freed individuals of African descent both during the defense of Havana and in the decades that followed. Defeat and the loss of Havana in the Seven Years’ War served as a catalyst for major reforms in the empire. After 1763, Cuba would serve as a testing site for the implementation of free trade and the improvement of fortifications. Likewise, Spain’s Bourbon kings also began implementing new policies regarding the slave trade. Spain developed its own slave trade — initially under monopolies and, later, under a free-trade regime — and expanded sugar production in Cuba. These efforts ultimately bolstered the island’s defenses, altered Cuba’s economic function in the Atlantic world, reduced the likelihood of elite collusion with the British and French, and led to the creation of a Spanish colony in Northwest Africa: Equatorial Guinea.

Elena Schneider is an assistant professor of History at UC Berkeley. She spoke for CLAS on October 21, 2013.

Raphael Murillo is a graduate student in the Department of History at UC Berkeley.
Open a newspaper in Colombia, and you are sure to find headlines touting the success of the military and the general public’s support of its counterinsurgency operations.

“The dominant view in Colombia is that the military is pretty widely supported,” said Aila M. Matanock, an assistant professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley who focuses on civil conflict and international intervention.

But a new survey, conducted by Matanock and Miguel García Sánchez of Colombia’s Universidad de los Andes, suggests that this basic assumption might not be consistent with the reality on the ground, especially for those living in guerilla-controlled regions. The study examined the levels of social support that groups conducting counterinsurgency operations have and hypothesized that people might not reveal their true preferences if they’re afraid of the regime in question.

In a presentation hosted by the Center for Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley, Matanock spoke about how officials gauge support for the Colombian military and how reported support drops when the population is surveyed in an experimental, as opposed to a direct, fashion. Matanock and García Sánchez’s fieldwork suggests that regimes and militaries involved in counterinsurgency could be prone to overrating how much support they have in local communities.

The survey drew inspiration from Nicaragua’s 1990 presidential elections, in which results deviated drastically
from the pre-election polling. Lead-up surveys strongly suggested that Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega would topple opposition candidate Violeta Chamorro by 16 points. Instead, Chamorro won by 14.

“All the way up until the elections, there was this very different measure of who was being widely supported,” Matanock said. “Almost all of these polls got it wrong and got it pretty substantially wrong.”

The election polling may have been off, Matanock concluded, because people were afraid to report their true preferences. By using creative polling methods that shield people from perceived harm or retribution, social and political scientists can get more accurate results.

Based on that assumption, Matanock and García Sánchez conducted a survey in Colombia in May 2010 that consisted of 1,900 face-to-face interviews with randomly selected subjects. The objective was to determine social support for the military through “list experiments,” which ideally give subjects an added layer of security by offering a series of questions, with the military query included in the list.

The conflict in Colombia dates back to 1964, as emergent leftist groups, including the FARC, faced off with rightwing paramilitary groups involved in drug trafficking. Throughout the conflict, the military has grown increasingly powerful and organized, gaining substantial autonomy in its counterinsurgency operations. In 2002, newly elected President Álvaro Uribe secured significant aid funds from the United States to quash the battles between the paramilitaries and guerrillas. Shortly after, Plan Colombia, which gives the military substantial autonomy, was born.

Since then, the military has been accused of committing widespread human rights violations. In 2008, the “falsos positivos” scandal broke out. The military reportedly lured poor Colombians into rural areas with the promise of work, but instead shot them and labeled the victims as guerrilla fighters who had been successfully killed in counterinsurgency operations. One might expect that such publicity would lead to declining military support, Matanock said.

But instead, they found that reported confidence in the military vacillated only slightly, and the numbers remained surprisingly stable. “Only the U.S. and Canada have more trust in the military than Colombia.” From 2004 to 2012, civilian trust in the Colombian military hovered around 65 percent. The military is consistently rated the third most trusted organization in Colombia, trailing only the Catholic Church and the president.

The continued high level of support for the military suggests two options, Matanock said. The first is that the reports are true, and support is high. The country’s security situation is improving, so it’s possible that people are actually very supportive of the military. The second possibility is what she called “preference falsification”: people know that support for the military is the dominant view in Colombia, and so they report that they also support
the military. To tackle this question, Matanock and García Sánchez decided to try their luck with a list experiment.

Matanock offered the following example to explain the concept: Give a person a list of three statements, and ask them how many of those they support; stress that they shouldn’t tell you which things they support, just the number. That list would be given to one half of the sample. The other half would get a list of four things, which include the item being measured — in this case, support for the military. The difference in the means between those two samples should give an estimate of support for the military, she explained.

Ideally, the lists and anonymous surveys would work symbiotically to lower the fear of retribution. By not outwardly saying whether they support the military, but rather, expressing it through a list, people may be more likely to accurately report how they feel.

Matanock pointed to the success of list experiments in the United States: more people report racism, drug use, and other socially condemned behaviors through list experiments. “People don’t feel the pressure to report the dominant view in these surveys,” she said.

Ultimately, Matanock and García Sánchez found that reported rates did differ when measured directly rather than experimentally. Less support for the military was reported experimentally than directly in paramilitary-controlled regions, but the difference was not significant.

In guerilla-controlled regions, however, the differences were profound. When measured experimentally, only 6.3 percent of people in guerilla-controlled regions reported support for the military. But, when measured directly, an average of 58 percent reported support for the military. “You have an over 40 percent difference in the reported rates of support measuring directly versus measuring experimentally in the guerilla-controlled regions,” Matanock said. “This is what our theory predicts based on preference falsification.”

In municipalities where coca is cultivated, results were similar. “What I hope we’ve shown you is that there is a statistically significant difference across experimental and direct measures,” Matanock said. “The experimental measures tend to be much lower than the direct measures. We see this especially in regions with guerrilla control and coca cultivation.”

Aila Matanock is an assistant professor in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley.

Erica Hellerstein is a student at UC Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism.

The military parades in period uniforms during the Colombian bicentennial, 2010.
To Guadalupe Chávez, the roads that snaked around the endless acres of farmland in California’s Lost Hills had begun to take on a cruel similarity. Almond orchards gave way to yet more almond orchards, which bled into unending stands of pistachio trees, their branches a blur of leafy green as she drove.

As a recently widowed mother of two from Mexico with no papers and little English, farm work was how Chávez supported her family. But she did not know these orchards.

In the red pickup truck ahead was the man who stood between her and an overdue paycheck. He was a supervisor with a local farm labor contractor, and when they met near the farm, he had told her the missing check was with his brother, and they needed to find him. Follow me, he said.

She thought of her unpaid bills and two sons. She started the car engine. He led her down one road, then another before directing her into the orchards themselves.

As she drove deeper into the grove, she became befuddled by its symmetry. She began to feel scared.

It was here that the man sexually assaulted her, as Chávez later told authorities. She could scream, she remembered the supervisor telling her, but “it’s not going to make any difference, because nobody can hear you way out here.”

At the end of it all — as she sat battered by fear and shame — he gave her the $245 paycheck she had earned for a week of picking pomegranates.

Stories like Chávez’s are emblematic of what we discovered through “Rape in the Fields,” a yearlong, multi-platform reporting project. They’re why some of the 556,000 female farmworkers in the United States have taken to calling their workplaces the *fils de calzón* or the fields of panties.

From the cantaloupe fields of California to the egg processing plants of Iowa, the stories we heard were as chilling as they were consistent.

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IMMIGRATION

Rape in the Fields

by Bernice Yeung and Andrés Cediel

A solitary woman works in an orchard.

(Photo by Andrés Cediel.)
We learned of cases where workers said they were isolated in distant fields or packing plants so they could be sexually harassed, assaulted, and even raped on the job. It’s a commonplace occurrence, agricultural worker advocates told us, and it’s happening everywhere.

A hidden phenomenon like this makes for a shocking story, but it’s a difficult one to report out, which is part of the reason it has gone overlooked for so long. Rape and sexual assault in America’s fields and packing plants is an entrenched problem in a distant and dusty world beyond the view of most consumers, powerbrokers, policymakers, technologists, and journalists.

But the Investigative Reporting Program at UC Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism and The Center for Investigative Reporting decided to commit to telling this story. Both organizations dedicated numerous reporters and researchers to investigate the issue for a year, in collaboration with PBS Frontline and Univision, as well as various public radio and newspaper outlets.

Despite pledging serious time and resources to the project, it was not an easy one to execute. As soon as we began reporting, we were confronted with two significant challenges: quantifying the problem and convincing sexual assault victims to discuss what had happened to them publicly.

The majority of agricultural workers are undocumented, and they tend to keep silent, hoping to keep their jobs and to avoid deportation. That Guadalupe Chávez went to the authorities was an anomaly. Law enforcement only got involved because she went to the hospital after the incident, and a nurse called the police. Chávez said she was scared and nervous about talking to the police, but the nurse told her, “Honey, you shouldn’t stay quiet.”

This hesitancy to report the crime ultimately creates a dynamic where a bilingual supervisor with a paycheck or a job to hand out is in a position where he can extract just about anything from his workers.

So while anecdotes are abundant, official statistics are scarce. Sexual assault is notoriously underreported, and undocumented farmworkers are less likely than citizens to complain to their bosses or to law enforcement.

Data and documentation are the lynchpins of sound investigative journalism, but none of the existing datasets on farmworkers or workplace violence addressed this issue directly. We became aware of a UC Santa Cruz study of 150 California female farmworkers that found that 40 percent reported experiencing sexual harassment that ranged from verbal advances to on-the-job rape. We also obtained access to 100 surveys on the sexual harassment of female agricultural workers conducted by a nonprofit in Iowa.
Forty-one percent of the women said they had experienced unwanted physical contact, and 30 percent said they had been sexually propositioned at work, according to our analysis of the surveys. Recent national polls of women workers put the rate of workplace sexual harassment at about 25 percent.

We also decided to look at a specific sample of lawsuits to empirically identify trends. By analyzing all of the civil sexual harassment lawsuits filed against agricultural businesses by the federal government — 41 cases in all — we found that more than 85 percent of the cases involved what would be considered sexual assault or rape. The vast majority of cases involved supervisors who had been accused of harassing or assaulting multiple workers. None resulted in criminal prosecutions.

This detailed look at the federal lawsuits confirmed what we were hearing anecdotally from the workers and advocates we interviewed: in the agricultural industry, sexual harassment at the hands of recidivist supervisors can be extreme and violent.

Although it is impossible to identify precisely how many farmworkers have been sexually assaulted or raped at work — as it would be for any population — the survey and lawsuit analysis enabled us to provide numerical detail to a specific universe of cases. In a space where very few had cared to count and quantify, it was a start.

Quantifying the scope of the issue was a major challenge, but as reporters, we faced another significant problem: very few people wanted to speak publicly about this topic.

Accused supervisors were understandably hesitant to address the issue, though we were able to include the perspectives of two foremen who had allegedly assaulted or raped female workers. Meanwhile, growers were wary of discussing the subject because they said they feared that the industry would be misrepresented; some told us that sexual harassment and assault exist in every industry, and farming is no different.

But those most averse to being interviewed were the women who had been victimized. We nevertheless needed to find a way to convince women to talk openly about a traumatizing and painful experience.

So we traveled to far-flung farming communities to find the person who could put a human face on the issue. We drove across California — to towns like Huron, Santa Paula, Arvin, and Woodland. We also visited agricultural regions across the country, from Sunnyside, Washington, to Clarion, Iowa, to Immokalee, Florida.

Predictably, it was hard to find people who were willing to go on camera or to use their full names. But in the process, we spoke with dozens of women, shared meals together, and met with their lawyers, counselors, and families. In some cases, we were among the first people,
aside from their lawyers, with whom they had talked about the abuse they had experienced at work.

Over the course of many months and miles, we met courageous women and heard enough stories to convince us that we were onto a topic with wide reach. Some of the women agreed to tell us their stories anonymously by appearing in shadow or by releasing only their first names. But more than halfway into our reporting, we still had not found the woman who would lend her face and full name to the story.

Of course, these women had every reason not to make their stories public. They were worried about deportation, about losing their jobs, and in some cases, about their personal safety. Speaking out also meant exposing themselves to more shame and ridicule. Some even said they were afraid that their husbands or boyfriends would blame them for what had happened. And they feared that they would not be believed.

And yet, as journalists, there were few things we could promise our sources to allay their fears. All we could promise was that we would tell their stories truthfully and respectfully.

It was some seven months into the project before the chance to capture the experiences of female farmworkers without obscuring their faces presented itself. We believed it was the payoff for spending many months developing relationships within a distrustful community. After multiple visits to the area, a half-dozen women who said they had been sexually harassed or assaulted at an apple orchard in Washington state finally agreed to go on camera. A three-member team flew up almost immediately.

But soon after we landed, we learned that the women had changed their minds — they decided it would be too risky to the lawsuits that the federal government and some of the women had filed against the company or the orchard foreman.

Two days later, we flew back home, beyond disappointed. But the experience was instructive: when it comes to asking vulnerable and potentially victimized sources to participate in a media project, we have to be both patient and persistent in finding the right people in the right moment of their lives to share their experience.

We would never have guessed that we would find that person the day after returning from our fraught trip to Washington state. We left early in the morning to make the two-hour drive to California’s Central Coast for an interview with Maricruz Ladino, a Salinas farmworker who said she had been raped by her supervisor at a lettuce farm in 2006.
We had been in touch with Ladino and her attorney over the course of the reporting process, but we had not been able to connect with her. We assumed that it was because she, like so many other women we had encountered, was simply not interested in being interviewed.

But as it turns out, we did not initially hear back from Ladino for an entirely different and more mundane reason: she had changed her cell phone number.

Her interview that brilliant spring morning was memorable and moving. She was honest and human. She was someone with whom both female farmworkers and non-agricultural workers in faraway cities could relate. She was the substance of good journalism: through her, we could clearly and viscerally understand the human impact of a problem and why it needs to stop.

And Ladino understood this. We asked her why she was willing to tell her story so publicly. “I didn’t say anything for many years because of my job, to make money to support my daughters,” she told us. “But there came a time when I told myself, ‘No more.’ I am seeing that this type of thing did not only happen to me…and if I stay quiet then it is going to continue happening. That is why I now prefer to talk about it.”

Since the release of our reporting, we have been back on the road, this time screening the film in agricultural communities throughout California. Audience members have told us they feel outraged, surprised, and unnerved by the film. They have also said that they are glad that we have told a story that has remained hidden for generations.

Each screening seems to spawn more events and dialogue. A wide range of organizations have hosted screenings, including farmworker groups, the California Department of Public Health, the Mexican Consulate in Fresno, and community colleges along the Central Coast.

Lawmakers have taken notice as well. California state legislators have begun the process of exploring legislation to address the issue, and Monterey County law enforcement officials said the film inspired them to improve outreach to the farmworker community in hopes of building better connections with a populace that is wary of them.

The public’s interaction with the project continues to grow. What seemed like the end goal — finding women, growers, and supervisors who would speak about rape in the fields — has turned out to be only a beginning.

Bernice Yeung is a reporter with The Center for Investigative Reporting. She spent a year reporting on “Rape in the Fields.” Andrés Cediel is the producer of “Rape in the Fields” and a lecturer in the Investigative Reporting Program at UC Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism. They both spoke at the CLAS screening of the film on September 4, 2013.
Mexican drug cartels were on the rise when Felipe Calderón assumed the presidency in 2007. Drug-related violence was one of the country’s most serious security and social problems, and Calderón responded with an aggressive campaign designed to weaken the power of the cartels and regain government control over areas affected by drug trafficking. But all did not go as planned: by the end of Calderón’s six-year term, a massive increase in drug-related violence had left more than 55,000 people dead.

During her presentation for CLAS, Stanford Professor Beatriz Magaloni discussed the evolution of the Mexican drug war, focusing on why the policies adopted during the Calderón administration proved ineffectual in addressing the conflict.

Mexico’s struggle with drug trafficking can be explained by a variety of factors. For Magaloni, two of the most important influences are increased trade with the United States and the U.S. government’s heightened policing of Caribbean drug routes. Mexico’s rising commercial exchange with the United States, precipitated by the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), has provided a larger variety of goods in which cartels can hide and smuggle drugs. At the same time, increased monitoring in the Caribbean has pushed drug traffickers toward land routes, turning Mexico into a bottleneck between the United States and the drug-producing countries of Latin America. These two factors have increased Mexico’s importance in the drug trade and fueled the rise of its cartels.

The newly empowered cartels were then able to take advantage of Mexico’s institutional characteristics to preserve their livelihood. During the period of hegemonic control of Mexican politics by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), drug cartels negotiated with national authorities for protection. Democratization and decentralization increased the number of people with
power, creating a greater supply of individuals who could provide local institutional protection to the drug gangs. The relative ease of bribing local, rather than national figures, decreased "barriers to entry," making space for a large number of new cartels.

Calderón took office in this environment, and he was looking for policies that would reverse the growth of the cartels’ power. Like other presidents before him, he continued seizures of marijuana and cocaine. However, he also employed two new measures that set him apart from past administrations.

First, he launched nine joint operations combining the forces of the army and navy to assume law enforcement responsibility in areas heavily affected by the drug trade. Whether these operations increased violence is unclear, according to Magaloni.

Second, Calderón began a campaign to neutralize drug-cartel leadership. This effort is the main focus of the research conducted by Magaloni and her colleagues — Gabriela Calderón, Gustavo Robles, and Alberto Díaz-Cayeros.

The key objective of President Calderón’s campaign was to arrest the top kingpins and “lieutenants” associated with the major drug cartels. The kingpins are the chief “coordinators” of the cartels’ operations, serving as the main leaders and figureheads of drug organizations. The lieutenants are the “main operators” who are responsible for negotiations with the government and for taxing opposition cartels.

Between 2007 and 2012, all the major cartel leaders and lieutenants targeted by the Calderón administration were either captured or killed. Despite this seeming success, the number of drug-related homicides increased dramatically. Violence, which had previously been contained to a few strategic areas (such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez), spread to include large swaths of the country.

Magaloni and her team studied death certificates and arrest records, and they found that capturing a leader has a strong effect on homicide rates. The capture of a leader typically resulted in a 40 percent increase in deaths among members of drug trade organizations (DTOs) in the municipality where the leader was taken. While homicide rates among the general population did not increase in the areas where a drug leader was captured or killed, those in neighboring municipalities did experience an uptick in homicides. These spillover effects did not occur randomly. Instead, the spread of violence disproportionately affected “strategic areas” such as routes and sites with transportation infrastructure.

Magaloni offered three explanations as to why Calderón’s arrest campaign might have increased violence in Mexico. First, the capture of drug capos led to intra-cartel struggles for leadership, which increased violence and instability. Second, when the state intervened and weakened the established cartels, other groups moved in to “take over their turf,” sparking inter-cartel violence. Finally, arrests weakened the lines of command within organizations. Criminals associated with the cartels lost their chief means of employment and were forced to engage in other criminal acts.

A critique of Magaloni’s findings might center on a wide body of
Evidence from other countries showing that the arrest of leaders successfully weakens terrorist organizations. However, the question remains: Why did similar tactics not work against drug trade organizations in Mexico?

Primarily, DTOs face competition from other drug cartels, not the state. Therefore, the arrests may have weakened one organization, but in the process, they strengthened another. DTOs also have a profit motive and decentralized structure that makes leadership changes logistical rather than ideological problems.

A second question arising from Magaloni’s findings might focus on why Colombia’s similar strategy of “decapitating” drug cartels was more successful. One answer is that Colombian drug cartels are more centralized, with the Cali and Medellin cartels controlling a disproportionate amount of the drug trade. In Mexico, greater fragmentation leads to a more competitive drug-trafficking market with more actors, which makes the DTOs difficult to control. Additionally, Colombia’s centralized government allowed for a coordinated effort to control drug trafficking that is more difficult to undertake in decentralized Mexico.

Ultimately, Calderón’s policy of attempting to neutralize the drug-cartel leadership appears to have led to a noticeable increase in homicides in Mexico. As a result, Mexico’s current president, Enrique Peña Nieto, has attempted to shift the focus away from drug-related violence. Data on drug-related homicides are no longer published by the Mexican government, and public discussion of the drug war has virtually ceased.

Magaloni’s research, however, maintains a focus on this understudied issue. For her, “Drug violence is the main developmental challenge facing Mexico and other Latin American countries today.” Solving this problem will require that future administrations avoid the strategies that have proved ineffective in the past.

Beatriz Magaloni is an associate professor of Political Science and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. She spoke for CLAS on September 30, 2013.

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At an age when many American children are devouring the latest sci-fi book, enjoying their first sleepover with friends, or being tucked in at night by a comforting parent, a growing number of young migrants are traveling solo, clinging to the tops of trains bound for el norte.

Every year, an estimated 100,000 children — hailing from Central America and Mexico — spend months on a perilous journey north, exposed to freezing and scorching temperatures, robbery, violence, rape, and hunger. Dismemberment — and even death — is common as a result of falling off the train, known as la bestia (the beast), and being sucked under its wheels. Adding to the danger, trains frequently derail, killing an untold number of immigrants.

In recent years, increasing numbers of Central Americans have migrated to the United States — many of them women and children. Children, some as young as seven years old, are setting out in search of parents or relatives who left to find work in the United States. Most have experienced years of separation from their loved ones.

In her book, Enrique’s Journey, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Sonia Nazario investigates the complex issues surrounding the causes and effects — both positive and negative — of Latin American immigration.

The book is told through the eyes of Enrique, a Honduran boy who travels by rail from Tegucigalpa, Honduras, to North Carolina to reunite with his mother, Lourdes.
“There are benefits and costs to this upfront. Let’s not be naïve that [immigration] is all positive and wonderful,” said Nazario during a recent event hosted by the Center for Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley. “There’s a misconception when people come here, such as the belief that you’ll reunify with your child immediately and that there’ll be a brief separation.”

Nazario was born in the United States but moved to her family’s native Argentina as a young teen in the wake of her father’s death. The family’s move coincided with the beginning of the genocidal “Dirty War” of the 1970s, a period in which the military targeted thousands of its citizens. Nazario recounted that she “lived in fear every day.” She remembers friends being tortured by the military and having to burn all her father’s books as a precaution, including a copy of the “revolutionary” Alice in Wonderland. While walking down the streets of Buenos Aires one day, Nazario came face to face with blood on the pavement. She discovered that two journalists had been killed for “trying to tell the truth.” It was the first time she realized the power of words and storytelling. It was in that moment that she decided to become a journalist.

“The lesson of that day never left me, and it made me determined to tell stories that I hoped would matter,” she told the audience.

Nazario’s family returned to the United States soon after. She flourished in college, despite her working-class status and being “one of maybe five Latinos on campus.” She graduated with honors and at 21 became the youngest person ever hired by The Wall Street Journal. There, she focused on covering social justice, women, children, the poor, Latinos, and those “who don’t get enough ink in this country.”

Her specialty became “fly-on-the-wall” reporting, which involves dropping oneself in the middle of the action and watching it unfold. “This is the best way to bring an immediacy and power to storytelling that you really can’t get any other way,” she said, noting her desire to take people into worlds they might otherwise never know.

During her talk, Nazario described using this same reporting method for Enrique’s Journey. In order to tell Enrique’s story, she decided to experience for herself what it’s like to ride the rails as migrants do. What followed was an arduous six-month journey across Honduras and Mexico, an odyssey she called “the hardest thing I’ve ever done in my life.” The personable, 50-something Nazario described crossing the Suchiate River by raft, evading Mexican gangsters, hitching a ride in an 18-wheeler in the Northern Mexican city of Matehuala, and traveling more than 1,600 miles — much of it riding atop trains.
“I wanted to show the dangers these kids faced,” she said. “I wanted to humanize immigrants and their experience.”

Nazario’s curiosity about the migrant route was first piqued by a conversation with her Guatemalan housecleaner, Carmen, who left four children behind to come work in the United States. Struck by Carmen’s sacrifice and the determination of migrant children to follow in their mothers’ footsteps — something Carmen experienced after her son rode the rails to find hers — Nazario started to investigate what she calls “a modern-day odyssey.”

Carmen’s choice is not uncommon. In Los Angeles, one study found that four out of five live-in nannies have a child left behind in their home country, said Nazario, who has reported on immigration for more than 20 years. While adult males once made up the overwhelming majority of immigrants, today 51 percent of the 11 million undocumented migrants living in the United States are women and children, explained Nazario.

“I saw a kind of determination that I could’ve never imagined before this journey,” said Nazario, recalling the moment she witnessed a boy re-board a train only three weeks after losing his legs in a previous attempt. Another time, she narrowly avoided tumbling off the train when she was smacked in the face by an overhanging branch. She later learned that a young boy had likely perished after being clouted by the same branch.

Nazario pointed to many factors that have contributed to the surge of immigration in recent decades. High rates of single motherhood in Central America have left women to fend for themselves. With the lack of work opportunities in their home countries, mothers become desperate to provide for their families. The result is a significant rise in migration north by Latin American mothers from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Honduras — a country that suffers from 44 percent unemployment and the highest homicide rate in Central America.

Children, in turn, flee their home countries to escape drug-fueled violence and poverty. However, as Nazario pointed out, they also frequently risk the rails simply to reunify with a parent from whom they’ve been separated for years — as in Enrique’s case. Before making his journey, Enrique had not seen his mother in 11 years.

Nazario concluded her talk with some reflections on the implications of her work for immigration policy. While noting that immigrants provide net economic...
benefits to the United States, she also acknowledged that “there are winners and losers in terms of this influx, and the losers are the one in 14 Americans who don’t have a high-school degree.” These workers, many of them African Americans or naturalized citizens, have seen their wages drop by 4 to 5 percent because of competition from migrants. Nazario also pointed to the costs that migration inflicts on immigrants themselves. Children who have been left behind have food to eat and the opportunity to stay in school, but their sense of abandonment can lead to resentment against their mothers. “Even a dog doesn’t leave its litter,” she recalled one son telling his migrant mother.

Because of who is hurt by migration, Nazario argued, the United States should try to reduce the flow. But what has been tried so far hasn’t worked. Border enforcement has made crossing the border increasingly expensive and dangerous, effectively sealing migrants inside the United States. Temporary guest workers have historically been very reluctant to go home. And the last time the United States offered pathways to citizenship, with the Reagan-era Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, newly legalized immigrants sent for their friends and families, leading to a new wave of illegal immigration. Nazario suggested that a better strategy would be to “tackle the exodus at its source.”

Four countries send 74 percent of all migrants, she noted. Foreign and trade policies “that promote democracy and job creation in the home countries” would be a more effective way to stem the tide of migrants than building bigger fences. And, if Mexican and Central American women can find jobs at home, they won’t have to face the wrenching choice between living with their children and feeding them.

Sonia Nazario is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and the author of *Enrique’s Journey*. She is a former reporter for The Los Angeles Times and The Wall Street Journal and earned her Master’s degree in Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley. She spoke for CLAS on August 29, 2013.

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Rare Earths: Lessons for Latin America

by Julie Klinger

From the freshly paved highway, Bayan Obo looks like much of the Mongolian Steppe: gently rolling grasslands, rocky soils, mountains in the distance. There are occasional herds of horses, sheep, or goats and the adobe homes of their keepers. Some small mining operations are visible from the road. Mounds of coal, shale, and gravel line two-lane tracks in the dirt, awaiting pick up. Giant wind turbines spin slowly, outlined against the dusty, gray horizon.

The source of the dust becomes clear the moment the bus tops the last, small hill, just south of town. A wide valley of scrub grass gives way to orderly clusters of freshly painted apartment blocs centered against the rise of a massive series of open-pit mines that stretch east to west for several kilometers. These mines are the source of more than half the world’s supply of rare earth elements, which are essential to the technological infrastructure of modern life.

The term “rare earths” refers to 17 chemically similar elements possessing exceptional magnetic and conductive properties. Adding them to iron or nickel creates the durable alloys used in oil pipelines, nuclear reactors, and jet engines. Rare earths are necessary to produce the powerful magnets used in maglev trains, drones, computer hard drives, and wind turbines. They act as amplifiers in the fiber-optic cables essential to global internet communications and are used in the imaging technologies of satellites, MRI machines, and televisions. Smart phones, hybrid vehicles, and flat-screen monitors all require some rare earth elements. The list goes on.

Bayan Obo looks quite different from most frontier mining towns in the Americas. Although it is a small, remote place, it is hardly the ramshackle desert outpost some have fancifully described. Banners and sculptures along the main roads welcome people to the “Hometown of Rare Earths,” where well-kept avenues are illuminated entirely by renewable energy sources. The local, state-owned mining company is responsible for providing housing, hospitals, schools, and recreational facilities for its employees and their families; other local firms
and government offices follow suit to attract officials and skilled labor. But despite these tidy appearances, the heavy metals, fluorine, and arsenic accumulated in the town’s soil and water from decades of mining have slowly poisoned nearby residents and their livestock. Some true locals are tragically recognizable by their blistered skin and discolored teeth, indicating severe chronic exposure to arsenic leaching out of the mine.

China’s recent steps to curb environmental destruction and slow resource depletion by enforcing production quotas were met with alarm from the rest of the world. The United States, the European Union, and Japan brought two unsuccessful World Trade Organization (WTO) suits against China in an effort to force the government to relax its quotas. In both cases, the WTO ruled in favor of China, citing that under Article XX of the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade, member states are permitted to limit natural resource exploitation for reasons of environmental protection or critical resource scarcity. But in November 2013, after 18 months of deliberation, a WTO special panel ruled in favor of the United States, the EU, and Japan on the basis that China failed to demonstrate that the export quotas were necessary to alleviate critical environmental harm or resource shortages.

Viewed from Bayan Obo, China’s environmental case for scaling back production actually seems understated. One local scientist commented that those hoping for a WTO victory against China are missing the fact that sustaining the global supply of these resources is less important to China and neighboring countries than stemming the tide of toxic and radioactive waste contaminating extensive reaches of Inner Mongolia, including the Yellow River watershed upon which nearly 200 million people rely for drinking water, irrigation, fishing, and industry. A week after the WTO ruling, China’s Ministry of Commerce released rare earth production quotas for 2014, which indicates that Beijing will most likely appeal the decision.

Because rare earths are so thoroughly embedded in modern life, it is likely that mining will continue to expand outside China regardless of the final outcome of the WTO suit. There is too much at stake in terms of national security and economic stability to rely overwhelmingly on one producer, especially when there are, according to the United States Geological Survey, nearly 800 potentially minable sites across the globe. Their strategic and economic value has prompted several national governments in the Americas to promote rare earth mining on their soils, China currently dominates the world’s production of rare earth oxides.

(Chart courtesy of Julie Klinger).
including in some remote reaches of the Western United States and the Brazilian Amazon.

But it is not enough to locate new mining sites in remote or sparsely populated areas. Such places are seldom as sparsely populated as government reports claim: officially, there have been no farmers or herders in Bayan Obo for decades. The story is that they have all been resettled or found other employment opportunities elsewhere. At first glance, this seems true. The only rural houses visible in the vicinity of the rare earth mine are abandoned. Only after traveling several kilometers away did I encounter an elderly herder, in a village built around a small, protected spring. He explained that Bayan Obo used to belong to Mongolian nomads, and the site of the famous mine was once a sacred mountain in local religious lore. Even as the mine expanded, nobody wanted to leave, but “first the animals got sick, then the infants, and then everybody else.” Ultimately, they had no choice.

Yet some herds can still be seen among the wind turbines, and hoof prints mark the silty, sparkling mud around the tailings ponds. Although grazing is technically illegal in Bayan Obo, it is clear that some households have no choice but to continue the practice. The local government has tried to compromise with a few remaining families along the highway by implementing a local eco-tourism initiative. Herders received some subsidies to build concrete huts around their dwellings, sculpted and painted to look like yurts, the iconic round tent of Mongolian nomads, which they advertise as an “Authentic Mongolian Eco-Tourism Resort.” A visit to a few of the proprietors revealed that there isn’t enough tourist traffic for them to break even on their investment, much less make a profit. So, they returned to grazing animals, even though they are aware of the pollution and view sickness as an inevitability. They prefer the risk to the life of a day laborer working on the margins of a far-off, big city.

The common ailments, in local parlance, are “Long Tooth Disease” and “Snake Disease,” otherwise known as fluorosis and chronic arsenic toxicity. Livestock suffering from fluorosis grow long, brittle teeth that hinder their grazing to the point that they eventually starve to death. Its counterpart in humans is debilitating skeletal fluorosis, which deforms the joints, long bones, and spinal column and causes muscle shrinkage, which eventually tears the ligaments. Snake Disease refers to the discolored scaling that occurs on the hands, feet, faces, and genitals of people with severe arsenic poisoning.

The toxicity of the land and its epidemiological consequences have been closely monitored by local environmental and public health bureaus for decades, but exact data on the history and extent of the diseases are considered too sensitive for public disclosure. There have been plenty of studies analyzing the heavy metal content of the soils in the grasslands surrounding the mine, but most are only available in Chinese print journals. Although many of the academic studies have escaped censorship, there is some hesitation to translate them into other languages because of nationalist sensitivities: any negative news reported internationally is viewed as “criticism of China,” even though full disclosure of the health and environmental cost is the first step toward constructive international dialogue on the problem. This secrecy — and what might be called misplaced nationalist pride — has some unintended and unfortunate consequences.

The first consequence is that there is little understanding internationally of the true human cost of rare earth mining, which precludes a discussion on how
Livestock tracks crisscross a tailings pond.

(Photograph by Julie Klinger.)
to avert similar catastrophes elsewhere. The second is that the outside world has often mistaken the paucity of English translations as mere secrecy, and mistaken secrecy for a lack of environmental monitoring, regulation, and remediation in the area. This speaks to the third and most significant consequence, which is that the hundreds of millions of renminbi committed by the central government to local environmental remediation programs, the long-established teams of dedicated specialists working on public health and environmental problems associated with mining-related pollution, and most importantly, the outcomes of their efforts are simply not known because they are generally not publicized beyond specialized, Chinese-speaking audiences.

Secrecy around acute environmental toxicity is hardly limited to China: governments and industries across the global rare earth frontier make various attempts to hide or to minimize the complex problems generated by rare earth mining and processing. While local experts in polluted regions around the world are coping with common problems, they appear to be toiling in isolation. The risk is that solutions discovered in one place may never be shared with the outside world. Amidst the divisive politics of the latest WTO case, rare earth mining-ready countries in the Americas may be missing a crucial opportunity to learn from China’s long experience observing, documenting, and attempting to manage this dangerous yet necessary enterprise.

Because of their relative abundance and strategic value, sourcing rare earths closer to home simply makes good political and economic sense. But the poisoned soils and radioactive water in rare-earth-producing regions old and new serve as constant reminders of the perils involved. A truly strategic rare earth policy in the Americas begins with an ongoing commitment to monitor, report, and remediate the intractable environmental and human costs associated with rare earth mining and processing while pursuing international cooperation to find better practices. Minimizing the costs of rare earths mining will not be easy. But if mining-ready regions in the Americas fail to enlist the expertise and accumulated knowledge of China’s local specialists, we risk recreating Bayan Obo’s tragedies in our own backyards.

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An “authentic Mongolian eco-tourism resort” built in an attempt to provide traditional herders with an alternate source of income.
The city of Potosí, Bolivia, seems to exist against the odds. Perched at a nose-bleeding altitude of 13,000 feet, sun scorched by day and teeth-numbingly cold by night, Potosí leaves normally intrepid visitors literally breathless. It is hard to believe that in the 17th century this tawny, dusty city of 170,000 people was more populous than either London or Paris. The reason for Potosí’s early urbanization is visible from any major street in the city: a perfectly cone-shaped yellow mountain that looms up in the south. During the colonial era, the Cerro Rico — which literally translates as “Rich Mountain” — was home to the most important active silver mines in the world.

A common lament among Bolivians is that enough silver was extracted from the Cerro Rico to build a bridge between South America and Spain. Regardless of the actual quantity extracted, however, the mountain’s historical relevance is indisputable: it provided the necessary economic lubrication for the industrial revolution in Europe, while also forever changing patterns of land use and social organization in the Bolivian altiplano (highlands).

The Cerro Rico is still riddled with active mineshafts, though they are no longer operating at the same scale or under the same ownership structures that they once were. Instead, the Cerro Rico’s mines are now almost entirely operated by mining cooperatives, which are essentially groups of independent miners who extract small quantities of minerals from otherwise abandoned mineshafts. Although cooperative mining exists in a handful of countries around the world, Bolivia is unique in the degree to which the mining sector is dominated by cooperatives, both in terms of total workforce and political clout. According to 2012 data prepared by the Bolivian Ministry of Mining and Metallurgy, there are currently about 60,000 Underground Cooperatives

by Andrea Marston

BOLIVIA

A miner heads below ground at the beginning of a day’s work. (Photo by Andrea Marston)
incorporated cooperativistas (cooperative members), which is five times the number of miners employed in the public and private sectors combined. These cooperatives are militantly organized, and they are very willing to take to the streets with dynamite when threatened by anti-cooperative policies. My research focuses on the role of these mining cooperatives at the nexus of contemporary and historical interactions between the Bolivian state, international capital flows, and land in the altiplano.

Mining cooperatives first emerged on the Bolivian highlands in the 1930s, when international mineral markets collapsed along with the rest of the global economy. At that time, many unemployed miners organized themselves into groups to exploit the private mines that had been shut down due to diminishing profits. Since then, each economic crisis has resulted in an increased number of cooperativistas. Historically, these cooperative members functioned as a reserve labor force for the corporate (public or private) mining sector: each time the mineral market began to boom again, there were willing laborers close at hand. With changing technology, however, private and state mining companies no longer need this labor reserve. Today, the only way for non-skilled miners to profit from rising commodity prices is by joining cooperatives.

Increasing numbers of rural residents are choosing to do just that, in part because the flexibility of cooperative membership means that agriculturalists can become miners — or agro-mineros — without abandoning their land. This relationship has been encouraged both by a series of laws passed in the last decade and by the state’s general willingness to not tax the cooperatives and to turn a blind eye to their questionable labor and environmental practices. Indeed, the cooperatives have been highly successful in blocking proposals that would require them to pay taxes, in thwarting attempts to nationalize mineral extraction, and in acquiring concessions from the state mining corporation, despite the fact that cooperative mining contributes less than 2 percent of Bolivia’s GDP. Even more importantly, they are actively involved in shaping national policies, notwithstanding the apparent contradictions between their interests and current President Evo Morales’s promise to protect Pachamama (Mother Earth) from encroaching capitalist resource extraction. In this context, my research questions are: How have the mining cooperatives come to exercise such influence in Bolivian politics, and how is their influence maintained in the contemporary era?

In order to answer these questions, it is first essential to understand how cooperatives function on a daily basis.

The city of Potosi and the Cerro Rico.

Although my research will eventually focus on mining cooperatives in other parts of the Bolivian altiplano, understanding the politics and working environs of the Cerro Rico, birthplace of the earliest mining cooperatives, remains vital to understanding cooperatives as a whole. Most of the earliest cooperatives in the Cerro Rico are still operational, though numerous others have joined them over the decades.

The day I set out to climb the mountain for the first time, I made a few stops in the city market to buy two bags of coca leaves — one to chew myself, as a remedy
against altitude sickness, and one to share with miners, who chew coca to minimize the effects of hunger, thirst, and exhaustion. I then took a bus to the edge of the city and started up one of the many footpaths that zigzag up and across the mountainside. Near the entrance of each major mine is a small collection of houses for families whose job it is to guard the mine against unauthorized miners. I hadn’t climbed very far — though the altitude had already made me breathless — when a group of children from one of these mining outposts ran towards me asking if I wanted a tour of the mine. Many cooperative members make extra money by offering guided tours to foreign tourists, who will pay for the pleasure of crawling through narrow tunnels whose interior temperature reaches 100°F and exclaiming over the extent to which working conditions have remained unchanged since the 16th century. These exclamations are well warranted: the cooperative members’ tools are hand operated, their protective gear is minimal, and their daily risk is high.

I explained to the kids that I had already been on a mine tour and that I just wanted to see the bocamina, or...
Mine entrance. They brought me to the bocamina and introduced me to the Enzo, the guard. Enzo’s wire frame glasses lent him an unexpectedly academic look that contrasted with his coveralls and rubber boots. As I sat and chatted with him, a steady stream of miners passed by on their way to work, each one stopping to share some coca leaves and ask what a gringa was doing hanging out around a mine.

These miners were all part of the same cooperative, but they do not work cooperatively per se. Although structures and practices vary wildly, internal social differentiation is common: the cooperative’s mining concession area is divided among the socios, or official cooperative members, each of whom might hire a group of workers, or peones, to mine the region to which he has rights (it is almost always a “he,” except in cases where a widow inherits her husband’s cooperative membership). Peones do not receive the benefits of cooperative membership, which include some life insurance and the ability to participate in decision-making processes, and they are often paid only a very small percentage of the value of the minerals that they extract. Most of the workers with whom I spoke were men in their early 20s who were working as peones. Armed with bags of coca leaves, bottles of 98-percent alcohol, and several sticks of dynamite, they take tremendous risks on a daily basis to scrape together a living.

The mineshafts in which these cooperatives work officially belong to the Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Comibol), the state-owned mining company that was created as one of the primary outcomes of Bolivia’s 1952 national revolution. At the time of its inception, Comibol owned and operated nearly all the mines in Bolivia, but at present, it exists largely as an administrative entity with only a handful of fully public mines. Economic challenges at various points throughout its history forced Comibol to seek international financial support and to trim its workforce. Cooperatives became a strategic means for the company to downsize without sparking insurmountable unrest.

Archival documents show that by the late 1950s, USAID was recommending that the Bolivian state encourage the proliferation of mining cooperatives in order to relieve widespread discontent among laid-off workers. A similar but more dramatic event occurred in the mid-1980s, when falling international mineral prices, pressure from international institutions, and general economic disarray prompted the state to privatize virtually all of Comibol’s mining concessions and lay off some 20,000 miners. Many of these miners joined or formed cooperatives, which were now concentrated not only in Potosí, but also in the northern part of the department of La Paz and around the city of Oruro (the heart of Bolivian tin mining and the country’s most important economic center from the early 20th century through the 1980s). The vast majority of these cooperatives rent their concessions areas from Comibol, though some also have direct concessions from the Bolivian state.

Over the past decade, Bolivia has witnessed yet another, much less well-documented, spike in the number of cooperativistas. Responding in part to rising commodity prices, many rural residents with no previous mining experience or affiliation have started joining cooperatives. The incentives for such action spring not just from international market prices, however. Since coming to power in 2005, current President Evo Morales and his party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), have passed a significant number of political reforms that benefit the cooperatives. In the new constitution, which was approved in 2009, cooperatives are recognized as equal players in the mining sector alongside private companies and Comibol. The first Morales-appointed minister of mining and metallurgy was an ex-cooperativista who blocked several attempts to nationalize privately owned mines because nationalization would have threatened cooperative access. Bolivia is also currently in the process of rewriting its mining code, which was originally passed in 1997, during the presidency of the notorious mining magnate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and the cooperatives have been actively involved in reviewing and amending drafts of the proposed law. The most recent draft indicates ever more favorable political conditions for cooperatives: reduced royalties, indefinite contracts with Comibol, and potentially easier means for cooperatives to form direct alliances with private companies.

Given this favorable political climate, a cooperativista with a lucky corner of the mine has the opportunity to generate a surprisingly good income, and increasing numbers of campesinos and indigenous communities are willing to risk poor health and water pollution in the hopes of benefiting from the boom. Mining cooperatives are poised to play a progressively more dominant role in Bolivian economic and territorial dynamics, a situation that implies serious contradictions within the “new left” politics that Morales and the MAS purport to defend.

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Two miners push a cart full of minerals along the tracks. (Photo by Andrea Marston.)
In Pursuit of Choice

by Erica Hellerstein

When Cata Flores found out she was pregnant, she was alone, broke, and living in a small town outside of Santiago, Chile. She didn’t know what to do, but she did know one thing: she couldn’t bring a child into the world without any resources or support.

She wanted to get an abortion, but that’s complicated in Chile, where terminating a pregnancy is illegal under any and all circumstances, including rape and to save a woman’s life. She couldn’t afford to fly out of the country to get an abortion, but she also didn’t have enough money to get the procedure from a safe, but illegal, local provider. Down on her luck and scrambling for options, Cata did what many poor women in her situation do: she found someone cheap.

“I was very irresponsible,” she said. “I went to a woman who gave me an unsafe abortion. I don’t know what she did, but in the end, she didn’t abort it.”

Three months later, the contractions began. Cata made her way to a public hospital in Santiago and gave birth to a premature baby. He was frail and slight, with a delicate chest that lurched whenever he gulped for air. For two months, Cata paced up and down the hospital’s bleak halls, watching her baby struggle to breathe through jagged gasps. And then one day, after months of fighting, he died.

“I aborted like a poor woman,” she said, reflecting on the experience years later. “And lived through what a poor woman lives through… This is my trauma.”

I first heard Cata’s story on a warm evening after dinner, in a dusty rural town near Santiago. I was in Chile researching an article about abortion, and I wanted to interview Cata about her job as a volunteer activist at a controversial pro-choice organization. I expected her
to talk about her hands-on work with women; I wasn’t expecting her to tell her own abortion story.

Listening to Cata, an idea that had been taking shape in my mind solidified. Many of the people I interviewed told me that Chile’s abortion laws mainly impact poor women who can’t afford safe alternatives. I wanted to find out if this was true.

At the time, Cata was working as a volunteer at the Línea Aborto Información Segura (Safe Abortion Information Hotline), run by Lesbianas y Feministas por el Derecho a la Información (Lesbians and Feminists for the Right to Information). The organization provides medical information about misoprostol, an ulcer medication that induces miscarriages and is clandestinely sold on the Chilean black market.

The hotline’s work fascinated me. They seemed to be operating in a tenuous, legally gray limbo: technically, their work is lawful, but only if they strictly adhere to a set of guidelines that prevents them from asking callers questions or addressing them in the first person. The only reason they’re able to provide any information at all is because similar guidelines are available online from a variety of organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO).

But more than information about misoprostol, I wanted to know statistics: How many women abort annually? And how dangerous are these procedures?

I quickly found out that my questions were a little too ambitious. The government doesn’t compile any official numbers on abortion. One of the only comprehensive, data-driven studies about abortion in Chile that has come out in the past 20 years is a 1994 study by the Guttmacher Institute, a reproductive health nonprofit. The report estimated that the country’s annual number of clandestine abortions hovered around 160,000. Other approximations range from 60,000 to 200,000 per year, in a country with a population of 17 million.

“The experience of having to obtain an illegal abortion can be traumatic,” hotline volunteer Emily Anne said. “Some of the women who call us will be really upset. They’ll be crying, or they’ll be really scared to talk to us... You don’t want to talk to them in the third person because it sounds cold... I try to express sympathy through my tone of voice.”
In Pursuit of Choice

It’s somewhat baffling to think that, 70 years ago, Chile’s abortion laws were more liberal than they are now. Between 1931 and 1989, therapeutic abortion — terminating a pregnancy to save a woman’s life — was legal. But that changed in 1989, when General Augusto Pinochet criminalized all forms of abortion shortly before the end of his 17-year rule. According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, Chile is one of 29 countries in the world that ban abortion without any explicit exceptions. In Latin America and the Caribbean, it is one of only five countries where abortion is absolutely prohibited, even when the procedure could save a woman’s life. The others are the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

Contraceptive methods including condoms, birth control pills, and Plan B are available to women, but they’re expensive. In 2002, the Chilean legislature passed a bill that allowed pharmacies to distribute Plan B, but many refused to comply for religious reasons.

And then came misoprostol. The pill was originally created to be an ulcer medication, but now it’s used in countries worldwide to provide women with non-surgical, first-trimester abortions. According to the International Consortium for Medical Abortion, more than 26 million women around the world safely aborted with misoprostol in 2005. Misoprostol is sold on the black market in Chile, but it’s technically legal. Pharmacies choose not to sell it, some speculate for religious reasons.

This makes it impossible for women to buy the drug over the counter. Instead, it’s sold clandestinely and is easy, but not cheap, to obtain. A full dosage of 12 pills costs about $250. In 2011, the average monthly salary in Chile was $800, according to a survey by the National Institute of Statistics.

As I continued my research in Chile, a few themes consistently came up. Almost everyone I interviewed said that the country’s strict abortion laws are a direct result of its Catholicism and political conservatism.

“It’s a profoundly conservative country,” Cata said. “Much more than Argentina, much more than Uruguay... The participation of the church in the conservative movement has always been important in Chile.”

Other people talked about Chile’s culturally pervasive chauvinism, or as the Chileans call it: machismo. Alejandro Guajardo Arriagada, the Executive Director of the Chilean reproductive health organization Aprofa, laughed when I asked him about machismo.

“Where on earth do I begin?” he chortled, explaining that in Chile, it’s common for men to be served dinner first, often before the women
who labored over the meal. What’s more, most men aren’t even aware of these unequal power structures, he said. They simply think that’s the way things are.

This cultural attitude impacts women of all socioeconomic standings, explained Eduardo Ramirez,* a doctor and illegal abortion provider. “This doesn’t just affect poor women,” he said, from his spacious apartment in downtown Santiago. “It affects everyone.”

Dr. Ramirez serves about one patient a week. He doesn’t provide surgical abortions. Instead, he meets with women seeking to abort with misoprostol, buys them the pills out of pocket, and checks up on them every couple hours. He offers in-home visits after they take the medication and support in case any medical complications arise. He provides free services, so the women he sees come from all socioeconomic classes. But more often than not, the women who come to him completely alone aren’t poor.

“They come from wealthy, conservative communities,” he said. “They’re usually very Catholic. They don’t feel they can tell anyone in their lives about what’s going on. So, they do it all alone. That process can be profoundly psychologically damaging.”

The more people I talked to, the more I was convinced that Dr. Ramirez was right. The process of seeking out an illegal, highly taboo procedure carries an intense amount of mental strain, regardless of a women’s socioeconomic standing. It’s hard to split hairs over trauma.

“Women are smart,” he said. “They’re the reason I have faith. They are always adapting, always looking for better options. Misoprostol has made abortion safer, and now, that’s what most women do. They’re not dying like they used to. We’ll see what they come up with next.”

*Dr. Eduardo Ramirez’s name has been changed to protect his identity.

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Members of the organization Lesbians and Feminists for the Right to Information, which provides information about misoprostol.
Robert Reich’s play, “Milton and Augusto,” opens with a terse exchange between American economist Milton Friedman and his Chilean-born assistant Carla.

Friedman anxiously peers at his watch and rifles through a report. He has flown all the way to Chile to discuss economics with Augusto Pinochet, but at the moment, the general is nowhere to be found.

“Where is he?” Friedman barks at Carla. “I thought generals ran on time.” She smiles meekly. “In Chile, no one expects anything to start on time.”

The play, performed to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Chilean coup, dramatizes a historic meeting between Milton Friedman and the dictator Augusto Pinochet. Friedman, a University of Chicago economist and Nobel laureate, was a fundamental player in the formation of “the Chicago Boys,” a group of young Chilean economists who touted free-market ideals and tried to adapt them to Chile’s economy.

In 1975, less than two years after the U.S.-supported coup that overthrew the democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, Pinochet invited Friedman to Chile to discuss the free market and the application of his economic theories. Reich’s play envisions that meeting by merging the facts with humor and emotional tension.

The Berkeley reading of the play begins with harrowing footage from the morning of September 11, 1973. Military jets swirl above the presidential palace, pummeling it with missiles. Plumes of smoke billow into the air, and bombs echo overhead. At 2:15 p.m., President Allende perishes in the presidential building; at 9:00 p.m., Pinochet addresses the public. “The junta will maintain judicial power and the consultantship of the Public Accounts Control,” he said. “The Chambers will remain in recess until further order.”

Eighteen months later, Friedman convenes with Pinochet at his office in Santiago.
“I had no you idea you were so small,” Pinochet says to Friedman when he finally arrives at the meeting. Flustered and crunched for time, Friedman advises Pinochet to implement the Chicago Boys’ economic ideas in a more timely fashion, urging him to privatize the Chilean economy as much as possible.

“The first thing you must do is put all your industry back into private hands,” he says. “Private property is essential to an economy. Otherwise, people have no incentive to invest… Remember, no one ever washed a rental car.”

But almost as soon as the two convene, they realize they have drastically different expectations for the meeting’s terms. Pinochet, presented as a buffoonish jokester who’s more interested in drinking than thinking, tries his best to steer the conversation away from the economy. He yawns theatrically, snores in mock boredom when Friedman discusses Chile’s place on the economic world stage, and — perhaps true to the character of a narcissistic ruler — tries to manipulate the meeting into a conversation about himself. His use of force with the Chilean people is justified, he tells Friedman, and what’s more, completely overblown by the American media.

“Your advice is valuable, professor,” he says, “but I need your help educating the world about what we have already accomplished... [the press] says I’ve been brutal; I’ve used torture; they accused me of atrocities. The real atrocities were on the other side. They brought on the war. We restored liberty.”

Pinochet continues, insinuating that the real thing he needs from Friedman isn’t economic advice but rather an endorsement of his regime.

Meanwhile, Reich uses the two other characters in the play — Pinochet’s aid Roberto, who was once a student of Friedman’s at the Chicago School of Economics, and Carla, Friedman’s current student — to drive another plotline, which explores the emotional impacts of Chile’s regime change.

Where Pinochet and Friedman embody government, power, and money, Carla and Roberto represent the Chilean people. Though their stilted dialogue and timid body language suggest that they used to have a personal relationship, they now have distinctly different opinions about the government’s legitimacy and its violent response to political opponents. Roberto, working as Pinochet’s aide, appears to support the coup and his boss’s political
tactics. Carla, on the other hand, seems to be struggling internally with something. Though she was born in Chile, we find out that she hasn’t been back for many years, and she is clearly uncomfortable upon her return. Through her eyes, we see a country that’s barely recognizable, a shadow of the place she once knew. She cries when Roberto shows her the room where Salvador Allende committed suicide after Pinochet’s military forces surrounded the presidential palace in 1973, and she keeps her distance from Pinochet during their meeting.

Later, we learn the source of Carla’s discomfort: her father was tortured and murdered by Pinochet’s forces. When Carla asks what happened to her father, the general methodically outlines the events that transpired. “First, we had to break your father’s legs. First one, and then the other. And still he would not cooperate. So, we had to break his jaw,” says the general. “You are a monster!” Carla declares.

These and other details begin to exacerbate Friedman’s concerns about being associated with an over-the-top powermonger. Pinochet makes his case for political violence, while Friedman makes a strong argument for capitalism and the free market. Both men are pragmatic and firm in their beliefs, but neither have much interest in what the other is saying. Pinochet registers Friedman’s reluctance and tries to manipulate him regardless, pitting the economist’s theories against the real world of power politics. In the end, Friedman is forced to make an important decision about his endorsement of Pinochet, leaving the audience to wonder what really happened behind closed doors in 1975.

“Milton and Augusto” was directed by Joy Carlin and featured Julián López-Morillas as Augusto Pinochet, Anthony Nemirovsky as Milton Friedman, Carla Pantoja as Carla, and Armando McClain as Roberto. The playwright, Robert Reich, is Chancellor’s Professor of Public Policy at UC Berkeley. The play was performed for CLAS on September 16, 2013.

Erica Hellerstein is a student in the Graduate School of Journalism at UC Berkeley.
There was one that was alive: wet, black fur dripping over his tiny body like ripples of water over bone. But he was alive, the puppy’s black eyes shone, and I looked at him and scooped him up out of the puddle with my two hands. His look was a shout; if he could have spoken, his words would have to be written in gigantic, capital letters, and — as if he had supernatural powers, as if he could give more weight to his request with evidence — the tiny, black-boned skeletons of his brothers appeared, sort of floating between the gutter and the air, forever still, in a dark, amphibious sadness.

The one I was holding might live if I took him home, dried him, gave him food and shelter. I didn’t get to make the decision: I woke up and was in Berkeley; it was the morning after my arrival to this place full of silence and trees and the scent of lavender, pine, juniper, and a wealth of other wonders that, as a woman from a megalopolis, my sense of smell could yet not identify.

I use the verb “llegar” (to arrive) to talk about my time here, but I use it with all its semantic strength in Spanish, which indicates that I moved from somewhere else and that I had some difficulty in doing so. It’s so far. The hours passed, and the airplane went on and on, flying at the same height, and I started to feel a childish anxiety for the journey to end. In fact, the kids who were on the plane were crying their eyes out. I managed to restrain myself. Sure, I’d had a couple of beers, and the kids hadn’t. “Llegar” also hints at another distance, from a childhood without a library to devoting oneself to writing.

But back to waking up in this peaceful city, so full of light. I think that’s what my first dream in California...
was about, the dream of the live puppy and the dead ones, something like the lean and fat cows of Pharaoh’s dream in the Bible. Only the cows provoke less pity, because they don’t live in our homes. I also don’t want to dwell on the distinguishing characteristics of my country. I’m not going to start this visit contradicting Borges and his essay “El escritor argentino y la tradición.” If there aren’t any camels in the Koran, that’s just fine, maestro, there won’t be any more cows in this talk either; I don’t want anyone to question my nationality.

Just five days ago, that luminous morning after the verb “to arrive” and the smell of Berkeley were both immediately linked with the puppy on the edge of life and death from my dream. I realized, while sipping my tea with milk and looking at a sequoia or some other similarly marvelous tree, that each of our desires has some hint of a puppy on the brink of survival. In my case and that of all my colleagues — because, paradoxically, writing is simultaneously the most solitary and most convivial work in the world — these desires are books; they are the act of writing. In my case, I arrived here thanks to three of those creatures that I was able to give warmth and time: *La Virgen Cabeza*, *Le viste la cara a Dios*, and *Beya*.

Whenever any one of us stops to contemplate this first image, this idea being born, whenever we decide to give shelter to this seed of a book or, if you are not a writer, but rather, for example, an engineer, this seed of a bridge, whenever we shirk our obligations — in general, in my country, writers (and, in this regard, we are very different from engineers) do not make a living from literature because our market is so small that it should have a more modest name (fair, perhaps, or shop) — whenever we decide to steal hours at night or in the morning, whenever we decide to flee the realm of necessity and claim a corner of freedom for ourselves in order to give time and warmth to that seed, we are saving a puppy, that part of ourselves that needs to be, that must be developed to make us whole people, happy human beings and not the resentful wretches we’d be if we didn’t have the courage to get up and give time to the fragile puppy that is every book when it is just being born as a project. We would be horrible creatures. That’s why I write: because my life would be hell if I didn’t. I would merely be a slave, forever crying. I think I would become as amphibious and mournful as the sad little black skeletons of my dream.

For this reason — to be able to give refuge to our own most heartfelt desires, to be able to write, in the case of writers, and here I am talking about those who
makes easier the always complex and often abrasive exercise of being. Many readers — I, personally, am convinced that all readers, but that would be a topic for another conversation — become authors. And in this, too, we are not alone, even the solitary writer in the most remote village. We write following tradition or against it, with our contemporaries or against them. A writer may or may not be aware of having so much company, but it’s unavoidable.

Anyway, in the case of writers — and I suppose for nearly everyone, but I don’t know — saving the puppy, giving it the warmth, the shelter, the time it needs to survive and thrive, gives us — first of all — books, of course, and through them we arrive in places that we thought beyond our reach. But there is something else that is, in my experience, even more fundamental: that warm and peaceful refuge that a text needs to develop constitutes a haven for oneself, where some storms are weathered and some old wounds healed, or at least new ones are avoided, which is something.

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The campanile and “The Last Dryad” wood nymph statue on the UC Berkeley campus.
A migrant looks forward.
(Photo by Mitchel C. Alcántara.)