BERKELEY REVIEW OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES

Fall 2018

Comment

The year 2019 begins as a time of political transformation and turmoil in Latin America, with climate change an increasingly destructive and irreversible threat for the entire planet.

We open this issue of the Review with an article about Sergio Fajardo and his recent presidential race in Colombia. Fajardo is among the most visionary political leaders in Latin America. What is unique about him — as this article shows — is the way in which he has translated his vision into schools, community centers, botanical gardens, and innovative transportation systems, among much more. In addition, he has sought to create a new kind of politics based on extensive citizen participation and the notion that the means determine the ends.

We then turn to Brazil with two articles that look at the profound electoral transformation that has taken place, which Professor Peter Evans refers to as “the most significant political shift” in that country since its return to democracy in the 1980s. Elizabeth McKenna, writing from Brazil, ... of former president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, the frontrunner. She views the future of the republic as at stake.

Our center section features searing photographs of Nicaragua, taken four decades apart by Susan Meiselas. Her images of the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1978–1979 provide a striking contrast to photos of the protests taken in mid-2018. “Susan Meiselas wants to tell the truth about Nicaragua,” Aryeh Neier writes. “As her recent photographs indicate, the truth lies in a story that has not ended.” Lesdi Goussen, a first-generation Nicaraguan American student at Berkeley, comments, “the government has come down hard on those who speak out.” Her statement resonates in the photo of riot police confronting noted journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro and his wife Desirée Elizondo after occupying and shutting down their news outlets Esta Semana and Confidencial on December 15, 2018.

The final four articles all relate to climate change, which California Governor Jerry Brown referred to as “the new abnormal.” Professors Lillian Hoddeson and Peter Garrett write on their book, The Man Who Saw Tomorrow: The Life and Inventions of Stanford R. Ovshinsky (MIT Press, 2018). Smithsonian magazine called Ovshinsky “one of the greatest thinkers and inventors you’ve never heard of.” He was a brilliant scientist who flagged the dangers of climate change early and sought to address it in far-reaching ways.

— Harley Shaiken

From left: Professor Harley Shaiken, President Ricardo Lagos, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Director Michael Witherell, and Professor Beatriz Manz in January 2018.
Teaching a New Kind of Politics

By Natalia Garbíras-Díaz

In Colombia’s 2018 presidential elections, a 62-year-old math professor transformed the race. He was in the running to become the country’s first new head of state since the 2016 peace accord that sought to end more than half a century of traumatic civil conflict. It seemed a logical next step. After all, Sergio Fajardo had already served his country as the mayor of Medellín, the third-most populous city in Colombia after Bogotá and Cali, and as the governor of Antioquia, the second-richest department in the country in terms of its GDP.

Just two months after the elections, Fajardo spoke for the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at UC Berkeley. His informal look — jeans, rolled-up sleeves, and no tie, not even for presidential debates — as well as his personable campaigning style and his unusual trajectory, made it clear that he’s not your traditional politician.
Before diving into local politics, Fajardo had received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from the University of Wisconsin and enjoyed a career as a math professor, teaching at the Universidad de Los Andes and the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Bogotá. His years as an academic left their mark, evident today in the way he approaches politics. Fajardo claims that his greatest pride is to be a teacher.

**Transforming Medellín and Antioquia**

Widespread corruption, violence, and drug trafficking had stigmatized Medellín for decades by the end of the 1990s, when Fajardo first became involved in politics. By then, he and a group of friends had realized that the most important decisions in Colombia — decisions that would eventually lead to structural changes — were made by politicians. So, they decided to start a civic political movement called Compromiso Ciudadano (Citizens’ Commitment). They originally founded Compromiso Ciudadano on the basis of 10 political principles that Fajardo called the “axioms.” According to Fajardo, these axioms — now numbering 18 — are the compass that has helped Compromiso Ciudadano navigate 19 years of doing politics differently.

Compromiso Ciudadano decided to participate in Medellín’s mayoral elections under a campaign promise to defeat traditional structures that operate through networks of clientelism and corruption. Fajardo first ran in the 1999 mayoral elections as a full outsider — he had no previous experience in politics, and he wasn’t running with a traditional party — so his loss wasn’t a complete surprise. However, the second time Fajardo threw his hat in the ring for mayor of Medellín in 2003, he emerged victorious. Fajardo was the first independent candidate to win office, and he received the highest vote share of any mayoral candidate in the history of the office in Medellín. (Mayors only began to be popularly elected in 1988; before then, they were appointed by the national government.)

Under Fajardo, Medellín experienced an extraordinary transformation, which today is recognized around the globe. The city’s homicide rate plummeted from 400 per 100,000 people in 1991 — a figure that earned Medellín the infamous record of being the most violent city in the world — to 31.5 by the end of his term in office in 2007. How did this social transformation come about? According to Fajardo, the “engine of social transformation” is education, understood in a broad sense. Specifically, education empowers young people, who may be at the verge of passing over the threshold to a life of crime and violence, enabling them to make a radical pivot and develop a life free of crime. Education became his flagship program, linking all the initiatives of his administration under the umbrella slogan: “Medellín: la más educada” (Medellín, the most educated).

As governor of Antioquia (2012-2016), Fajardo continued to articulate his policies around education. Among the most impressive projects of the Fajardo administration were the parques educativos, massive architectural marvels constructed in the most remote and marginalized areas of Antioquia, where the state had been barely present before. These cultural centers emphasized innovation, experimentation, and knowledge. They provided the residents of neighboring communities with comprehensive libraries, free access to the Internet, technological tools, recreational areas, and other resources. Governor Fajardo also created several signature programs — such as Jóvenes con Futuro (Youth With a Future) and Entornos Protectores (Protective Environments) — that provided vulnerable young people with vocational training, along with sports and cultural activities, as an alternative to crime.

Fajardo’s commitment to education has been a leitmotif of his political career, including the 2018 presidential election. As he often stated in his campaign speeches, the main characters of Colombia’s history have always been drug lords, corrupt politicians, the guerrilla, and the paramilitary. By making education the main focus of policymaking, Fajardo envisions a new chapter of Colombia’s history, which he called a “chapter of opportunities,” where the lead roles are replaced with teachers, who Fajardo recognized as the most important social leaders of their communities.

**Running for President**

Turning his attention to the 2018 presidential election, Fajardo highlighted the complexity of the context in which his campaign took place. He spent almost two years traveling throughout the country, finding a society he described as fragmented, unequal, afraid, and very indignant. To fully understand his diagnosis requires a brief account of Colombia’s recent history.

Colombia’s civil conflict was one of the longest in the Western Hemisphere. From 1964 until 2016, what began as a leftist Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), fought the Colombian government in the context of a power-sharing agreement between the two most traditional parties in the country (the Liberal and the Conservative parties), which effectively limited participation in politics by minority parties and other groups. After more than 50 years of civil war — and more than 6 million estimated victims — Colombians reported extremely low levels of trust in the FARC. According to data from the 2012 and 2014 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) surveys, less than 2 percent of Colombians declared their trust in the FARC. On the other hand, the 2016 LAPOP survey reported that only 25.5 percent of Colombians trusted the country’s president.

While there were earlier attempts at peace negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s, it wasn’t until 2012 that President Juan Manuel Santos announced a new round of peace negotiations with the FARC in Havana, Cuba. For four years, these talks dragged on, while most Colombians remained in the dark about what was actually being discussed on the island. Nonetheless, President Santos eventually kept his promise to allow the people of Colombia to have the last word on the final document signed by the representatives of FARC and the government. On October 2, 2016, a plebiscite was held with the majority of voters rejecting the final peace accord, an outcome that came as a surprise to many Colombians.

In the end, however, Congress stepped in to approve an amended agreement that incorporated some of the comments and modifications demanded by the opposition. At this point, Colombian politics was at a crossroads, with...
Teaching a New Kind of Politics

Sergio Fajardo on the campaign trail in Medellín in 1999.

Sergio Fajardo has served Colombia as the mayor of Medellín (2004-2007) and the governor of Antioquia (2012-2016). A presidential candidate in his country’s 2018 elections, Fajardo holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics from the University of Wisconsin. He spoke for CLAS on October 2, 2018.

Natalia Garbiras-Díaz is a Ph.D. candidate in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley.

The country polarized between those supporting the peace agreement and those against it (this latter coalition was led largely by former President Alvaro Uribe Vélez). According to Fajardo, Colombians missed a unique opportunity to unite the country around the positive — in fact, essential — national project of peace.

This climate of polarization carried over to the 2018 presidential elections. Colombians were fragmented as a society and also distrustful of the country’s political class following one of the biggest corruption scandals in the recent history of Latin America. The Odebrecht scandal involved bribes received by high-profile politicians (both in Colombia and other countries in the region) from the eponymous Brazilian construction firm in exchange for obtaining construction procurement contracts.

In this context of dramatic polarization and general indignation, Fajardo ran for the presidency under the slogan of “La fuerza de la esperanza” (The Strength of Hope), which symbolized his efforts to reconcile the country and unite it around a new joint project: education.

In the end, Fajardo narrowly missed making the second round, which was disputed between Gustavo Petro, former mayor of Bogotá, and Iván Duque, a young conservative who ran (and won) with the support of Uribe.

Educating a Nation

Since the beginning, Fajardo and Compromiso Ciudadano have made a tremendous effort to renew the way politics has traditionally been done in Colombia. In keeping with this goal, Fajardo’s campaigns have always been in the streets, walking around every inch of territory, talking to people, listening to their concerns, and carefully studying the root causes of the major problems identified through this process.

Reflecting back on the lessons learned after 19 years in politics, Fajardo observed in his speech for CLAS that it is precisely this new way of doing politics that builds trust among citizens. This relationship of trust, he assured us, is the most important political capital that he and Compromiso Ciudadano have been able to accrue. Trust connects candidates with citizens in an inherently different way from traditional politicians, who tend to create support on the basis of clientelistic (quid pro quo) linkages. But trust cannot be bought, it must be built, as Fajardo and Compromiso Ciudadano have consistently been doing for nearly two decades.

According to Fajardo, doing politics differently also requires being more aware of the means employed to mobilize voters and address the problems. “The means we use are as important as the ends we pursue,” he emphasized. Fajardo shared his firm belief that how candidates mobilize voters and build support to get into power determine the constraints they will face once in office, explaining that electoral campaigns are the initial entry point for corruption. During his 2018 presidential campaign, Fajardo stressed that the key to being able to govern with “no strings attached” — and therefore being able to fight corruption — is not paying a single peso or offering any contracts in exchange for votes.

Colombia has several major problems to address, Fajardo observed. These problems include tremendous inequalities, pervasive corruption, and entrenched violence. But the nation as a whole must recognize the abilities of every individual in society and ensure that all citizens are able to have a say in how resources are being spent. Politics should emphasize transparency and pedagogy, he concluded, it should empower citizens and their communities and connect different sectors around a common project, which for Fajardo will always be education.

Sergio Fajardo has served Colombia as the mayor of Medellín (2004-2007) and the governor of Antioquia (2012-2016). A presidential candidate in his country’s 2018 elections, Fajardo holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics from the University of Wisconsin. He spoke for CLAS on October 2, 2018.

Natalia Garbiras-Díaz is a Ph.D. candidate in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley.

The country polarized between those supporting the peace agreement and those against it (this latter coalition was led largely by former President Alvaro Uribe Vélez). According to Fajardo, Colombians missed a unique opportunity to unite the country around the positive — in fact, essential — national project of peace.

This climate of polarization carried over to the 2018 presidential elections. Colombians were fragmented as a society and also distrustful of the country’s political class following one of the biggest corruption scandals in the recent history of Latin America. The Odebrecht scandal involved bribes received by high-profile politicians (both in Colombia and other countries in the region) from the eponymous Brazilian construction firm in exchange for obtaining construction procurement contracts.

In this context of dramatic polarization and general indignation, Fajardo ran for the presidency under the slogan of “La fuerza de la esperanza” (The Strength of Hope), which symbolized his efforts to reconcile the country and unite it around a new joint project: education.

His campaign was based on three main issues: education, reconciliation, and the fight against corruption. And just like his very first campaign, when he ran for mayor of Medellín in 1999, Fajardo traveled throughout Colombia, canvassing neighborhoods and handing out leaflets in the streets. He also held what were called conversaciones ciudadanas (citizen conversations) to learn about Colombians’ most pressing concerns. In the midst of one the most polarized elections in recent history, Fajardo maintained a serene campaign style, always advocating for education as the engine of social transformation and reminding citizens that “the means justify the ends.”

In the end, Fajardo narrowly missed making the second round, which was disputed between Gustavo Petro, former mayor of Bogotá, and Iván Duque, a young conservative who ran (and won) with the support of Uribe. Yet, Fajardo made a very good showing: he won 4.6 million votes (approximately 24 percent), only about 200,000 votes less than Petro (a difference of less than 1.5 percentage points). These figures mean that millions of Colombians believe in a new vision of doing politics outside traditional structures and are committed to a unifying project that not only promises structural change but has been tested in the past with positive results. In fact, a number of polls indicated that Fajardo could have won the final contest had he made it into the second round.

Educating a Nation

Since the beginning, Fajardo and Compromiso Ciudadano have made a tremendous effort to renew the way politics has traditionally been done in Colombia. In keeping with this goal, Fajardo’s campaigns have always been in the streets, walking around every inch of territory, talking to people, listening to their concerns, and carefully studying the root causes of the major problems identified through this process.

Reflecting back on the lessons learned after 19 years in politics, Fajardo observed in his speech for CLAS that it is precisely this new way of doing politics that builds trust among citizens. This relationship of trust, he assured us, is the most important political capital that he and Compromiso Ciudadano have been able to accrue. Trust connects candidates with citizens in an inherently different way from traditional politicians, who tend to create support on the basis of clientelistic (quid pro quo) linkages. But trust cannot be bought, it must be built, as Fajardo and Compromiso Ciudadano have consistently been doing for nearly two decades.

According to Fajardo, doing politics differently also requires being more aware of the means employed to mobilize voters and address the problems. “The means we use are as important as the ends we pursue,” he emphasized. Fajardo shared his firm belief that how candidates mobilize voters and build support to get into power determine the constraints they will face once in office, explaining that electoral campaigns are the initial entry point for corruption. During his 2018 presidential campaign, Fajardo stressed that the key to being able to govern with “no strings attached” — and therefore being able to fight corruption — is not paying a single peso or offering any contracts in exchange for votes.

Colombia has several major problems to address, Fajardo observed. These problems include tremendous inequalities, pervasive corruption, and entrenched violence. But the nation as a whole must recognize the abilities of every individual in society and ensure that all citizens are able to have a say in how resources are being spent. Politics should emphasize transparency and pedagogy, he concluded, it should empower citizens and their communities and connect different sectors around a common project, which for Fajardo will always be education.

Sergio Fajardo has served Colombia as the mayor of Medellín (2004-2007) and the governor of Antioquia (2012-2016). A presidential candidate in his country’s 2018 elections, Fajardo holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics from the University of Wisconsin. He spoke for CLAS on October 2, 2018.

Natalia Garbiras-Díaz is a Ph.D. candidate in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley.
An Unfolding Tragedy

By Peter Evans

The full-blown political tragedy of Brazil’s 2018 presidential elections was only lurking as a frightening possibility when Dilma Rousseff (President of Brazil, 2011-2016) gave her speech at UC Berkeley in April 2018. Nonetheless, her address provided a cogent summary of the perverse dynamics that led to the outcome of the October 2018 elections. President Rousseff offered us an analysis of the startling series of transitions that have transformed Brazil in four short years since her election, drawing on her experience as a central actor in the drama, her expertise as a political economist, and her political commitment to building a more politically and economically equitable Brazil.

Brazil’s cascade of transitions started with the shift from the unusual social and economic successes of the early years of the 21st century, led by elected administrations of the Workers’ Party (hereafter “PT,” the acronym for Partido dos Trabalhadores), to the regressive regime of Michel Temer, installed in August 2016 through what is best described as a “legislative coup.” The next transition in January 2019, to a regime dominated by Jair Bolsonaro and his allies, will reinforce and extend the regressive policies of the Temer administration, adding a new level of vicious authoritarian repression. The contrasts between these three regimes are not difficult to set out. The challenge is to offer a plausible account of the dynamics that enabled the transition from the first to the second and from the second to the third.

The temptation is to focus all our attention on the most recent transition — after all, it represents the most significant political shift in Brazil since the redemocratization of the 1980s — but understanding this triumph of reaction requires setting it in a larger context. President Rousseff’s address offered an excellent start, highlighting the character of the first of these regimes, which she helped construct.

Though Rousseff is an economist with a sophisticated understanding of how the Brazilian economy operates, her presentation at UC Berkeley defined the successes of PT administrations in a simple and straightforward way: improved lives for ordinary Brazilians. The concrete policy manifestations were “expanding the population’s...
access to services, such as education, health, and other services that the Brazilian population never had, from electricity to running water, but above all, education.” Perhaps even more important was change in the vision that poor people had of their future: “We gave people hope that their children would have a better life than they did.” For Rousseff, “knowing that people believed that they would have a better life” was her “greatest pride as president of Brazil.”

The expansion of social security programs, such as the BPC (Benefício de Prestação Continuada), and of rural and special pension regimes were part of the general expansion of the social safety net. Perhaps most well known is the Bolsa Família program of conditional cash transfers. Bolsa Família reached tens of millions of very poor Brazilians. Even more important in terms of the magnitude of resources shifted to the poor was the reshaping of the labor market.

Under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) — popularly known as “Lula” and “Dilma” — nearly four terms of PT administrations helped workers escape precarious work by “re-formalizing” the labor market. According to Berg (2010:7) the first decade of the 21st century saw “formal job growth outpacing informal job growth by a three-to-one ratio.” If we take the decade between 2003 and 2013 as the period of reference, the share of “informal” workers in private sector jobs shrunk by almost 40 percent. The proportion of workers who are registered under the labor laws, and therefore have the formal rights that accrue under those laws, went up from slightly more than one-half of the labor force to 64 percent over the course of that decade. Perhaps the most important policy of all was increasing the real minimum wage.

The impact of statutory increases in the minimum wage went well beyond changes in the incomes of workers whose wages were directly affected. The level of the minimum wage is used as a reference point for workers who are still employed “informally” (i.e., outside the framework of labor legislation), generating an unofficial buoyant effect on their livelihoods. Perhaps even more important, Brazil’s 1988 Constitution tied a variety of non-wage incomes to the minimum wage, including pensions. Thus, the minimum wage serves as a kind of general “social wage,” with a broad impact on society as a whole. According to one estimate, 64 percent of the reduction in inequality in Brazil from 1995 to 2005 can be attributed to the increase in the minimum wage.

Strengthening the “social safety net,” combined with improvements in the labor market, changed overall levels of economic well-being. Despite relatively modest overall economic growth, median household income rose by 30 percent between 2003 and 2013, indicating a more inclusive pattern of growth. The share of wages in the national income, which had declined during the liberalization of the 1990s, rose back to the level of the mid-1990s. Inequality, as measured by the Gini index, dropped from 0.55 to 0.50 between 2001 and 2012 (Brazilian Ministry of Planning, 2014:11), and the rate of income growth in the bottom quintile was three times income growth in the top quintile (Brazilian Ministry of Planning, 2014:16).

Even the World Bank concurred that the first three PT administrations constituted “golden years” from the point of view of ordinary Brazilians, summarizing the gains as follows:

“Brazil’s economic and social progress between 2003 and 2014 lifted 29 million people out of poverty and inequality dropped significantly (the Gini coefficient fell by 6.6 percentage points in the same period, from 58.1 down to 51.5). The income level of the poorest 40 percent of the population rose, on average, 7.1 percent (in real terms) between 2003 and 2014, compared to a 4.4 percent income growth for the population as a whole.”

If we “fast forward” four years from President Rousseff’s re-election in 2014 to 2018 when the Temer regime had largely completed its objectives, the direction of change has been reversed. The new regime’s insistence on reducing social expenditures by diverting government revenues to insure financial capital returns had changed the landscape of social protection. Fleury and Pinho (2018:30) summarize the welfare consequences of current government policy by saying, “Brazil has been undergoing an unprecedented process of destruction of its (incipient) welfare state.” Simultaneously, the new government has enacted what may be the most substantial regressive change in labor legislation in 75 years, forcing Brazil’s workers back into precarious work (Oliveira, 2018:334).

The abrupt and thorough nature of this transition is perplexing. The most powerful and parsimonious explanation sounds too simple: capitalist elites (dominated principally by finance capital) were unwilling to allow their interests to be prejudiced by democratic institutions, so they used their power to remake those institutions in a way that would produce results more consistent with their interests.

Their allies in the major “centrist” political parties had amassed sufficient institutional and political power...
An Unfolding Tragedy

to successfully carry out what amounted to a double coup — first impeaching Dilma and then eliminating Lula’s political rights. This is not to argue that they were able to achieve exactly the political results that they would have preferred, but they were unquestionably successful in shifting the rules of the game to their advantage. After four successive presidential elections won on platforms in which social protection and redistribution were key planks, they can enjoy the prospect of a political future in which they will not have to worry about these issues being taken seriously.

This is, admittedly, a harsh characterization of Brazilian elites and of Brazilian capitalism as a system. It suggests that the aegis of capitalism doom the possibility of implementing redistributive agendas in the 21st century, at least in the Global South and perhaps in a broader set of countries not usually considered part of the Global South. Hopefully, this analysis is too harsh, but it is still a useful springboard for thinking about what has happened in Brazil.

In order to understand the transition from Rousseff to Temer, the political analysis of the PT must be broadened. It must be recognized that the PT regimes were less robust and effective than they seemed, both in their ability to deliver the economic and social benefits necessary to cement the loyalty of their natural constituents and in terms of their ability to build the organizational and mobilizational infrastructure necessary to defend their agenda from elite attacks.

Once the transition from the PT administrations to Temer was accomplished, the seeds of the transition from Temer to Bolsonaro had been sowed, but key additional components were added. The Temer regime was a full success in delivering capital’s economic and social agenda but a dismal failure in creating political credibility. Lack of popular legitimacy made impossible the election of the next president from among the leadership of the main centrist parties — the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB, Brazilian Social Democracy Party) and the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) — cutting off the most obvious path to continuation of the new regime.

To make matters worse for those with aspirations to continue the Temer regime’s agenda, the persistence of Lula’s political charisma meant that he continued to be a viable presidential candidate. He had to be eliminated from the electoral arena in order to ensure that austerity would continue unimpeded. Accomplishing this required a complex juridical dance in which the first move was the elevation of “anti-corruption” to the paramount position on the national political agenda to the exclusion of substantive policy agendas like equity and redistribution. The second move was leveraging this trope by engaging in “lawfare” to legally wipe Lula off the electoral map.

Even once the sequence is identified, fundamental political questions remain. First of all, why was it so easy to unseat what seemed to be, in Dilma’s first term, a “hegemonic” political project (Braga, 2012)? Viewed in comparative perspective, the PT was among the most effective progressive parties in the Global South. In the context of a national political economy thoroughly dominated by finance capital, the party’s success was historic. Nonetheless, the PT’s 21st-century story makes it clear that, within the limits imposed by contemporary capitalism, even the most progressive and effective government can deliver only a limited set of improvements in people’s lives. Most jobs remained precarious, and the state’s capacity to deliver essential public services was still a project under construction. Decades of progress at a rate similar to that achieved from 2003 to 2014 would have been required to fully transform the lives of ordinary Brazilians and to fully gain their loyalty.

Could the PT have pushed the redistributive side of its economic program further or faster? Given the limits imposed by the overall conjuncture of Brazilian political institutions, the answer is “probably not.” Winning the presidency, even four times in a row, was not enough. The PT’s persistent inability to garner a majority in Congress left it constrained and vulnerable. Forced to rely on undependable and opportunistic parliamentary allies — principally the representatives affiliated with the PMDB — the PT had very limited political space.

Policies challenging the massive rates of returns that finance was able to appropriate at the expense of the productive side of the Brazilian economy were at the boundaries of what the PT could attempt. Dilma made more serious efforts than Lula in this direction, but her efforts came at a time when the favorable global economic conditions that had allowed the Brazilian economy to grow in the early years of the 21st century had begun to recede.

Could the PT have pushed the redistributive side of its economic program further or faster? Given the limits imposed by the overall conjuncture of Brazilian political institutions, the answer is “probably not.” Winning the presidency, even four times in a row, was not enough. The PT’s persistent inability to garner a majority in Congress left it constrained and vulnerable. Forced to rely on undependable and opportunistic parliamentary allies — principally the representatives affiliated with the PMDB — the PT had very limited political space.

Policies challenging the massive rates of returns that finance was able to appropriate at the expense of the productive side of the Brazilian economy were at the boundaries of what the PT could attempt. Dilma made more serious efforts than Lula in this direction, but her efforts came at a time when the favorable global economic conditions that had allowed the Brazilian economy to grow in the early years of the 21st century had begun to recede.
The Life and Death of the New Republic?

By Elizabeth McKenna

Brazil is not for beginners, the saying goes. This much-repeated turn of phrase implies that a certain insider status is needed to understand the contradictions for which Brazil is famous: the communist party governor who praises capitalism; the women’s party made up of men; inequality levels that increase and decrease simultaneously, depending on how you measure them. After the dramatic arrest of Brazil’s larger-than-life former president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva on April 7, 2018, journalist Antônia Prata wrote: “The reality is that since the mass protests in 2013, Brazil is not even for the initiated. It will take years — perhaps many — to understand the meaning of what is going on.”

Two weeks after Lula’s arrest, Brazil’s first female, twice-elected Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, henceforth PT) President Dilma Rousseff went on a speaking tour in the United States. In a lecture organized by UC Berkeley’s Center for Latin American Studies and co-sponsored by the Departments of Political Science and Sociology, Rousseff — also an economist, former Minister of Mines and Energy, and a political prisoner for three years during the country’s 21-year military dictatorship — made plain the political motivations behind her impeachment (and Lula’s arrest). “Even the cobblestones in the streets of Brasilia and the ostriches that live on the grounds of the Palácio da Alvorada [the official residence of the president of Brazil] knew that this was just subterfuge,” she joked. At the same time, Rousseff admitted last April, Brazil is in the midst of a “dark time — nobody knows exactly what is happening. There is a high probability of an impasse, [or] an attempt to turn the [upcoming presidential] election into an open farce.”

The central motif of Rousseff’s talk was the series of coups, or golpes, that she and her supporters argue were set in motion shortly after her narrow re-election in 2014. The coup is a familiar repertoire in Brazil. The country’s history is littered with examples, from an imperial coup to a “preventative” coup, from a military coup to what many describe as the “parliamentary” coup that led to Rousseff’s ouster in 2016. Different from the more brazen ruptures of the past, which she likened to chopping down a tree with a machete, today’s coups are more like arboreal parasites, corroding the system quietly from the inside. “When an elected president is overthrown without having committed high crimes, … anything is possible,” she said.

Plutocratic Populism Comes to Brazil

The Brazil that was revealed at the ballot box exactly six months after Lula’s arrest confirmed that anything was, in fact, possible. It is difficult to overstate the extent to which the far right emerged victorious. They did so not by way of a coup d’état, but rather through procedural democracy. In the first round of the election on October 7, 2018, nearly 50 million Brazilians — one in three eligible voters — cast their ballot for Jair Messias Bolsonaro, a military captain turned seven-term congressman who made a career of maligning minorities and degrading democracy. Although Bolsonaro’s support spans classes, race, gender, and geography, it has always been most pronounced among the country’s most affluent populations. If the electorate were restricted to only Brazil’s wealthy, white, and college educated, Bolsonaro would have won in the first round of voting by a landslide. As shown in the figure below, the same is true for other key demographic groups. Evangelicals (one of the most important political forces in the country), men, and voters who live in the comparatively wealthy south and southeastern regions of the country overwhelmingly supported Bolsonaro.

At the same time, it would be inaccurate to suggest that Bolsonaro’s support is only the product of the reactionary tendencies of Brazil’s elite. As is also clear in the figure below, young adults, those with only a high school degree, and voters in both the cities and the countryside all favored Bolsonaro. A 2017 study conducted by the Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (Brazilian Forum on Public Safety) and Instituto Datafolha reported that, on a scale of 0 to 10, Brazilians average 8.1 in their predilection for authoritarian behavior. Meanwhile, in this barely 30-year-old republic — famous for its progressive social movements, for hosting the first World Social Forum, and for inventing participatory budgeting — support for democracy has plummeted. In 2016, the year of Rousseff’s impeachment, Latinobarómetro reported that only 32 percent of Brazilians agreed with the statement: “Democracy has its problems but is preferable to all other forms of government” — down from 54 percent and...
The results of the 2018 congressional election imply that shutting down one or both houses of Parliament may not even be necessary. The best estimates suggest that elected officials will systematically oppose Bolsonaro will only occupy 135 of the 513 total congressional seats in the lower house. "This is not a [right-wing] wave, it is a tsunami," said political analyst José Roberto de Toledo, pointing to the overwhelming number of votes won by Bolsonaro and the hundreds of far-right politicians elected on his coattails. "And Jair Bolsonaro surfed it on a piece of Styrofoam," Toledo finished, referring to the candidate’s expert and legally dubious use of social media and the minimal traditional resources that the candidate had at his disposal during the campaign.

What is unique about Bolsonaro’s brand of digital-first fascism is that it is packaged in a worldview that many elites are more comfortable openly supporting: neoliberalism. According to one of his most prominent cabinet appointees, Chicago-trained, Pinochet-friendly economist Paulo Guedes, Bolsonaro’s government will be “the marriage of order and progress,” a reference to the motto inscribed on Brazil’s flag. "Order," in this case, refers to the police state Bolsonaro plans to install, and progress means “the market’s ideas,” Guedes explained. Earlier this year, Bolsonaro wooed Faria Lima, the Brazilian equivalent of Wall Street, with the news that he would appoint Guedes to a “super” ministry position that will “put the country ‘back to what it was 40 or 50 years ago,” the deadliest years of Brazil’s military dictatorship, known as the anos de chumbo, or iron-fist years. The period was also characterized by extreme state interventionism in the economy, anathema to the libertarian project of Guedes and his followers, which suggests that the two ideologies are on a collision course.

All of these developments suggest that the right wing was lurking just around the corner from Latin America’s much-heralded “left turn.” But what Rousseff called Brazil’s “dark time” cannot be simply understood in traditional right-left terms. Rather, bolsonarismo revolves on a democracy-versus-authoritarianism axis at the levels of culture, politics, and economics.
**A Coup in Three Acts**

How did we get here? Latin America has long held the dubious distinction of being one of the most unequal parts of the world. In the first decade of the 2000s, however, a surprising trend took hold. Inequality — as measured by income distribution and the percent of the population in extreme poverty — declined in 16 of 17 countries in the region (O’Sorío, 2015). In Brazil, 40 million people exited extreme poverty, social policies like the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família were deemed so successful that they were exported to other countries, and the Gini coefficient declined by 10 percent in as many years. In an era when global inequality trends marched stubbornly in the opposite direction, the PT’s pro-poor development project was the subject of euphoric praise. In 2014, however, this project came to a crashing halt when Brazil fell into its longest and deepest recession on record. The country’s unemployment nearly doubled between 2014 and 2016.

An uncomfortable truth for both supporters and opponents of the PT is that the country’s recent economic boom and bust — and many of the associated social gains and setbacks — are demonstrably linked to factors largely exogenous to domestic governing choices. With an export portfolio dominated by primary commodities like crude oil and soy (see figure below), large sectors of the Brazilian economy were held hostage by global markets. A decade-long commodity supercycle and increased financial liquidity — linked to plummeting real interest rates following the 2008 financial and Eurozone crises — helped explain recent dramatic swings in the Brazilian economy. Albeit for very different reasons, there is broad consensus among economists across the political spectrum that the PT’s response to the causes of the recession was inadequate (see, for example, Liu, 2017; Castro, 2018; Loureiro and Saad-Filho, 2018).

**Act One: Rousseff’s Impeachment**

It is against this backdrop of socioeconomic turmoil, Rousseff argued in her speech at UC Berkeley, that the events following her reelection in 2014 represented a slow-motion coup in three acts. First, after 18 separate attempts to impeach her on corruption charges for which her opponents could not muster sufficient evidence, Brazil’s most conservative Congress since the dictatorship (until the most recent election) voted to remove her on charges of fiscal mismanagement. Both charges, one related to credit lines from the national development bank and another related to the yearly farm bill, were later shelved by independent investigators from the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which determined that no crime was committed.

---

**Brazilian Exports by Percent of Total Export Value, January - October, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary commodity</th>
<th>Manufactured goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soy</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude oil</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood pulp</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drilling rigs</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron/steel products</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferroalloy</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Journalist Cecília Oliveira cataloged a list of the statements members of Congress made as they cast their floor votes during Rousseff’s impeachment proceedings. “Against the Bolivarian dictatorship!” “For my Aunt Eurides!” “For truckers!” And even, “For you, mommy.” Bolsonaro dedicated his vote to the coronel who oversaw the prisons in which Rousseff was tortured. “For Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra,” he said, “Dilma’s nightmare.”

Months after the vote, Rousseff’s former vice-president and then successor Michel Temer (whom she referred to as “Mr. Illegitimate President” throughout her speech) took a trip to New York to speak to foreign investors. In his remarks to the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, Temer all but admitted that the pedaladas fiscais — the budgetary maneuvers that all of Rousseff’s predecessors and no fewer than 17 (male) governors employed in the same period with impunity — were merely the legal pretext needed to remove her from office. When Brazil fell into recession, Temer proposed an investor-friendly austerity plan that Rousseff had rejected. “Since [my economic] plan wasn’t adopted, a process was established which culminated with me being installed as President of the Republic,” Temer said. The role that certain segments of capital played in Rousseff’s impeachment and Bolsonaro’s rise is consistent with what political economist Thomas Ferguson calls “the investment theory of politics.” Unable to oust the PT at the ballot box, corporate elites and rentier capitalists helped orchestrate Rousseff’s removal by other means.

A focus on the maneuvering of certain capital factions alone, however, misses other longer-term political dynamics that more fully contextualize Bolsonaro’s rise and the PT’s downfall. Rousseff spent considerable time in her political career, has the highest number of elected officials under investigation in the Lava Jato (Car Wash) scandal. Politicians from more than half of the country’s 35 parties are now implicated for graft, bribery, or illicit kickbacks. The Partido Progressista (PP, Progressive Party), the party in which Bolsonaro spent the longest stint of his extensive political career, has the highest number of elected officials under investigation in the Lava Jato (Car Wash) scandal.
CHILE

From Student Movements to Congress

By James Gerardo Lamb

Former student movement leader Giorgio Jackson is 31 years old, and he has already been elected deputy to the Chilean Congress, twice. Speaking at an October 2018 event organized by the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at UC Berkeley, Jackson got straight to the bottom line: "The main thesis is to aggregate the demand for change within the system." As a founder of the Revolución Democrática (RD, Democratic Revolution) party and the Frente Amplio (FA, Broad Front) coalition, Jackson has defined his politics by bringing together diverse forces for change, fueling this effort with a bold progressive vision and a strong pragmatic desire to make things happen.

Chile has seen dramatic political changes in this past decade, as generational turnover and social movements have transformed political institutions, parties, and coalitions. This period of rapid transformation has been particularly surprising given the prior 20 years of stability and continuity under center-left Concertación coalition governments (1990-2010), which followed the military regime led by General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). And Giorgio Jackson has been at the center of the most notable and consequential events and processes in these last years.

Jackson first burst onto the national political scene during massive student-led protests, the so-called "Chilean Winter" that convulsed Chile in 2011. At the prestigious Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (UC), Jackson was a leader in the center-left, reform-oriented student group Nueva Acción Universitaria (NAU), founded by Miguel Crispi, Jackson's long-time political ally and current fellow RD deputy in Congress. In November 2010, Jackson was elected president of the university's student union, the Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica de Chile (FEUC). Jackson's victory was the third consecutive year in which the NAU candidate won the FEUC presidency. The first, unseating Concertación-aligned student groups, had been Crispi.

When the student movement exploded in 2011, Jackson was a key leader in the Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (CONFECH, Confederation of Chilean Students), which congregates university student unions across Chile. CONFECH organized and led iconic protests, among the largest ever seen in Chile, demanding a "free and high-quality public education."

Public opinion strongly backed the student movement. Parents, workers, labor leaders, and environmentalists, among many others, took to the streets with the students, and support collapsed for the first government of conservative President Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014). Public leaders of the movement garnered popular support and legitimacy that challenged and exceeded the traditional parties of the incumbent coalitions, the center-right government, and the center-left opposition, alike. Along with other student leaders who became members of Congress in the next elections — the so-called bancada estudiantil (student block) that included Camila Vallejo, Karol Cariola, Vlado Mirosevic, and Gabriel Boric — Giorgio Jackson transitioned quickly from the social movement to the arena of electoral politics.

In January 2012, Jackson, Crispi, and other NAU leaders and student movement allies founded Revolución Democrática as a political movement that later became a party. Key themes that animated the student group continued to mark this important new political tendency. One focus was participatory democracy and transparency of institutions. While the NAU pushed to democratize the university (and education more generally), the RD aims to democratize Chile's political institutions. Another touchstone for young progressive reformers positioning themselves as challengers to the status quo was autonomy from the long-established center and left parties that re-emerged in opposition to the military regime during the 1980s.

According to Crispi, the RD's founding objective was to "channel the energy of the young people interested in strengthening democracy who took to the streets in 2011." In its Carta de Presentación, a public introduction calling on adherents to join the new movement, the RD stated, "Our generation does not understand democracy only as a moment when every four years we visit the polls to express our preference for one or another candidate pre-designated by a coalition of parties." Since 2012, the party's Declaration of Principles has defined the RD's fundamental bases. The first two principles are "the democratic principle" and "the principle of transparency."

In January 2012, Jackson, Crispi, and other NAU leaders and student movement allies founded Revolución Democrática as a political movement that later became a party. Key themes that animated the student group continued to mark this important new political tendency. One focus was participatory democracy and transparency of institutions. While the NAU pushed to democratize the university (and education more generally), the RD aims to democratize Chile’s political institutions. Another touchstone for young progressive reformers positioning themselves as challengers to the status quo was autonomy from the long-established center and left parties that re-emerged in opposition to the military regime during the 1980s.

According to Crispi, the RD’s founding objective was to “channel the energy of the young people interested in strengthening democracy who took to the streets in 2011.” In its Carta de Presentación, a public introduction calling on adherents to join the new movement, the RD stated, “Our generation does not understand democracy only as a moment when every four years we visit the polls to express our preference for one or another candidate pre-designated by a coalition of parties.” Since 2012, the party’s Declaration of Principles has defined the RD’s fundamental bases. The first two principles are “the democratic principle” and “the principle of transparency.”
Jackson was the movement’s most prominent leader, and in just its first week, thousands of new members joined. The group’s first foray into electoral politics was in 2012. As part of a large coalition, the RD helped to defeat the incumbent conservative mayor of Providencia, a central, economically prosperous district in the capital city, Santiago.

In 2013, Jackson ran for Congress in the national elections. Throughout that election year, the RD had a complicated relationship with the established coalition of center-left and left parties headed by former President Michelle Bachelet, who was running for another term. Rebranded as the Nueva Mayoría (New Majority), the historic Concertación had expanded to the left to include the Communist Party and other groups. Initially, the RD nominated candidates to compete within the Nueva Mayoría primaries for three congressional districts. When no primaries were held, Javiera Parada, an RD member on Bachelet’s presidential campaign team, withdrew, and the RD decided to back only Jackson for Congress. He ran as an independent in a downtown Santiago district.

Under the Chilean law in operation since the transition from military rule, two candidates for Congress were elected per district. One coalition list could only win both seats if its total votes were double that of the next list. Until a reform of the country’s voting system in 2015, this “binomial majoritarian” electoral system forced electoral competition into a two-coalition system, where smaller parties were greatly disadvantaged. Jackson had strong name recognition and support in a student-heavy district, the Nueva Mayoría decided at the last minute not to run a competing candidate, but to back him instead.

On November 17, 2013, Jackson won the first majority in his district with more than 48 percent of the vote. A conservative candidate won the second seat with just 19.5 percent. For the period 2014-2018, Jackson was the only RD member of Congress. However, other progressive candidates the RD had endorsed ran and won seats as deputies, including Vallejo, Cariola, and Boric.

The RD did not officially back any candidate for president in the first round of the 2013 elections, but after an online vote, the movement decided to support Bachelet in the run-off round of the election in December. Bachelet and the Nueva Mayoría won a resounding victory, obtaining super-majorities in Congress as well as the presidency. It was as a part of this progressive wave that Jackson and the other “student block” representatives arrived in Congress.

The new administration had committed to progressive educational reforms inspired by the student movement during the campaign and offered RD leaders high-level appointments in the Ministry of Education after winning the election. For the administration, the young movement offered demonstrated technical proficiency in mobilization and campaigning, strong links with social movement organizations, and a powerful symbolic association with the student struggle. The RD decided on a posture of “critical collaboration” with the Nueva Mayoría government on its program of structural reforms, with education policy a special focus. Miguel Crispi became an advisor to the Minister of Education, and Gonzalo Muñoz was appointed head of the ministry’s General Education Division, among other RD member appointments.

The Bachelet administration began its term with high public support. In the Ministry of Education and with Jackson in Congress, the RD was influential in the drafting of education reform proposals. Although the decision to work in an administration run by the traditional parties was controversial among some within the movement, Jackson was a strong advocate for collaborating with the administration and supporting whatever reforms substantively advanced the movement’s goals.

Another key Bachelet reform that Jackson and the RD strongly backed was a replacement of the binomial majoritarian electoral system with an “inclusive proportional” system to “strengthen the representativeness of the National Congress.” This bill — proposed in April 2014, and signed into law one year later — finally put an end to the standstill on Congress by the two coalitions that emerged from the transition. The new rules took effect for the 2017 elections.

Education reforms, which were more complicated and divided into numerous bills, progressed more slowly. The obstacles stemmed, in part, from conservative sectors of the Nueva Mayoría coalition, particularly Christian Democrats accustomed to more influential roles in education policy and the Ministry of Education during Concertación administrations. They disagreed with many student movement proposals backed by the RD and progressive political forces in the Nueva Mayoría.

Tensions between the government and the social movements were expressed in various ways and included the NAU’s loss of UC student leadership after six years in power, just one year into the Bachelet administration. In February 2015, the Caso Caval, an influence-trafficking case against President Bachelet’s son, became a major public scandal. The administration’s poll numbers began to fall...

Photo by Luis Hidalgo/AP Photo.
Jackson was a main proponent of using the new strategic environment defined by the reformed electoral system to compete with the two incumbent coalitions. This approach meant not only a full slate of congressional candidates, but also an alternative progressive candidate for president.

In January 2017, the Frente Amplio was formally launched, the culmination of a complex process of convergence among 14 political movements and parties. Jackson and Boric remained the most prominent public figures, and their political movements remained the most popular. The FA presented itself as a proponent of pluralism and participatory democracy and an opponent of neoliberalism, emphasizing independence from the business lobby, financially and politically.

Jackson and Boric also played crucial roles in supporting the candidacy of Beatriz Sánchez, an independent radio journalist in her early forties who had not run for public office before. They recruited her to compete first in the FA primary and then in the general election for president. Sánchez announced her candidacy in late March 2017, running on a robust social democratic platform: free universal public education at all levels, universal health care and social security, more progressive taxation of the wealthy, and sector-wide collective bargaining rights. In addition, her campaign emphasized themes of transparency, democratic participation of the citizenry, and women’s rights. On July 6, 2017, Sánchez triumphed in the FA primary with almost 70 percent of the vote.

Jackson and Sánchez, along with the RD and FA overall, scored historic results in the national elections on November 19, 2017.

Jackson won the most votes of any candidate for Congress: more than 100,000. Competing in the newly created, high-profile District 10 in Santiago — transformed by the electoral reform from a district centered on affluent areas that included important institutions of higher learning to a sprawling swath of the capital that is one of the most economically diverse districts in the country — Jackson was one of 46 candidates running for eight seats under the new voting system. His strong performance brought along two additional FA deputies to Congress, each of whom received between 4,000 and 5,000 votes. The RD itself sent 10 members to Congress, nine deputies, and the party’s first senator, Juan Ignacio Latorre.

The FA achieved electoral success beyond many expectations and unprecedented for any political force outside of the two major coalitions since the dictatorship. The Frente Amplio won nearly a million votes and seated 20 deputies out of 155, all newly elected, along with Latorre in the Senate. In an election that saw 10 lists, 51 parties, and 960 candidates competing for the Chamber of Deputies, the restricted electoral competition that had characterized post-transition Chilean democracy was superseded by a Congress significantly more diverse in partisan affiliation and demographics.

In the presidential race, Sánchez far surpassed previous candidates positioned left of the incumbent coalitions. With more than 1.3 million votes and 20 percent in the first round of the election, she nearly beat Senator Alejandro Guiller, the candidate of the traditional center-left coalition, and she almost entered the run-off. This groundbreaking campaign galvanized a new political dynamic: party and coalition dynamism and fragmentation have overtaken stability and stasis. Even the historic Concertación-Nueva Mayoría political alliance — the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC, Christian Democratic Party), on the one hand, and the Socialist Party, the Partido por la Democracia (PPD, Party for Democracy), and the Partido Radical (PR, Radical Party), on the other — broke apart after 28 years, as Christian Democrats withdrew and ran their own candidate.

This trend even spread to the right. The conservative coalition of Chile Vamos (Chile Let’s Go) incorporated more than just the traditional Renovación Nacional (RN, National Renewal) and Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI, Independent Democratic Union), the incumbent center-right parties that have dominated since the Pinochet era. Just as Sánchez and the FA surprised many, so did the results for the new right-wing political party, Evópoli — short for Evolución Política (Political Evolution) — elected two senators and four deputies. The presidential candidacies of Evópoli founder José Antonio Kast gained more than 500,000 votes (7 percent of the total), outpacing PDC candidate Carolina Goic. Kast now presents the first major challenge from the right to the RN and UDI.

Former President Sebastián Piñera made a weaker showing than expected in the first round, less than 37 percent of the vote, followed by Senator Guillier at 23 percent. Within the Frente Amplio, political positioning in the second round emerged as a serious and controversial debate. After convoking a series of internal consultations and votes, the coalition decided on December 1, 2017, to call for supporters to vote in the second round without explicitly
Jackson backed the position that won in the internal RD plebiscite. The resolution expressed the ongoing ambiguity with which this sector views traditional parties, stating, “Although we consider it the responsibility of the Nueva Mayoría to win over those who put their confidence in the project of the Frente Amplio, we call on Alejandro Guillier to take up the demands of the social movements, such as ‘no more APFs’ [a movement against privatized pensions], lowering congressional salaries, among others, to defeat the right.” As the left faced difficulty in uniting, Piñera won the second round on December 17, 2017, with 54.5 percent of the vote, gaining nearly 1.4 million additional votes between the two rounds.

In this new political reality, Jackson, the RD, and the FA have positioned themselves as often-fierce critics of the second Piñera administration. Still, Jackson advocates remaining open to working with the administration on an issue-by-issue basis where possible, arguing the FA should be “a firm opposition, but not obtuse.”

The FA has also maintained a political and institutional distance from the parties of the traditional center-left. Jackson defines the legacy of the second Bachelet administration very positively in terms of representative institutional and electoral reform, but he has offered a more critical evaluation of educational reform, calling it a source of frustration. Jackson has said, “We are far from talking about a programmatic or political alliance with the ex-NM [Nueva Mayoría].”

In the opposition during 2018, the FA has seen processes of internal convergence and reorganization. What was once seven legal political parties and seven movements will be consolidated to seven parties and two movements by 2019. This process of consolidation, in part, represents the better organization and relative empowerment of the left wing of the FA, as it has gradually become a more influential counterweight to the RD’s preeminence.

Jackson has announced that he will retire from Congress after his term ends in 2022, maintaining a long-held commitment to serve no more than two terms, although the move may prove to be more a sabbatical than retirement from politics.

In his talk for CLAS, Jackson addressed the situation faced by progressives in Latin America and beyond in broad and structural terms. “Latin America is...one of the most rich and beautiful lands, but at the same time, one of the most unequal societies,” he reminded us.

During a time of profound change and many powerful contradictions, he urged us “to rethink our ideologies to be as complex as the contradictions that [shape] people’s lives.”

He insisted that if reforms to address the growing inequalities and exploitation of neoliberalism were made incredibly difficult by socioeconomic inequality within the United States because of its effect on the political system, it is that much harder across the political-economic divides that separate rich developed countries and the Global South. “Even intangible assets,” suggested Jackson, “are distributed very unevenly between countries” in the contemporary, globalized era.

One of Jackson’s central intellectual and political themes has been the difficult lessons from the failure of the left’s historic and contemporary political projects. Since his days as a student activist, a critical distance from the traditional left has been a hallmark. “It’s hard to find hope when you read about the failure of the Soviet experience in the past, the autocratic shift to capitalism by China, and the current political, economic, and social crises in many of the progressive governments in Latin America,” Jackson explained. And he asked, “Why should someone trust in the left when corruption, homophobia, patriarchy, extractivism, and dictatorships have been present in both right- and left-wing governments?” This painful historical experience is the basis of the centrality of democracy and democratization in Jackson’s ideas around progressive social transformation. He not only has a deep commitment to democracy, but also a commitment to deepen democracy.

Regardless, the legitimacy of democratic institutions has been declining in many countries around the world, he noted. In Latin America, Jackson said, “many of the democratic institutions are perceived as corrupt and useless by an increasing number of citizens.” A resulting individualism in the search for solutions to social problems combines with democratic delegitimization to form “the breeding ground for a right-wing populism,” as in Brazil and the United States.

Jackson argued that it is critical to neither dismiss, nor “laugh or scream” at this rising right-wing, nationalist populism. Insisting that the power of capitalist hegemony comes from emotion rather than rationality, Jackson pointed to the feelings of fear and insecurity behind the success of anti-immigrant politics. These insecurities, along with justified doubts about the left, need to be addressed to drain support for these movements, he concluded.

Finally, Jackson emphasized the need for solidarity throughout the Global South. On issues as crucial as international economic inequality and climate change, the Global South is most directly affected and must be unified and central to any substantive solutions. The stakes with climate change are existential — the future of the planet is at stake — and “if we don’t have global mechanisms [to address climate change] the result could end in a humanitarian disaster,” he warned. “We need to start thinking about global well-being, not national well-being,” Jackson argued, “and I think the South must lead these discussions because we are facing the worst part of this globalization process.”

Giorgio Jackson is currently serving his second term as a deputy in the Chilean Congress. He spoke at an event organized by CLAS on October 11, 2018.

James Gerardo Lamb is an instructor in the Department of Sociology at UC Berkeley.

Giorgio Jackson with a poster advertising his talk at Berkeley, October 2018.

Sebastian Piñera takes office as President of Chile, January 2018.

ENDORSE GIULIERR, though rejecting Piñera as “a step backwards.”

Jackson backed the position that won in the internal RD plebiscite. The resolution expressed the ongoing ambiguity with which this sector views traditional parties, stating, “Although we consider it the responsibility of the Nueva Mayoría to win over those who put their confidence in the project of the Frente Amplio, we call on Alejandro Guillier to take up the demands of the social movements, such as ‘no more APFs’ [a movement against privatized pensions], lowering congressional salaries, among others, to defeat the right.” As the left faced difficulty in uniting, Piñera won the second round on December 17, 2017, with 54.5 percent of the vote, gaining nearly 1.4 million additional votes between the two rounds.

In this new political reality, Jackson, the RD, and the FA have positioned themselves as often-fierce critics of the second Piñera administration. Still, Jackson advoca-
Argentina’s economy is in trouble. The Argentine peso saw a 90-percent devaluation from April 2018 to September 2018. Inflation rates are projected to be 30 to 40 percent in 2018 and what was seen as a potential growth year is now forecast to see a 1-percent contraction of its GDP. The country’s economy is at its most fragile since the 2001-2002 economic crisis, and many Argentines face the possibility of poverty as the country tries to find a way out of its economic woes.

During her talk to the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) in September 2018, Alison Post, Associate Professor of Political Science and Global Metropolitan Studies at UC Berkeley, discussed how worsening external conditions have complicated efforts by Argentina’s current president, Mauricio Macri, to reverse the troubled fiscal situation he and his Cambiemos coalition inherited when they came to power in late 2015. Argentina’s problems are related to a variety of economic and political factors, but broad-based consumer subsidy programs have played a crucial role in how the crisis has unfolded, argued Post.

President Mauricio Macri and his political allies won the 2015 elections based on a campaign platform stressing the need for economic reform. When Macri assumed office, the inflation rate was about 27 percent, the budget deficit had grown to 71 percent of the GDP, and the government spent the equivalent of approximately 5 percent of the GDP on subsidizing consumer prices for privatized public services such as electricity and natural gas. Rather than implementing sudden and large cuts to government expenditures reminiscent of the structural adjustment programs adopted in preceding decades, President Macri pursued a “gradual” approach to economic reform.

First, his administration removed the limit on the number of pesos an individual could exchange for dollars — known as the cepo al dólar — which had led to the emergence of a black market for U.S. dollars. Removing the “cepo” caused the Argentine peso to depreciate from 10 to 15 pesos to the dollar. Second, Macri reached an agreement with holdout creditors who had not entered the prior agreement, and thus, Argentina regained access to international credit markets. The government subsequently contracted debt, much of which was in new foreign currency, to finance the existing budget deficit. Third, the government created a new inflation measure to return credibility to government statistics, which under the administrations of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015) had come to diverge significantly from private estimates. Fourth, gradual cuts were made to consumer subsidies for privately provided public services, namely electricity, gas, and public transportation. Fifth, taxes on agricultural exports were reduced in order to incentivize production and trade.

In taking this gradual approach to economic reform, Macri and his team ran a major risk: they assumed that the United States and other international entities would avoid quickly increasing interest rates, which would have made it harder for Argentina to continue financing budget deficits. This approach was successful as late as 2017, when the economy showed signs of improvement. Although inflation increased in 2016 — in part due to the subsidy cuts, which forced consumers to pay more — the economy grew 3 percent, and inflation decreased in 2017.

Argentina’s economic situation began to deteriorate towards the end of December 2017, as the United States and the European Union engaged in macroeconomic tightening. Combined with rising oil costs, the U.S.–China trade war, a drought that devastated key agricultural exports, and a major corruption scandal implicating the prior administration, Argentina’s economy took a turn for the worse. The government’s August 2018 announcement that it had requested an advance disbursement of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan rattled markets — investors were reminded of the 2001 crisis.

How has the government responded to the worsening economic situation? To stem capital flight, the country’s central bank, the Banco Central de la República de Argentina, raised its overnight lending rate to 60 percent, the highest in the world. And the government has been negotiating the terms under which the IMF will release a US$57.1 billion loan.
rapidly. In absence of these programs, price increases would trigger increased living costs for many citizens. These initially modest consumer subsidy programs come to form ‘policy traps’ that limit a politician’s ability to alter or remove them.”

Argentina’s current consumer subsidy program dates back to the 2001-2002 financial and political crisis. Following the peso’s devaluation, President Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003) chose to freeze the rates charged by privatized utilities, given the large income shock experienced by the population. Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner maintained utility rate freezes and related subsidy programs to mitigate price fluctuations through their respective administrations from 2003 through 2015, even as the economy recovered. Over time, the fiscal burden of the consumer subsidy program grew dramatically. By 2010, the government devoted about $30 billion pesos or approximately 10 percent of government expenditure to utility subsidies.

Many factors contributed to this decision. The first were price pressures. Inflation and increases in the price of imported inputs — such as natural gas — resulted in increases in the fiscal burden imposed by consumer subsidy programs. For example, shortages in domestically produced gas led the Kirchners to create a new state-owned petroleum and natural gas company, Energía Argentina Sociedad Anónima (ENARSA), which subsidized the difference between international prices and the frozen price of gas on the domestic market. The government-mandated freeze led to increasing costs, especially as domestic supply shortages became more pronounced.

In the case of subsidies for bus tickets, the price pressure came from inflation, which increased labor costs. After receding in 2002, inflation rose to double-digit levels in 2004, and then exceeded 20 percent in 2008 and 2010. Workers demanded wage increases and managed to extract a 90-percent real wage increase between 2003 and 2010. At that point, wages constituted 50 percent of operation costs. Officials chose to subsidize the gap, rather than risk angering the public through price hikes for bus tickets.

Concerned about maintaining their hold on power in the short run, the Kirchners chose not to repeal or reduce subsidies. Consumer prices were held constant at pre-crisis levels, even as inflation and rising input costs increased the fiscal burden of the government’s subsidies to maintain these prices. The Kirchners had many disincentives to repeal, chief among them, subsidy beneficiaries were concentrated in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region, the site of the controlled bus/transit services and major gas networks. Neither Kirchner administration wanted

Public Service Subsidies in Argentina as Percent of GDP (by Sector)


Professor Alison Post and Tomás Bril Mascarenhas, UC Berkeley Ph.D. alumnus and now Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and Government at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín in Argentina, address this issue in a co-authored article entitled “Policy Traps: Consumer Subsidies in Post-Crisis Argentina.” They argue that “developing countries tend to adopt and subsequently increase outlays for broad-based consumer subsidy programs when the price of key inputs — such as imported fuel or domestic labor — rise

Public Service Subsidies in Argentina as Percent of GDP (by Sector)


2015* = CIPPEC estimate.

(from Lucio Castro and Magdalena Barafani. “Buscando la diagonal. Cómo reducir los subsidios protegiendo a los sectores vulnerables.” CIPPEC 2015.)

Implementing cuts to subsidies that reduce consumer prices for services such as gas, electricity, and public transit will be complicated. The devaluation of the Argentine peso and continuing inflation has had an impact on the financial situation of the utilities that are required to sell services at regulated prices. In the case of natural gas, for example, the massive devaluation has created pressures for subsidy growth because much gas is imported, and subsidies cover the difference between international and domestic prices. Neither industrial nor residential consumers are well placed to absorb mounting prices as the economy deteriorates. Macri faces a dilemma: continue cutting subsidies to comply with IMF requirements to reduce the fiscal deficit or tame subsidy reduction and jeopardize the agreement with the IMF.

Consumer Subsidies and the Current Crisis

The above account highlights the central role played by consumer subsidies in Argentina’s current economic situation. Argentina is not unique in devoting a large fraction of the government budget to consumer subsidies, however. Many developing countries devote significant resources to lower consumer prices for basic goods and services like food and electricity. These expenditures often exceed what is spent on basic health and education.

Professor Alison Post and Tomás Bril Mascarenhas, UC Berkeley Ph.D. alumnus and now Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and Government at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín in Argentina, address this issue in a co-authored article entitled “Policy Traps: Consumer Subsidies in Post-Crisis Argentina.” They argue that “developing countries tend to adopt and subsequently increase outlays for broad-based consumer subsidy programs when the price of key inputs — such as imported fuel or domestic labor — rise

Public Service Subsidies in Argentina as Percent of GDP (by Sector)


2015* = CIPPEC estimate.

(from Lucio Castro and Magdalena Barafani. “Buscando la diagonal. Cómo reducir los subsidios protegiendo a los sectores vulnerables.” CIPPEC 2015.)

Implementing cuts to subsidies that reduce consumer prices for services such as gas, electricity, and public transit will be complicated. The devaluation of the Argentine peso and continuing inflation has had an impact on the financial situation of the utilities that are required to sell services at regulated prices. In the case of natural gas, for example, the massive devaluation has created pressures for subsidy growth because much gas is imported, and subsidies cover the difference between international and domestic prices. Neither industrial nor residential consumers are well placed to absorb mounting prices as the economy deteriorates. Macri faces a dilemma: continue cutting subsidies to comply with IMF requirements to reduce the fiscal deficit or tame subsidy reduction and jeopardize the agreement with the IMF.

Consumer Subsidies and the Current Crisis

The above account highlights the central role played by consumer subsidies in Argentina’s current economic situation. Argentina is not unique in devoting a large fraction of the government budget to consumer subsidies, however. Many developing countries devote significant resources to lower consumer prices for basic goods and services like food and electricity. These expenditures often exceed what is spent on basic health and education.

Professor Alison Post and Tomás Bril Mascarenhas, UC Berkeley Ph.D. alumnus and now Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and Government at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín in Argentina, address this issue in a co-authored article entitled “Policy Traps: Consumer Subsidies in Post-Crisis Argentina.” They argue that “developing countries tend to adopt and subsequently increase outlays for broad-based consumer subsidy programs when the price of key inputs — such as imported fuel or domestic labor — rise

Public Service Subsidies in Argentina as Percent of GDP (by Sector)


2015* = CIPPEC estimate.

(from Lucio Castro and Magdalena Barafani. “Buscando la diagonal. Cómo reducir los subsidios protegiendo a los sectores vulnerables.” CIPPEC 2015.)

Implementing cuts to subsidies that reduce consumer prices for services such as gas, electricity, and public transit will be complicated. The devaluation of the Argentine peso and continuing inflation has had an impact on the financial situation of the utilities that are required to sell services at regulated prices. In the case of natural gas, for example, the massive devaluation has created pressures for subsidy growth because much gas is imported, and subsidies cover the difference between international and domestic prices. Neither industrial nor residential consumers are well placed to absorb mounting prices as the economy deteriorates. Macri faces a dilemma: continue cutting subsidies to comply with IMF requirements to reduce the fiscal deficit or tame subsidy reduction and jeopardize the agreement with the IMF.

Consumer Subsidies and the Current Crisis

The above account highlights the central role played by consumer subsidies in Argentina’s current economic situation. Argentina is not unique in devoting a large fraction of the government budget to consumer subsidies, however. Many developing countries devote significant resources to lower consumer prices for basic goods and services like food and electricity. These expenditures often exceed what is spent on basic health and education.

Professor Alison Post and Tomás Bril Mascarenhas, UC Berkeley Ph.D. alumnus and now Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and Government at the Universidad Nacional de San Martín in Argentina, address this issue in a co-authored article entitled “Policy Traps: Consumer Subsidies in Post-Crisis Argentina.” They argue that “developing countries tend to adopt and subsequently increase outlays for broad-based consumer subsidy programs when the price of key inputs — such as imported fuel or domestic labor — rise

Public Service Subsidies in Argentina as Percent of GDP (by Sector)


2015* = CIPPEC estimate.

(from Lucio Castro and Magdalena Barafani. “Buscando la diagonal. Cómo reducir los subsidios protegiendo a los sectores vulnerables.” CIPPEC 2015.)
to run the political risk of turning public opinion against them in such an influential urban center.

In fact, public opinion in 2006 stood firmly behind the rate freezes. Protests in the provincial capitals, where subsidies were scaled back, reminded the Kirchners of the potential for — and visibility of — public protests against price increases. Tentative efforts to curtail gas subsidies in 2008 generated such strong reactions that the Kirchners refrained from any attempt to modify them for three years. By 2010, if subsidies for buses were eliminated, prices would need to rise by 300 percent to cover costs. The gap between “real” and subsidized prices grew over time, as did the political costs of repealing the subsidies. When Macri arrived in 2015, he vowed to eliminate these subsidies, yet three years later, they still remain. Why? Consumer subsidies not only comprise half the deficit but distort incentives for residents to conserve energy. Those living in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region pay 10 times less for electricity than residents of other urban areas in the neighboring countries of Brazil and Uruguay.

Macri took a gradual approach to reducing subsidies, and he and his team encountered more roadblocks than they expected. For example, the current administration started phasing out subsidies to wholesale power distributors in 2016. In June 2016, the government moved on to natural gas, but limited changes to large industries when households and small businesses showed signs of discontent. The nation’s Supreme Court further delayed gas hikes when it ruled that the administration needed to hold public hearings. In January 2017, the government announced new energy guidelines phasing out consumer subsidies for electricity by 2019. Exchange rate pressures and concerns about stoking inflation and voter backlash continue to constrain efforts to wind down this subsidy program.

Environmental factors will make eliminating subsidies difficult as inflation increases, the Argentine economy remains weak, and public resistance grows against the emerging austerity program. IMF pressures to reduce the budget deficit and the severity of the country’s financial situation, however, may force the Macri administration to make at least partial reductions.

The president’s core constituents, in Buenos Aires province and the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region, will shoulder the bulk of price increases. At the same time, these populations may be the most likely to understand why the era of subsidized utility prices is over.

The Future of Argentina’s Economy and of President Macri

Argentina needs to break the vicious cycle characterized by unsustainable budget deficits, decreasing investor confidence, and growing political paralysis. Some analysts have advocated for immediate, full-scale reform including adopting new labor reforms to lower public expenditures; reducing public sector employment; cutting utility subsidies (which would disproportionately affect Buenos Aires province and the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region); incentivizing provinces to rein in expenditures; and making social programs more targeted. Others argue that such a dramatic decrease in government spending could push Argentina’s economy further into recession, as occurred in Greece.

As for President Macri’s future, it’s too soon to tell, as the situation in Argentina changes day to day. Post looks to an analysis by María Victoria Murillo, Professor of Political Science and International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, who suggests that Macri will likely serve out his term but may not win re-election in 2019.

Many factors make it unlikely that Argentina’s president will resign or be removed from office. First, President Macri consolidated his political position in the 2017 midterm elections, whereas previous leaders who faced similar crises, namely Presidents Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) and Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001), fared poorly and lost their popular legitimacy. De la Rúa’s Alianza had also lost its coalition partner by the time the crisis hit. In contrast, the Cambiemos coalition is still intact. Second, the Peronist party remains divided between progressives led by former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and moderates led by Sergio Massa. A more organized popular sector and heightened polarization will make it difficult to reach any agreement.

At the conclusion of Post’s presentation, questions from the audience highlighted the depth and historical roots of this polarization, which originates in the country’s controversial legacy of Peronism. Compromise will be necessary, however, for Argentina to avoid financial ruin. Whatever the case, 2018 may well prove crucial for Argentina and President Macri.
When I first saw Susan Meiselas’s photos of the 1978-1979 Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, I thought they looked different from any other photos I had seen. Viewing them afresh four decades later, they still look different.

There were some differences that were obvious. Almost all the war photography I had seen previously was in black and white. I suppose that war photographers worry that color would either sensationalize or prettify their images of armed conflict, which is always a nasty business. Also, of course, the photos I had seen of major conflicts — such as the two World Wars, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War — were mostly meant for publication in newspapers which then only published in black and white. Though Meiselas’s photos are in color, they are neither gory nor pretty. Her use of color seems natural and integral to her portrayal of the war in Nicaragua as a desperate extension of the struggles of daily life.

Another striking characteristic of Meiselas’s photos for me is that they were taken up close to those engaged in the struggle. Photography in a war zone is an extremely dangerous profession because it is important to the photographers to get close to the action. Meiselas’s photos seem even closer than usual.

More important, though Meiselas’s photos are not accompanied by text, a narrative emerges from the photos themselves. Her photos make it plain that what took place in Nicaragua was not a war in any conventional sense. It was an uprising fought by untrained combatants in the streets and alleys and doorways of Nicaragua’s towns and villages. The fighters did not have uniforms, they were dressed in their everyday clothes. Their weapons did not have a military heft. It is easy to imagine that many of the fighters continued to work part of the time as farm laborers or mechanics to make a living and to support their families. Some of them were probably students or teachers or low-level civil servants. Many of the fighters wore homemade masks to shield their identities and try to protect themselves against reprisals. Even though the photos do not depict cruelties by government forces nor heroic acts by the Sandinista guerrillas, they seem to suggest that this was a revolution that needed to take place.

In 1991, more than a decade after the Sandinista Revolution and shortly after the “contra” war sponsored by the Reagan administration to overturn the results of the revolution, Susan Meiselas returned to Nicaragua and sought out some of the people whose photos she had taken while the revolution was underway. She made these interviews into a film — “Pictures From a Revolution” (1991) — in which her subjects talked about their lives since the revolution. A number of the Nicaraguans she interviewed were disappointed at the way things had turned out. Having gotten to know Meiselas in the years after the revolution, it seems to me natural that she should take this next step. After creating a body of work that had played an important role internationally in building sympathy for the Sandinista Revolution, I believe she was intent on deepening and, to an extent, correcting her own portrayal of the events that had taken place in Nicaragua.

These days, with the Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega back in power in Nicaragua, an uprising is underway against his increasingly despotic and corrupt rule. Some of those opposing Ortega now are individuals who had been allied with him at the time of the Sandinista revolution four decades ago. They had served with him in the government that took power after the revolution. Meiselas has been back in Nicaragua during this period. I have not yet seen many of the photographs she has taken on her recent trips to Nicaragua, but I am eager to. Those published here suggest that the struggle underway now is a continuation of the one that took place four decades ago. The cast of characters in power is different, but ordinary Nicaraguans are still struggling against the abuses that go with the exercise of unchecked power.

Though the quality of Susan Meiselas’s photos of Nicaragua in 1978-1979 produced a substantive body of work — and the book in which they were assembled is a work of art — she has been unwilling to let it stand on its own. Susan Meiselas wants to tell the truth about Nicaragua. As her recent photographs indicate, the truth lies in a story that has not ended.

Aryeh Neier served for 12 years as the Founding Executive Director of Human Rights Watch before becoming president of the Open Society Institute from 1993 to 2012.

The photographs on these center spread pages are by and © Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos, unless otherwise credited.

FIRST

SECOND
Left: Jinotepe, Nicaragua. A funeral procession for assassinated student leaders. Demonstrators carry a photograph of Arlen Siu, an FSLN guerrilla fighter killed in the mountains three years earlier. June 1978.

THIRD
Susan Meiselas's images documenting the overthrow of the Somoza regime in 1978-1979 have become ubiquitous for visualizing the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua. A decade after these photographs were first published and well into the precarious leadership of the Sandinista government, Meiselas returned to the country in 1991 to follow up with the subjects pictured in her work. Crossing temporal coordinates, Meiselas's photographs emerge as diptychs of insurrection, capturing the ways in which people and places transgress and transform over time.

In June 2018, just days before the inauguration of her exhibition, “Mediations,” at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, Susan Meiselas returned to Nicaragua. Her decision was prompted by the swelling protests that had swept across the country in a matter of weeks. With little to no media attention in the United States, these recent photographs tell a vital yet disturbingly familiar narrative. The images and their familiar compositions produce a puzzling sensation of déjà vu. Like a photographic negative, Meiselas's contemporary pictures capture the dark gradient of a failed revolution and a disintegrating social body.

In April 2018, President Daniel Ortega issued a series of social security reforms that included changes like a 5-percent tax on pensions for elderly and disabled citizens. Protestors, primarily college students, took to the streets demanding the overturn of the reforms and calling into question the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan constitution — the student movement began to turn a spotlight on the dictatorial tendencies displayed by the president.

In the early days of the demonstrations, students and civilians were met with lethal force by paramilitary agents. The atrocities of these events quickly inspired a national uprising. As the death toll rose, protests across the country called for justice on behalf of those massacred as well as the resignation of President Ortega. Amid the violence, the Ortega administration agreed to a series of national dialogues, with the Catholic church mediating conversations between government representatives and student leaders. These dialogues proved to be short-lived and ineffective. To make matters worse, they exposed many student activists who have now been forced into exile.

With no protection from national police and paramilitary forces, protestors resorted to familiar tactics of self-defense. Reminiscent of the strategies deployed by Sandinista revolutionaries in the late 1970s, they used homemade mortars, built barricades, and relied on internal networks of communication for protection. The new generation restaged acts of national resistance through a vernacular familiar to the Nicaraguan people.

However, the present-day iteration of history tells a different story. While Sandinistas set images of the dictator Anastasio Somoza on their barricaded walls in 1979, protestors today have adapted the words of the famous revolutionary figure Augusto Sandino, hanging banners that read: “Ortega Vende Patria,” a phrase that implies the president has betrayed his own country. But not only is the current liberation front accusing Ortega of being a traitor, they are comparing him to the very dictator that the Sandinista party fought so hard to overthrow. Through ruptures like these, the broken grammar of Sandinism and what it means to be a Sandinista reveals the instabilities of political affiliation and collective memory.

As the country continues to mourn, the pain of old wounds re-emerge. Protestors in the March of Flowers on June 30, 2018, carried images of student activists and loved ones recently massacred at the hands of the state. They retraced the steps of protestors in 1978 who likewise raised photographs of student leaders killed fighting the Somoza regime, including the student martyr Arlen Siu Bermúdez.

Though Arlen's memory persists, the symbol of revolution that she and her contemporaries represented has been rejected by those on the frontlines today. Folded into the visual language of Sandinismo, murals of Arlen and other revolutionary leaders of that time have been defaced and destroyed. Moving away from the rhetoric of revolutionary national pride, the visual landscape of today's resistance began to take shape. With no time to craft a cohesive visual program, protestors masked their faces and called for help, covering city walls with messages that read "SOS Nicaragua..."

In July 2018, after several months of arduous resistance and grueling hope, Ortega ordered the deployment of "Operation Clean-Up," which authorized the use of lethal force on unarmed civilians. Declaring protests illegal, the government has come down hard on those who speak out. Facing torture, disappearance, exile, and death, Nicaraguan citizens have been forced into silence. Since the beginning of the crisis in April 2018, more than 500 people have been killed, with many unconfirmed deaths and thousands disappeared. According to the UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency, more than 20,000 Nicaraguans have applied for asylum.

Today, Ortega's authoritarian government grasps for control as countries around the world, including the United States, begin to impose sanctions on his regime.

Susan Meiselas is a documentary photographer and a member of the internationally renowned photographic cooperative Magnum Photos. She spoke for CLAS on September 10, 2018.

Lesdi Goussen is a first-generation Nicaraguan-American and a Ph.D. student in the History of Art Department at UC Berkeley.
Teodoro Petkoff (1932 – 2018)


Teodoro Petkoff, one of Venezuela’s most incisive political critics and public intellectuals, died on October 31, 2018, at age 86. His Financial Times obituary called him “the best president Venezuela never had,” reflecting Petkoff’s international stature as well as his three failed bids for the country’s highest office.

Petkoff’s remarkable political trajectory began in the Communist Party, which he joined at age 18 during the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. He fought the Betancourt government as an armed guerrilla in the 1960s and made several escapes from prison. After the Prague Spring in 1968, he left the armed struggle, a departure that led Fidel Castro to call him and fellow former rebels “traitors, temporizers, and cowards.” “With the zeal of a convert,” the Financial Times continued, “Teodoro spent the next 45 years fighting for democracy in Venezuela.” He helped found the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement for Socialism) party in 1971, served several terms in office as a deputy, and became a pragmatic planning minister in the 1990s. Petkoff later raised a significant voice of criticism against Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, founding the newspaper Tal Cual in 2000. As a journalist, he won the prestigious Maria Moors Cabot Prize (2012) and the Ortega y Gasset Award (2015) and published some dozen books.

In 2008, Petkoff gave a talk for CLAS entitled “Venezuela Faces the Future.” He provided an analysis of the current situation in Venezuela, explaining that while Chávez’s oil-fueled social spending had earned a large following among the poor, the long-term sustainability and health of the Venezuelan economy was in jeopardy. Petkoff concluded that “the idea of a democratic strategy […] is the only field in which we can confront Chávez with possibilities of success.”

The following is his response to a question following that talk:

“What is there so much uncritical admiration for Hugo Chávez and his policies in international circles among intellectuals and the left? Many of these people are quick to criticize governments on the right but give Chávez their unconditional support. How do you explain this phenomenon?

Teodoro Petkoff: Mark Lilla, an American, wrote an important book called The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics (New York Review Books, 2001). I recommend it because he examines the fascination of 20th-century intellectuals with strongmen and totalitarianism. Lilla draws on the examples of Martin Heidegger (who was a member of the Nazi party), Carl Schmitt (the theoretician of Nazism), and the politics of the Frenchman Jacques Derrida to examine the attraction of some intellectuals to totalitarianism.

I know my own country’s intellectuals very well. The majority of Venezuelan intellectuals are against Chávez. This is a revolution without intellectuals. Outside Venezuela, there is a different perception. David Viñas is a very well-known Argentine writer. He told me once, “I must support Chávez — he is giving cheap oil to Fidel!” Regardless of what is happening in Venezuela, all Viñas cares about is Chávez giving cheap oil to Cuba.

We saw the same tendency with the Soviet Union and Stalin. Around the world, well-known intellectuals, poets, and writers — Louis Aragon in France; Rafael Alberti in Spain; Pablo Neruda, Gabriel García Márquez, and for some time, Mario Vargas Llosa in Latin America; and many others — supported Soviet communism uncritically. Having only a superficial understanding of the character of totalitarian societies, what they espoused to their audiences was an irresponsible abuse of their role.

How can you explain Jean-Paul Sartre’s Maoist politics? How can a Frenchman, living in France, understand Maoist realities? When an intellectual of the French Communist Party denounced the Soviet gulags, Sartre called it an “imperialist lie.” How do we understand this? The relationship between intellectuals and totalitarianism is not reflexive. At the same time that Sartre was apologizing for the gulag, Albert Camus was identifying the murky history Sartre and some others had with Nazism in France. Camus, however, was consistently anti-totalitarian. During the occupation, Camus was the editor of Combat, the underground newspaper. He was against the gulag and the Soviet model from the beginning.

We can also consider the Polish poet Czesław Miłosz’s The Captive Mind (Knopf, 1953). In the novel, Miłosz tries to explain the behavior of four nameless intellectuals who consciously accept a totalitarian regime. He describes what happens in the minds of these people, the fascination they have with totalitarian solutions. Perhaps the fascination comes from Rousseau’s conception of the common will of the people. Maybe it comes from Saint-Just, Robespierre’s right-hand, who once said, “What constitutes a republic is the total destruction of everything that stands in opposition to it.” Well, that philosophy is the birth certificate of totalitarianism. Years later, it was Fidel’s same phrase: “Inside the Revolution, everything; outside the Revolution, nothing.” But who says who or what is inside the Revolution? Fidel.

In hindsight, it’s surprising that some of the most prominent intellectuals of the 20th century supported Stalinism. They were blind to clearly presented evidence of excesses. I should say that when I was a member of the Communist Party, I was the same way. But I was in Venezuela. When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, we didn’t think about Hungary — we had our hands full opposing the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship.

In 1968, however, when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, we were older, more mature, and we could read the coverage with open eyes. We saw it for what it was.

This article was adapted from Teodoro Petkoff’s talk for CLAS on January 25, 2008. It was first published as “Intellectuals and Totalitarianism” in the Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies, Spring 2008.
MEXICO

1968: Fifty Years Later

An Interview With Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas

Harley Shaiken: The year 1968 transformed the world. There were students, workers, and citizens around the world demonstrating in the streets, from Paris to Prague, from Chicago to Berkeley, and of course, in October of 1968, in Mexico City at the Plaza de Tres Culturas in Tlatelolco. Where were you when you heard about what took place in Tlatelolco, and what was your reaction?

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas: In those days, I was working as an engineer in the construction of a dam on the Río Balsas in Michoacán. However, on October 2, I was in Mexico City. I had come to the city to deal with some problems related to the dam’s construction. I knew that there was an important student movement that had started in July of ’68. From July to the last days of September, different demonstrations and demands from the students had been presented to the government. There had been a violent repression of students in July, and the students demanded justice and the resignation of the chief of police and the deputy chief of police — really democratic demands. On October 2, at about nine or ten in the evening, while I was with my wife Celeste and my parents at their home, a collaborator of my father arrived and then some other friends followed, bringing word of what had happened in Tlatelolco, how the demonstration had been attacked, and that there were deaths and injuries after this aggression from — well, we didn’t know exactly who had led the aggression, if it was military or police forces. But the next day, we learned what had happened in Tlatelolco.

Shaiken: It was certainly something that had an extraordinary impact. It was not widely covered at the time, but there are those who say that the PRI [Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Institutional Revolutionary Party] lost an important part of its legitimacy that day, and that had an impact going forward. Do you think that was the case?

Cárdenas: No, I think it was a very strong confrontation between the students and the government, not precisely the PRI, not precisely the ruling party. The PRI was at that time just — I would say — part of the executive power. As you know, the PRI was not the classic political party as we may understand in other parts of the world. It was part of the state, and it was a party of the state. But the students’ protests and the repression was ordered and known by some high-ranking government officials. I wouldn’t blame the whole administration. But I am almost certain the president knew what was being prepared, as the leader of the October 2 aggression was General Luis Gutiérrez Oropeza, Chief of the Presidential Staff [Jefe del Estado Mayor Presidencial].
Shaiken: I think this is a very important distinction that you lay out. What do you think is the lasting legacy of that tragic day for Mexico and going forward?

Cárdenas: Yes, I think what happened in October ’68, is a clear antecedent of what happened later — of the democratic movement of ’88 and of the democratic transformations Mexico has had up to now. This is the very important legacy of the student movement of ’68. And I would like to add something more. I think that what is still lacking here in Mexico is for the government to release the names of those responsible. We cannot blame the armed forces as a whole. It was not the institutions that committed this crime. It was individuals, and it is important for Mexico and for the construction of our democracy to know the names of those responsible for the attacks against the students. It was not the whole administration and not the whole of the armed forces. It was not an order from the secretary of defense or any other official, but an operation prepared and led by the chief of the presidential staff. These individuals have names. I think that the names of those responsible should be released. And that would remove the blame that some place on the institution as a whole. It would erase misunderstandings and close wounds still open in our society. It would surely improve our democracy at the present time.

Shaiken: Are there other ways in which the democratic movement in Mexico bears some relation to these events? For example, you mentioned that they influenced your presidential run in 1988.

Cárdenas: Yes, I think one of the lessons we may derive from 1968 is that participating and demanding are ways to open our democracy. These have been elements that have opened our democracy, even if we have much more to do in that respect. But I think that this movement is behind all that has happened after, in terms of democratic transformation in Mexico.

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas has been a defining figure in Mexico’s move towards democracy. He has been a presidential candidate three times beginning in 2008, served as the first elected Head of Government of Mexico City from 1997 to 1999, and is the president of the Fundación para la Democracia (Foundation for Democracy). He was interviewed on November 8, 2018.

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas campaigning during his 1988 presidential bid in Mexico.

Photo by Semilla Luz.

An Unfolding Tragedy

(continued from page 13)

Growth was already beginning to fade by 2014, and the economy shrank in 2015 and 2016, diminishing the ability of the government to deliver services and jobs to ordinary Brazilians and reinforcing the determination of economic elites to unseat the government. Pundits predictably refused to consider the downturn a cyclical problem typical of capitalist growth, attributing it instead to the effects of “populist” policies aimed at redistribution.

Despite these limits, the fact that the PT was unable to muster a more robust resistance to political attack during Dilma’s second term, given that the party had delivered substantial benefits to poor constituencies, is still puzzling. This is all the more true during Lula’s second term, researchers argued that the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT, Central Labor Federation) had abandoned its focus on organizing and mobilization (see Sluyter-Beltrão, 2010). As the economy faltered during Dilma’s second term, rebellion in the ranks of labor rose precipitously. According to Bastos (2018:17), the year of 2013 saw a record number of 2,050 strikes and the third-highest number of hours lost to strikes in Brazilian history.

The PT’s focus on alliances with centrist parties also had indirect corrosive effects. Relying on corrupt political allies led the PT to become involved in corrupt practices itself (most famously in the “mensalão” scandal of 2005; see Elizabeth McKenna’s article in this issue, beginning on page 14). Even if one adopts the least negative possible interpretation — that this corruption was in the service of passing progressive legislation, not enriching individual PT leaders — it was still fundamentally destructive of the way that ordinary Brazilians viewed the party.

Having acknowledged the structural limits of the PT’s political position, we must return to the two principle ideological components that were key to enabling the transition from Temer to Bolsonaro: sanctifying the fight
against corruption as the paramount political value and crafting the strategy of “lawfare” that removed Lula from the political battlefield.

No one can oppose campaigns against corruption. The fact of corruption is indisputable in almost every political system and violates the formal norms of all of them. The ability of elites to prosper from corruption is a form of injustice that is much more straightforward and easy to understand than the structural effects of bad policy. Fighting corruption is the easiest way to win the loyalty of the middle classes. The best way to undermine a politician is to succeed in labeling them corrupt.

Once the PT had been tainted by connections to corruption, its claims to being a different sort of party, dedicated to pursuing programmatic ends rather than its own interests, were undermined. With the PT tainted, accusations of corruption against Lula seemed more plausible. This, in turn, opened the door to “lawfare.” Judge Sérgio Moro was able to mobilize the judiciary to pursue a dubious case against Lula with draconian speed and thoroughness, while better substantiated accusations of corruption against the leadership of the centrist parties (e.g., Michel Temer and Aécio Neves) were left unpursued.

The consequences of Lula’s elimination from the presidential race were overwhelming. Before he was imprisoned, Lula was polling more than 30 percent while Bolsonaro polled slightly more than one-half of that. As President Rousseff pointed out in her speech at UC Berkeley, the political failure of the centrist parties, combined with the removal of Lula via imprisonment, “opened up the political landscape of Brazil to the far right.” Perhaps more than any other single individual, Judge Sérgio Moro deserves credit for opening the door to Bolsonaro’s rise.

If the transition from Rousseff to Temer was shocking for its cynicism and disregard for democratic institutions, the transition from Temer to Bolsonaro is the most frightening sea change in Brazilian politics in recent history. Even the mild-mannered global media admit that Bolsonaro’s rhetorical stance is a jarring contrast to the relatively “civilized” tone that has dominated Brazil’s political discourse since the return of democratic elections in 1985. His avowed misogynist, racist, homophobic positions and fervent admiration for the military officers who overthrew Brazil’s democratically elected government in 1964, expressly including those who tortured civilian prisoners, are there for all to see. Bolsonaro exudes depravity and contempt toward the full gamut of less-privileged groups in Brazilian society, with women, blacks, and gays being the most prominent targets. His professed support for the torture or summary execution of drug dealers and other “extreme criminal elements” echoes President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines.

The extreme character of Bolsonaro’s positions raises the question of the relation between his rise and the interests of capital. Does his rise contradict the presumption of capital’s powerful role in shaping political outcomes? It might be argued that, unable to muster even a modicum of popular support for its preferred party vehicles and unwilling to accept another PT administration under any circumstances, economic elites were helpless in the face of this outsized “populist” persona. In this interpretation, they were blindsided by the results of their own political cleverness and forced to accept a candidate whose agenda was alien to their own. The “blindsided elites” interpretation neglects, however, a key element in Bolsonaro’s ascension.

In the sequence of Bolsonaro’s rise, the figure of Paulo Guedes rivals that of Judge Sérgio Moro. If Moro and his judicial allies did the negative work of removing Lula, Guedes did the positive work of building capital’s confidence that Bolsonaro’s economic agenda would serve its interests.

Guedes is a genuine “Chicago Boy.” His Chicago economics doctorate is just the beginning. More important, the policies he espouses are straight from the traditional neoliberal playbook. Guedes looked to Chilean economic policies as a model during the 1980s and took a university post in Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship. His projected agenda of economic policies includes completing the efforts to undermine the social safety net by attacking the social security system and engaging in “radical privatizations.” Guedes may be a naively ambitious advocate of free-market policies serving the financial elite, but he provided Bolsonaro with the necessary economic “seal of approval” and removed the stain of a possible affinity for “statism” created by Bolsonaro’s career in the military. After the November 2017 announcement that Guedes would be Bolsonaro’s finance minister, it was clear that the new administration’s economic agenda would be a more ambitious continuation of the Temer agenda.

In its post-Guedes version, the Bolsonaro agenda echoes the classic formula of successful fascist politicians in the pre-World War II era. It combines political authoritarianism, repression, and social reaction with strong support for capitalism and the prerogatives of capitalists, eschewing the sort of state-centered nationalism that characterized key members of the 1970s military government.

Even given the door opened by Moro and the legitimacy in the eyes of finance capital provided by Guedes, it is still a challenge to explain Bolsonaro’s electoral success. If acceptability to finance capital were sufficient, Henrique Meirelles would have received more than 1 percent of the votes in the first round of the presidential contest. Meirelles spent 28 formative years working for the Bank of Boston, was selected by Lula to provide legitimacy with global capital as president of the Central Bank, and was Temer’s Finance Minister (2016-2018). Meirelles’s credentials as an expert on finance are vastly superior to those of Guedes (say nothing of Bolsonaro). Obviously the support of capital, even if necessary, is far from sufficient.

If Brazil’s political tragedy is going to yield useful lessons for the future, not just for Brazil, but for the global roster of countries facing analogous threats, the frightening level of popular support for Bolsonaro’s completely retrograde political values must be analysed with care and dispassion. Here, only the most tentative and unsatisfying response is possible.

The most disheartening dimension of Bolsonaro’s support is the ease with which the legitimate rage of ordinary Brazilians was deflected from those who control economic power. Exploited and maltreated by Brazilian capitalism, the Brazilian middle classes chose to blame those even more dispossessed and oppressed who had benefited from the PT’s redistributive policies. A satisfying understanding of how this was possible still remains beyond our grasp, but elements of the conundrum can be set out.

To begin with, deeply hierarchical historical threads of Brazilian culture remain in place. As President Rousseff said in her April address, “Our people have suffered a great deal. They have suffered under the heritage of 300 years of slavery. And the elite always thought that not only do these people have no rights, they don’t even have the right to be there.” Such afflication for hierarchy extends beyond the elite. Resistance against the PT’s redistributive reforms permeated the whiter, more affluent segments of the middle class, some of whom, as Rousseff noted, complained that the PT was “turning the airports into public streets because regular people started..."
Brazil is still the home of social movements that are admired around the world, for example the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST, Landless Workers Movement; see Tarlau, forthcoming). Guilherme Boulos, the leader of the MST’s urban analog, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto (MTST, Homeless Workers Movement), exhibited a charisma during the presidential campaign that far outpaced his electoral totals. And, despite being derided by its critics on the left as insufficiently militant, Brazil’s labor movement is still among the best organized in the world (see Evans, 2014). Finally, Bolsonaro’s repressive cadres will do their best to cut down future grassroots progressives, just as Marielle Franco, the black, openly gay city councilor was gunned down in Rio de Janeiro a few months before the election. But, more Marielles than they expect will slip through their nets — just as militants managed to survive during the military regime that waged the last round of repression a half century ago.

Dilma Rousseff herself is an example of political resilience. Asked at the end of her address in Berkeley whether she continued to find grounds for optimism, she responded that having been engaged in politics since the age of 15 and having been imprisoned for three years and tortured, her optimism was still grounded in her conviction that “we are not just social beings, we are cooperators. It is not competition that defines social relations. It is cooperation. This conviction makes me an ‘optimist of the will.’” Emerging from defeat in the 2018 Senate race, Rousseff remained as determined as ever, saying: “Now we must struggle to form a broad alliance in support of democracy and against inequality. We will go forward together against hate, reaction, and violence.”

Acknowledgements, endnotes, and full references are online at clas.berkeley.edu.

Peter Evans is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at UC Berkeley. Dilma Rousseff served as the President of Brazil from 2011 to 2016. Her presentation in April 2018 was organized by the Center for Latin American Studies and co-sponsored by the Department of Sociology and the Charles & Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley.

to fly.” A surprising number of educated members of the middle class considered the fact that “35 percent of all university graduates were the first of their families to earn a college degree” to be an affront to meritocratic values. And, of course, the retrograde threads in the popular political consciousness were amplified and exacerbated by a drumbeat litany in the media that Brazil’s problems could be solved by the simple combination of punishing corruption (hence the necessity of rejecting the full spectrum of the existing political class) and punishing violence (hence the necessity of subjecting the poor to unrestricted repression).

At the same time, ironically, disaffection with established politicians (even those with progressive agendas) reflected frustration over the limits of what was accomplished in terms of real improvements in ordinary people’s lives during the PT’s “golden years.” The apparent ineffectuality of normal democratic institutions made “extraordinary measures” like those proposed by Bolsonaro seem legitimate.

Is there any convincing counterpoint to what seems to be an unremittingly bleak political horizon in Brazil? Perhaps not, but it would be irresponsible to close leaving the impression that Brazil must be given up as a lost cause. Even in the midst of the bleakness, positive threads should be recuperated.

First, in the current context, the PT’s hastily inserted substitute candidate, Fernando Haddad, performed better than the PT had reason to expect. While the presidential candidates of the PMDB and PSDB were immolated by Bolsonaro in the first round of voting, Haddad secured almost one-third of the presidential vote, and he went on to get 45 percent in the final round. Haddad’s victories in the states of the country’s poorest region, the Northeast, suggest that there is still a substantial segment of the population that appreciates their gains (however limited) during the PT administrations and would support a renovated effort to take up a progressive agenda once again.

Second, the progressive institutions constructed during the fight for re-democratization and the subsequent four decades, while definitely under siege, may not be as easily erased as Bolsonaro and Brazil’s elite might hope. From the Constitution of 1988 to the plethora of grassroots democratic initiatives that bubbled up and became part of Brazil’s institutional landscape (see Avritzer, 2002; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva, 2011), there are myriad footholds for resistance to the reactionary tide.

Ele Não! (Not Him!) in September 2018.
Rousseff, who signed the laws creating mechanisms like the plea bargain that catalyzed the investigations, said that she supports the anti-corruption campaign not in the name of moralism, but because it siphons much-needed money from the public coffers. Many observers, including Rousseff herself, believe that her unflinching stance on the investigations contributed to her impeachment. A year before the vote, the ex-president of Transpetro, a branch of the national oil company Petrobras, negotiated a plea bargain deal for which he secretly recorded a senator from Temer’s party, Romero Jucá. On the tape — which Rousseff paraphrased at the CLAS event — Jucá says, “We have to solve this damn thing. We have to change the government in order to stop the bleeding,” he continued, referring to the Car Wash corruption investigations.

Act Two: The Rise of the Right — and a Rollback of Rights

The second act of the three-part soft coup Rousseff outlined consisted of the Temer administration’s swift and draconian rollbacks of social and workers’ rights. In December 2016, Congress passed a constitutional amendment known as the New Fiscal Regime (PEC 55), which froze social spending for 20 years. Health care, education, pension, infrastructure, and defense spending is now pegged to inflation. Economist Pedro Paulo Bastos, a UC Berkeley visiting scholar, notes that the only two other countries in the world that have such cuts “hardwired” into their constitutions are Singapore and Georgia and even then not for as long or detached from GDP growth. Bastos estimates that education outlays will fall by a third.

This social-sparing freeze joins a host of other longstanding regressive political economic policies in Brazil. To take just one example, the federal government’s REFSIP program forgives billions of dollars in private sector debt each year. In 2017, more than $400 billion reais in unpaid business loans was forgiven — more than was spent on health and education combined. Meanwhile, Brazil has one of the most regressive tax systems in the world, with more than two-thirds of tax revenue coming from consumption taxes on basic essentials and — unique to most OECD countries — the complete tax exemption of shareholder dividends (Gobetti and Oratii, 2017). Seven months after PEC 55 passed, Congress followed the United States’ tradition of union busting by abolishing obligatory dues and eliminating labor protections that had existed since 1943. To further entrench these reversals, Bolsonaro announced that he will extinguish Brazil’s Labor Ministry altogether.

Act Three: Lula, Lawfare, and Leadership

The third and final act takes us to the once-industrial ABC region of greater São Paulo, exactly four decades after the manufacturing strikes launched a new era of contentious politics that would help bring down Brazil’s military dictatorship. In each of the first three presidential elections after the country’s transition to democracy — 1989, 1994, and 1998 — Lula finished second. According to PT historiography, Lula told the national leadership of his party that he would only run a fourth time if he could form alliances with bankers, business leaders, and conservative politicians that the PT had theretofore eschewed. A striking documentary of Lula’s 2002 campaign, “Entreatos,” captures the early stages of what some describe as this reinvention. At one point, the campaign’s marqueteiro (chief marketer) says, “Lula the syndicalist scares people. Now he’s the ex-syndicalist.”

During the campaign, Lula published a famous “Letter to the Brazilian People” indicating that if elected, his administration would not renge on debt repayments and would mostly continue the political economic project of his predecessor. Rousseff followed a similar strategy after her reelection in 2014, appointing Chicago-trained economist Joaquim Levy as her Finance Minister to implement austerity measures that she had campaigned against. Brazilian scholars have argued that it was concessions like these that helped sound the death knell of the organized popular support on which the PT depended, a partial explanation for why the left did not mobilize en masse during Rousseff’s impeachment or afterwards as the right-wing protests gained strength. Other observers note that these moderating processes were inevitable — such compromises are necessary in any social democratic regime. If the PT wanted to come to power, this line of reasoning goes, they could not break the pact that structure the state’s relationship with economic elites. The ire of the right and the reality of governing notwithstanding, lulismo has also been the target of longstanding criticism from the fragmented Brazilian left, including dissenting voices within the PT itself. Some argue that the PT’s class-compromising policies demobilized the party’s base, particularly the labor unions (Antunes, Santana, and Praun, 2018). As historian Perry Anderson has observed: “In power, Lula neither mobilized nor even incorporated the electorate that acclaimed him. No new structural forms gave shape to popular life. The signature of his rule was, if anything, demobilization.” Even when the PT was at the height of its power, scholars and activists registered their critique of what they saw as the party’s failure to fully reckon with the paradoxical effects of inclusion and institutionalization. In 2010, for example, Gilmar Mauro, a national leader in Brazil’s famed Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST, Landless Workers Movement), said that the PT failed in its attempt to implement the petite, or tweezers, project, wherein one prong of the strategy sought to occupy institutions while the other arm built a socialist movement of the masses. “The idea was that you compete in the institutional realm with the goal of strengthening the social movements. That didn’t happen. The institutional dispute and arena became the strong arm, and the social movements were the weak arm,” Mauro said.

Lula won his fourth bid for the presidency by a margin of nearly 20 million votes, and the PT won three consecutive presidential elections thereafter. The economic, political, and social successes of his two mandates are undeniable (see Peter Evans in this issue, beginning on page 8). Upon leaving office, Lula’s approval rating was 86 percent, the highest ever registered by Brazilian polling companies. The PT survived the mensalão (big monthly payment) vote-buying scandal of 2005. As of the time of this writing, however, Lula and his defense team have been unable to wrest back political power. As evidence of the political motives behind Lula’s conviction, observers point to his clear frontrunner status in the polls, the speed with which his prosecution took
place (a rarity for Brazil’s notoriously sluggish judicial system), and the differential treatment of politicians from other parties — notably, Aécio Neves and Michel Temer, whose cases involve material evidence of wrongdoing. That Sérgio Moro, the judge who oversaw Lula’s jailing, was recently named to another “super” ministry position in the Bolsonaro government further undermines the investigation’s façade of impartiality.

Lula is now serving a 12-year jail term in a 15-square meter room in Curitiba. He faces visitor restrictions, cannot record messages to supporters, and has been barred even from giving interviews to the press, a right regularly conceded to the incarcerated in Brazil. In her speech at UC Berkeley last spring, Rousseff was defiant. “In jail or free, dead or alive, condemned or absolved, Lula will be in the election.”

Democracy Unfulfilled

Whether or not Brazil’s fragmented progressive forces rebound from these profound setbacks depends a great deal on the extent to which they confront the ways that Brazil’s young democracy failed to fully deliver on its promises and their willingness to recruit and develop new leadership. The capital-labor relationship has changed significantly since Lula’s ABC union days and demands alternative base-building strategies. The eight political parties that make up Brazil’s institutional left must recruit new leaders not only from the factory floor, but also from the vast rural interior and the ranks of new categories of service workers concentrated in the urban peripheries, where support for conservative, evangelical, and right-wing politics has been on the rise for decades. “When a party like ours comes to power, something inexorable happens,” Rousseff said, in response to Peter Evans’s question at the event about how to rebuild the PT. “The best leaders come to the government, which weakens the party.” Good organizers learn to agitate around contradictions like those inherent in the PT’s 13-year rule, identifying and training successors in the process.

It is the dearth of such new political leadership that made the March 2018 assassination of Marielle Franco — a black, gay, socialist city councilwoman from one of Rio de Janeiro’s largest favelas — all the more tragic. Less than 24 hours after Franco’s execution, tens of thousands of outraged Brazilians poured into the streets. This response — in a country where extrajudicial killings rarely make headlines — speaks to the ways in which Franco was a transformational political leader at a place and time that is largely bereft of them. Writing from his prison cell in fascist Italy, Antonio Gramsci (1971) warned that failing to give conscious leadership to “so-called spontaneous movements” — like the mass protests that erupted in Brazil in 2013 — can have “extremely serious consequences,” including inciting and making room for organized counterrevolutions. Right-wing groups in Brazil sensed and seized on the new political opportunity that the amorphous protests created five years ago. New conservative and libertarian leaders, some of whom are men and women of color from working-class backgrounds, are united in their anti-petismo — their hatred of the PT — and have been sworn in this year as some of the most-voted members of Congress.

It is tempting to view the outcome of Brazil’s 2018 election as yet one more foreseeable case in a reactionary global wave — in the words of Gabriel García Márquez, a “crónica de una muerte anunciada” (chronicle of a death foretold). Careful attention to the contingent choices that political actors made along the way as they faced always-uncertain circumstances, however, tends to reveal more about how political terrain shifts than do post hoc accounts that deny these actors their strategic agency. As emboldened authoritarians head to Brasilia, Brazil’s New Republic appears to be coming to a close. But history is still up for grabs.

References available online at clas.berkeley.edu.

Elizabeth McKenna is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at UC Berkeley. She is currently based in São Paulo.
Wildfires devastated California in 2017 and 2018. When asked whether this situation should be considered “the new normal,” Governor Jerry Brown replied, “This is the new abnormal.” Prior experience will have little predictive value when climate change dramatically alters innumerable influences on the environment.

In 2018, two Berkeley graduate students supported by CLAS and the Tinker Foundation looked at climate change from different perspectives unified by a common theme: this “new abnormal” is one of devastating extremes. From macro variables like the strength of hurricanes and the persistence of drought, they examine effects on a smaller level, in the daily lives of farmers in Central America and frogs in the Andes. In both cases, the implications span the planet.

“This is not the new normal; this is the new abnormal.”

(Photograph courtesy of Pacific Southwest Region, U.S. Forest Service.)
When Hurricane Georges came through back in 1998, we lost a lot of trees. Our canopy trees fell and crushed the cacao trees,” Hugo tells me. We’re sitting in the shade of a cacao tree with three other cacaocultores (cacao growers) on the outskirts of the city of San Francisco de Macorís, in the Dominican Republic. Jorge, Juan, María, and Pablo are all members of a local cacao growers’ cooperative. They generously agreed to spend a day with me, showing me around their small farms in the island’s northeastern region. They grow cacao trees in the shade of taller timber and fruit trees that enrich and stabilize the soil and provide a habitat for native birds and insects. While feeding me copious amounts of tropical fruit — and joking that a cacao farm is better than a grocery store for finding snacks — they patiently answer my questions about agroforestry, biodiversity, and hurricanes.

At the mention of Hurricane Georges, they jump into the conversation to share their memories and observations. “Georges killed a couple hundred people,” Pablo says, “and it destroyed around 50 percent of the island’s crops.” I ask the group what happened after Georges. Were farmers like themselves able to replant their crops or trees and resume production the following year? “Some did,” María explains, “especially those of us in cooperatives, where we had community support and help getting going again. But some people gave up and left their land. Especially because with cacao, you won’t get a crop right away; the tree has to mature first.”

This observation lies at the crux of my interest in agriculture, environmental shocks, and land-use trends in the Caribbean. Small-scale farmers in the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean islands face recurrent environmental disturbances in the form of hurricanes. These extreme weather events cause mortality and direct damage to buildings and fields, reducing agricultural production in their immediate aftermath. For example, data from the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization indicates a nearly 29-percent decrease in the area harvested for cacao in the Dominican Republic in the year after the passage of Hurricane Georges.

With the support of a Tinker Foundation and CLAS-funded research grant, I spent two weeks in the Dominican Republic carrying out preliminary fieldwork for my dissertation, which studies the impacts of hurricane strikes on small-scale agricultural production. More specifically, I examine whether the catastrophic damage and losses from hurricanes drive land abandonment and forest transition in the Caribbean, a process in which farmers cease their activities. In the absence of direct land management, secondary forests can grow on land that had recently been used for agriculture.

Caribbean forests form part of a global biodiversity hotspot, where high levels of endemic species are threatened by habitat loss due to deforestation for agriculture, livestock, tourism, and urban development. While agricultural land abandonment in the Caribbean in the wake of disasters like hurricanes threatens the economic sustainability of rural communities and local food security, it also potentially expands habitats for native species. I am interested in both of these potential consequences, the negative and the positive. Understanding the patterns and drivers of these trends will become even more important as climate change intensifies the strength of hurricanes.

In addition to their concerns regarding hurricanes, the farmers I spoke with stressed two additional threats to rural communities in the Dominican Republic. The first problem is the increasing age of the rural population: more and more young people are migrating to the cities for work, leaving the older generation in the countryside. The other threat is poor land-use planning. As a coffee farmer in San Cristóbal Province, in the southern part of the island, explained to me, “The government is sowing the best farm land with cement and harvesting cities and airports.” In his view, some of the country’s prime agricultural land is being converted into urban areas for the island’s growing population and for airports, hotels, and other infrastructure for the tourism industry. This concern underscores the immense pressures on the limited land areas of Caribbean islands, where competing land uses threaten both biodiversity and rural livelihoods.

In light of the pressure on land in the Caribbean, I am particularly interested in the trajectories of abandoned farmland. When someone stops farming, what happens to the land? Under what circumstances does someone else buy the land and start farming, either with the same crops that were grown before or with different crops? When does the land get developed for the tourism industry or urban growth? And when and where does forest regenerate on abandoned land? And how does this process vary depending on the type of agriculture that was practiced previously?

Groups like Grupo Jaragua, Enda Dominicana, Sur Futuro, and the Centro para el Desarrollo Agropecuario y Forestal (CEDAF, Center for Agricultural and Forestry Development) — four nonprofit organizations I visited while in the Dominican Republic — are trying to address both issues: the aging rural population and changing land use. All four groups see agroforestry as a potential way to restore land that has been degraded by intensive agricultural activity or grazing, turning it into productive farms that can simultaneously support native biodiversity. As climate change is predicted to increase the incidence of extreme weather events in the Caribbean, it is important to understand the social and ecological resilience of these agroforestry systems to hurricanes.

“W
The frogs were dying. The streams were drying. In the Cordillera Vilcanota, a heavily glaciated mountain range in the Peruvian Andes southeast of Cusco, Quechua tradition suggested that these events were linked: it is the frogs that call the rain when it is dry, keeping the streams flowing.

Legends associating frogs with rainfall emerged for obvious reasons, but they also have more complex cultural roots. Tradition dating back to Inca culture (and possibly back to pre-Inca times) named not only the bright stars of the heavens but also the “dark constellations”—the negative space around the stars. Hanp‘atu, “The Toad,” was a dark constellation that rose from the horizon synchronously with the first seasonal rains.

Perhaps because of the perceived threat that the disappearing frogs posed to their crops and pastures, local smallholders managed to broadcast their concerns widely and to mobilize social responses to mitigate the threat. As the chytrid fungus Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd) continued to spread widely and destroy frogs, media and NGOs came to support these efforts, though the threat continued.

Throughout my trip to the Dominican Republic, I met with small-scale coffee and cacao farmers, local academics, and scientists and officials from nongovernmental organizations working on rural development and biodiversity conservation who were happy to talk with me about recent trends in land use and conservation in the island nation. These conversations were a valuable opportunity to get feedback on my research questions and to hear about current trends and challenges in the region.

My conversation with Jorge, Juan, Maria, and Pablo stands out in particular: their explanation of the role that their cooperative plays in their lives, with the social and economic connections and support that it provides, reinforced for me the role of institutions in mediating the impacts of shocks—be they environmental, like hurricanes and pest outbreaks, or economic, like a change in trade policies. While I had read academic articles about the role of local institutions in increasing resilience to shocks, I had underestimated this factor in my initial conceptualization of the processes at play linking environmental disturbances to land abandonment. The members of the cacao cooperative demonstrated to me the very real impact of the cooperative in their lives.

This insight will influence my research approach as I move forward with my data collection and model development. Much of my ongoing research involves using large geospatial datasets and remote sensing, far removed from the face-to-face conversations I enjoyed during the summer of 2018. My time in the Dominican Republic serves as a strong reminder that not all the important factors in a complex social-ecological system can be identified and measured through satellite images.

Katherine Siegel is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management at UC Berkeley. She was the recipient of a research grant from the Tinker Foundation and CLAS in 2018.

Frogs in the Frost

By Emma Steigerwald

The marbled four-eyed frog in its high-elevation wetland habitat.

RESEARCH

The frogs were dying. The streams were drying. In the Cordillera Vilcanota, a heavily glaciated mountain range in the Peruvian Andes southeast of Cusco, Quechua tradition suggested that these events were linked: it is the frogs that call the rain when it is dry, keeping the streams flowing.

Legends associating frogs with rainfall emerged for obvious reasons, but they also have more complex cultural roots. Tradition dating back to Inca culture (and possibly back to pre-Inca times) named not only the bright stars of the heavens but also the “dark constellations”—the negative space around the stars. Hanp‘atu, “The Toad,” was a dark constellation that rose from the horizon synchronously with the first seasonal rains.

Perhaps because of the perceived threat that the disappearing frogs posed to their crops and pastures, local smallholders managed to broadcast their concerns widely despite their extreme geographic isolation. A long-term amphibian-monitoring effort was quickly established in the Cordillera. Soon, scientists had linked the reported die-offs to the pathogen that has driven the largest biodiversity loss in history: the chytrid fungus Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd).

However, I am drawn to the Cordillera because I wonder if the dying frogs and drying streams are, ultimately, connected. From March to May 2018, I spent my first season in the Cordillera collecting data to test my hypotheses. I was supported by a Tinker Foundation and CLAS-funded research grant, as well as by spirited local
guide Gumercindo Crispin Condori; dedicated Cusco undergraduate students Jared Guarva Casafraanca and Peter Condori Czarhuarupay; ever-patient packhorses Chumpipaya, Oroscocha, Yanapaya, and Yura; and troublemaker packhorse Muro.

Drying streams are just one symptom of much larger changes occurring across this landscape. This season, as we crossed the countryside and spoke to smallholders who have lived here all their lives, we were confronted by the local repercussions of a globally changing climate. We met herdors and cultivators digging new irrigation ditches and diverting new springs, replacing streams that have ebbed or gone extinct. We easily crossed high mountain passes that just a few decades ago were blocked by glacial ice. Our steps sometimes sunk more than a foot into desiccated carpets of cushion plants that, though they had thrived for several hundred years, had recently parted as their perennial water sources became ephemeral. We walked through newly born communities of plants and microbes that have bloomed behind the tails of retreating glaciers.

Three frog species have taken advantage of this new habitat, expanding their ranges 660 vertical feet upslope and setting the global elevational record for amphibians at 17,700 feet above sea level: the marbled four-eyed frog, the Andean toad, and the marbled water frog. With nets and bags, we captured these new arrivals — colonists of narrow mountain passes, regularly blanketet in snow or hail, where solar UV is relatively unfiltered by the atmosphere and night covers the ponds in sheets of ice. Cracking pond ice with the butts of our tadpole nets or digging under snow to flip rocks, we had daily cause to marvel at these intrepid amphibians. But we also took careful precautions to not transmit Bd from one frog or site to another during our fieldwork. As we crossed the landscape, we sterilized equipment between animals and after anything touched the ground.

I am exploring two mechanisms by which climate-change-driven range expansions might influence the disease dynamics of Bd — and thus the die-offs — in frogs. First, each time frogs colonize farther up the mountain passes, the colonists are not entirely representative of their source population. Instead, a small number of juveniles migrates forward. They may represent a random subset or perhaps individuals with traits that enhance their movement capability (e.g., strong back legs). In this way, each “founder event” reduces the biological variation present relative to the source population, including the genetic variation underlying frogs’ physical traits.

When expansion occurs rapidly over a large distance, genetic variation may be lost simply by chance, rather than because it is not useful. Frogs’ susceptibility to infection by the Bd pathogen can be influenced in several ways by their genetics. Studies have shown that having specific versions of particular immune genes or inheriting different versions versus identical versions of genes from each parent can affect frogs’ Bd resilience. Therefore, I suspect that frogs on an expanding range front may be more susceptible to the Bd pathogen because variation conferring resilience may have been lost by chance and because these frogs are more likely to inherit the same gene versions from both parents.

A second potential influence of climate-change-driven range expansions on disease dynamics concerns their effect on patterns of genetic exchange. Deglaciation opens new movement routes across the landscape by melting open mountain passes. The colonization of these passes may therefore allow for the interbreeding of groups of animals separated by the mountain barrier. For example, the final glacial “stopper” preventing movement across Ossollo, the longest pass in the Cordillera Vilcanota, melted in the last 1970s. Since the Cordillera has served as an 80-kilometer-long ice barrier across the landscape for perhaps as long as five millennia, frogs colonizing the newly melted mountain passes may now be interbreeding with frogs with which they had accumulated genetic differences over time. I am curious if this opportunity for new genetic exchange improves the Bd resilience of these frogs. If it does, I will resolve whether general “hybrid advantage” or specifically the effect of interbreeding on immune genes is responsible.

The Cordillera Vilcanota is a perfect example of a landscape that at times appears nearly pristine, while local flora and fauna are, in fact, silently dealing with compound anthropogenic pressures. Dazzlingly turquoise waters tumble from the slopes. Miniature alpine plants coat the ground with delicately intricate structures. Human population density is so low that you can walk non-stop for a week without seeing a fence or a person. Yet, beyond the control of residents — human and other living creatures — the meltwater streams are drying. Glaciers are vanishing. Some species are changing their distributions as conditions change, but each species does so in its own unique way, changing the composition of biological communities.

It is in this context that a novel pathogen, which likely emerged in Asia and only spread this far with the trade of amphibians by humans, has swept across the Cordillera Vilcanota. The three frog species I am studying have used accelerated deglaciation as an ecological opportunity to expand into new upslope habitat. We might, then, consider them successful climate responders and be less concerned about their long-term persistence. However, in a context of compound pressures, what if a successful response relative to one pressure moderates genetic susceptibility to a second pressure, like disease? Populations’ histories may be invisible to the naked eye, but modern genetic sequencing approaches allow me to measure the imprint of these histories and understand how they might affect the present and future of these populations.

The people of this region continue to dedicate themselves to the hard work and fickle rewards of cultivating tubers and raising alpaca. However, their anxiety over their changing landscape is palpable. Their future options are narrowing. When we explained that we were studying frogs, some people responded that we could work with them only if we did not hurt or distress them — despite the disgust they invariably expressed that we should even want to handle them. Their culture’s traditions have left them with some deep-seated beliefs about the connectedness of organisms and their ecosystems. With my study of the Cordilleran frogs, I hope to shed light on a small fragment of that dynamic connection.

Emma Steigerwald is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management at UC Berkeley. She was the recipient of a research grant from the Tinker Foundation and CLAS in 2018.
"Ovshinsky is arguably one of the greatest thinkers and inventors you’ve never heard of. He’s been called his generation’s Thomas Edison and his brilliance compared to that of Albert Einstein."

— Rachael Lallensack, Smithsonian magazine, October 2018

"Stan has allowed us to see the world as it could be."

— Senator Carl Levin, September 2012

The scientific research and inventions of Stanford Ovshinsky (1922–2012) have changed the world from Chile to China and, of course, the United States, Japan, Germany, and beyond. Lillian Hoddeson and Peter Garrett’s excellent new biography The Man Who Saw Tomorrow: The Life and Inventions of Stanford R. Ovshinsky (MIT Press, April 2018) insightfully probes the sources of his scientific genius, his remarkable and often turbulent life, and his deep commitment to social justice. The Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) hosted Stan a number of times — he was a lifelong friend and mentor — and his work inspired UC Berkeley faculty, researchers, and students.

Given Stan’s scientific achievements and his social values, it was natural to introduce him to key friends of CLAS. A dinner with President Michelle Bachelet and Jerry Brown, hosted by Isabel Allende, stands out. But Stan also enjoyed meeting informally with students, people from social movements, scientists, and labor leaders.

Three dimensions of Stan’s work had particular importance for Latin America: his incandescent scientific brilliance; his deep understanding of manufacturing (he began his career as a machinist); and his commitment to social justice. At a celebration near Detroit, Michigan, honoring Stan on his 90th birthday, Hellmut Fritzsche, an internationally recognized physicist and former chair of the Department of Physics at the University of Chicago, described his reaction to his first encounter with Stan and his ground-breaking research in 1963 when he visited Energy Conversion Laboratories, then located in a nondescript storefront in northwest Detroit:

I realized that Stan had discovered a huge unexplored field of material science. This happens very rarely. We were in unchartered territory. In Stan’s disordered Ovonic materials, we were confronted with phenomena of bewildering diversity and complexity which required for their explanation a new language and concepts. Stan’s intuition and deep understanding of the roles of different elements in his materials were ingenious.

The ultimate outcome of these discoveries, The Economist reported in late 2007, "can be used for energy generation (in fuel cells and solar cells), for energy storage (in batteries), for computing (to store data on discs or in chips), and to create custom materials with novel properties," all of which are expanded on and put in context in The Man Who Saw Tomorrow.

Stan’s background as a machinist in Akron, Ohio, and his early career as a designer and builder of machine tools gave him a deep understanding of manufacturing and mass production. The originality and value of his scientific vision was exceptional, but he was also able to translate this vision not simply into profound scientific discoveries, but into new machines, processes, factories, and industries. He and his brother Herb, who was a gifted engineer, instinctively saw new approaches to making things. When Stan began producing flexible solar panels based on Ovonic material, he produced it by the mile on a machine the length of a football field using a process that resembled a printing press. The best and brightest scientific minds had assured Stan it couldn’t be done, yet he once again defied conventional wisdom. What Henry Ford had achieved six decades earlier for the production of cars, Stan did for the production of solar material.

Stan passionately advocated for a “Green New Deal” in the 1970s (decades before the term had been coined) and, most importantly, created the technical basis for accomplishing many seemingly impossible goals. "You want new industry in the United States, with astonishing technological advances, new mass production techniques and jobs, jobs, jobs?" New York Times columnist Bob

A large solar farm in the Atacama Desert, Tarapacá, Chile. (Photo by zwansaurio.)
Six years later, President Bachelet and her new Minister of Energy, Máximo Pacheco, implemented a far-reaching plan to embrace renewable energy at the beginning of her second term in 2015. “I am convinced that climate change is a real and immediate threat. We need a new energy system that is clean, efficient, and sustainable.” President Lagos is more committed than ever to addressing climate change, and he returned to California in late January 2018 on a trip organized by CLAS. He visited Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories to look at cutting-edge work on climate change and renewables and then met with Governor Brown in Sacramento to discuss the ways in which California and Chile might cooperate on new approaches in these areas. He also took time to meet with students and scientists.

As Lillian and Peter’s compelling book and their article below clearly indicate, Stan would have been proud! His vision continues to inspire, and his work has never been more relevant. I can see him smiling and saying, “Great work! But we have a lot more to do.”

In the 1960s and 1970s, Stan began developing his vision of a hydrogen economy that would sharply reduce the world’s dependence on fossil fuels. Remarkably, he saw very early issues related to environmental destruction, climate change, and wars over oil. As United States Senator Carl Levin said at Stan’s 90th birthday celebration:

(Stan’s) vision for decades has been a world freed from its dependence on fossil fuels. One in which we create good jobs and a growing economy on the strength of green ideas. One in which science lights the way to a brighter future and in which justice and fairness prevail.

Senator Levin pointed out “Stan knows that the visionary’s path is not an easy one. Those who seek to change the world embark on a lifetime of ups and downs.” This assertion underestates what Stan faced: the “ups” were exceptional, but the opposition from rivals and those who felt threatened could be virulent. Nonetheless, he and Iris persevered.

Stan particularly seemed to resonate with Chile, although he engaged with Brazil and Mexico, as well. In 2009, I traveled with Ricardo Lagos (President of Chile, 2000–2006) to meet Stan in Detroit, where he lived and worked. The research laboratories and production facilities he had built were still located. President Lagos has a strong relationship with CLAS and taught several classes at UC Berkeley following his presidency, while he also served as the United Nation’s Special Envoy for Climate Change (2007–2010). President Lagos reflected on the visit to Detroit in a subsequent article in the Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies:

The kinds of solutions that Stan Ovshinsky is proposing should be available in Chile… I think that we, the developing countries here in South America, are going to have to better integrate our own energy resources while at the same time advancing in such a way that will be good for the U.S. and good for Latin America. And Chile would like to play a role in that cooperation.

Finally, his passion for social justice informed everything. While he and his wife Iris were starting Energy Conversion Devices in the 1960s, they stated the goal was “using creative science to solve societal problems.” Both remained very active in the civil rights and peace movements, human rights campaigns, and other progressive causes. They would send good friends and family a dozen carnations and a card saying “with the oppressed, against the oppressor” every May Day. As Hellmut Fritzsche told Stan, “(you) continued fighting against injustice and prejudice all your life. It is typical for you to be the only Fellow of the American Physical Society who, at the same time, is a union member of the International Association of Machinists.”

In the 1960s and 1970s, Stan began developing his vision of a hydrogen economy that would sharply reduce the world’s dependence on fossil fuels. Remarkably, he saw very early issues related to environmental destruction, climate change, and wars over oil. As United States Senator Carl Levin said at Stan’s 90th birthday celebration:

(Stan’s) vision for decades has been a world freed from its dependence on fossil fuels. One in which we create good jobs and a growing economy on the strength of green ideas. One in which science lights the way to a brighter future and in which justice and fairness prevail.

Senator Levin pointed out “Stan knows that the visionary’s path is not an easy one. Those who seek to change the world embark on a lifetime of ups and downs.” This assertion underestates what Stan faced: the “ups” were exceptional, but the opposition from rivals and those who felt threatened could be virulent. Nonetheless, he and Iris persevered.

Stan particularly seemed to resonate with Chile, although he engaged with Brazil and Mexico, as well. In 2009, I traveled with Ricardo Lagos (President of Chile, 2000–2006) to meet Stan in Detroit, where he lived and worked. The research laboratories and production facilities he had built were still located. President Lagos has a strong relationship with CLAS and taught several classes at UC Berkeley following his presidency, while he also served as the United Nation’s Special Envoy for Climate Change (2007–2010). President Lagos reflected on the visit to Detroit in a subsequent article in the Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies:

The kinds of solutions that Stan Ovshinsky is proposing should be available in Chile… I think that we, the developing countries here in South America, are going to have to better integrate our own energy resources while at the same time advancing in such a way that will be good for the U.S. and good for Latin America. And Chile would like to play a role in that cooperation.

Given the accelerated and dangerous ways in which climate change and environmental destruction are now proceeding, these were truly prescient sentiments. Later n 2009, President Lagos invited Stan to visit Chile for a week on a trip organized by the government of President Michelle Bachelet. At the time, Chile had very little installed solar. Stan began the trip with the keynote address at a renewable energy conference with 500 participants from throughout Chile — from scientists to business leaders, from cabinet ministers to students. The conference was held in the north of the country in the port city of Antofagasta, surrounded by the Atacama Desert, one of the driest and sunniest places on the planet. Stan saw the possibilities for Chile to harness the intense rays of the desert sun to reduce pollution, address climate change, and create new industries. Little had been done with solar in Chile at the time, but Stan sparked real interest, inspired many, and received a standing ovation.

After the talk, Stan spent a day and a night at the Paranal Observatory, one of the world’s best astronomical observation sites. Standing near the top of a desolate 8,800-foot mountain in the sun-drenched Atacama, which receives the strongest solar irradiance on the planet, Stan told a film crew that “Chile [could be] a showcase of how you could have energy without pollution, without climate change, without war over oil.” He saw the possibilities of “building new industry in Chile” for jobs and development and collaborating with Chilean scientists on future research, “I love it here,” he said, “I’m closest to the sun.”

The trip received widespread publicity and introduced new ideas on solar energy throughout the country. Juan Gabriel Valdés, the Director of Public Diplomacy and subsequently Chile’s Ambassador to the United States, accompanied Stan for the week. He gave lectures and met with scholars, entrepreneurs, and government leaders in Santiago, including a dinner with President Bachelet at her home, where they both spoke deep into the night reflecting on the traumas of the past and looking toward a brighter future. She was very aware of the dangers of climate change and fascinated by Stan, his research, his vision, and his values.

El Mercurio, the leading Chilean newspaper, published an extensive article on Stan, his research, his vision, and his values. The article ran on the first page under the headline “Stan Ovshinsky: Visionary.” The kinds of solutions that Stan Ovshinsky is proposing should be available in Chile… I think that we, the developing countries here in South America, are going to have to better integrate our own energy resources while at the same time advancing in such a way that will be good for the U.S. and good for Latin America. And Chile would like to play a role in that cooperation.

Given the accelerated and dangerous ways in which climate change and environmental destruction are now proceeding, these were truly prescient sentiments. Later n 2009, President Lagos invited Stan to visit Chile for a week on a trip organized by the government of President Michelle Bachelet. At the time, Chile had very little installed solar. Stan began the trip with the keynote address at a renewable energy conference with 500 participants from throughout Chile — from scientists to business leaders, from cabinet ministers to students. The conference was held in the north of the country in the port city of Antofagasta, surrounded by the Atacama Desert, one of the driest and sunniest places on the planet. Stan saw the possibilities for Chile to harness the intense rays of the desert sun to reduce pollution, address climate change, and create new industries. Little had been done with solar in Chile at the time, but Stan sparked real interest, inspired many, and received a standing ovation.

After the talk, Stan spent a day and a night at the Paranal Observatory, one of the world’s best astronomical observation sites. Standing near the top of a desolate 8,800-foot mountain in the sun-drenched Atacama, which receives the strongest solar irradiance on the planet, Stan told a film crew that “Chile [could be] a showcase of how you could have energy without pollution, without climate change, without war over oil.” He saw the possibilities of “building new industry in Chile” for jobs and development and collaborating with Chilean scientists on future research, “I love it here,” he said, “I’m closest to the sun.”

The trip received widespread publicity and introduced new ideas on solar energy throughout the country. Juan Gabriel Valdés, the Director of Public Diplomacy and subsequently Chile’s Ambassador to the United States, accompanied Stan for the week. He gave lectures and met with scholars, entrepreneurs, and government leaders in Santiago, including a dinner with President Bachelet at her home, where they both spoke deep into the night reflecting on the traumas of the past and looking toward a brighter future. She was very aware of the dangers of climate change and fascinated by Stan, his research, his vision, and his values.

El Mercurio, the leading Chilean newspaper, published an extensive article on Stan, his research, his vision, and his values. The article ran on the first page under the headline “Stan Ovshinsky: Visionary.”
Stanford R. Ovshinsky’s name isn’t as well known as it should be, though readers of the Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies have already learned something about his work. Yet even if his name still isn’t widely known, Ovshinsky’s energy and information inventions have become familiar parts of contemporary life. Leading examples include nickel-metal hydride batteries (the basis of many hybrid cars), thin-film solar panels, rewritable CDs and DVDs, and phase-change memory (the basis for the latest advance in computer technology). Almost as remarkable as these achievements are the social motivations behind Ovshinsky’s work, particularly his early commitment to clean energy technologies, and the fact that he accomplished so much without any formal education past high school.

We have recently told the story of this extraordinary man in our biography The Man Who Saw Tomorrow: The Life and Inventions of Stanford R. Ovshinsky (MIT Press, April 2018). In this article, we want to step back and consider his lasting significance. Ovshinsky’s technological innovations and scientific discoveries may recede in time as others build on and replace them, but the larger meaning we can find in his career will remain. We explore this meaning under three closely related aspects: his position as a scientific outsider, his unique historical trajectory, and his guiding progressive values.

The Outsider

The pivotal achievement of Ovshinsky’s career as an independent inventor was a fundamental scientific discovery he made in 1961 while working alone in a modest storefront in Detroit, Michigan: a fast, reversible switching effect in certain amorphous (i.e., non-crystalline) materials, which became the basis for creating new semiconductor devices, like his threshold switch and phase-change memory. Ovshinsky’s announcement of his discovery in 1968 sent shock waves through the field of solid-state physics because it described something previously considered impossible (at that time, the field considered only crystalline materials).

Many physicists were outraged, not only because the discovery contradicted their assumptions, but also because it came from a scientific outsider, a self-educated former machinist, with no academic credentials beyond a high school diploma. What we now know as the “Ovshinsky effect” eventually became accepted, but it is important to recognize that he made his discovery not just in spite of, but because of being an outsider.

A quick review of Ovshinsky’s early career indicates how his diverse experiences contributed to his discovery. He began working as a machinist and toolmaker in 1941 and by 1946 had made his first significant invention, a high-speed automated lathe that outperformed all others. He went on to develop other uses of automation, applying the principles of the new science of cybernetics to automotive inventions like power steering. Those principles considered control and communication in both animals and machines in terms of the same processes, like feedback, a parallel that led Ovshinsky to study neurology. Although he never held an academic position, he not only wrote and published papers in the field, but also carried out laboratory research on motor control. Then, based on his conception of the neuron, he created...
a novel kind of electrochemical switch that he called “the Ovitron.” This invention, which he described as his “nerve cell analogy,” was clearly the work of an outsider. Neither a trained neuroscientist nor an electrical engineer would have been likely to arrive at the Ovitron.

Ovshinsky planned to develop the Ovitron further, but the settlement terms of a lawsuit with a former partner prevented him from using the same materials or design. Overcoming that restriction eventually led to his breakthrough switching discovery. Systematic experimentation and a series of hunches enabled him to replace the Ovitron’s materials with the thin films of amorphous and disordered materials that produced the Ovshinsky effect. Several of those hunches drew on his working-class background, including his experience working at B.F. Goodrich, where he encountered thin films of dirt on the relays of lathes and milling machines and learned about the polymeric structure of rubber. Ovshinsky often proceeded intuitively, using analogies and visualization instead of the mathematically formalized methods of physics. In such ways, Ovshinsky’s position as a scientific outsider enabled him to create the amorphous semiconductors that academically trained physicists could not imagine.

The Trajectory

It is remarkable to consider that the inventions of the same man have played important roles in such diverse settings as the machine shops and factories of Akron, Ohio, and Detroit, Michigan in the 1940s and ’50s, and the cleanrooms of California’s Silicon Valley, today. In order to move from the one to the other, however, Ovshinsky had to change the way he worked. While his outsider origins and work as an independent inventor were crucial to making his discoveries, to take them further he needed to collaborate with scientific insiders, trained researchers who could develop, apply, and communicate his ideas. Using revenues from the growing commercial success of his switching inventions, he formed his own research and development company, Energy Conversion Devices (ECD), which by the 1980s had created and manufactured alternative energy technologies like nickel–metal hydride batteries and thin-film solar panels, for which Ovshinsky invented a system of continuous mass production to make solar power affordable. These energy technologies all depended on his pioneering use of amorphous and disordered materials, as do the information devices that may prove to be his most important contribution to 21st-century technology.

Although Ovshinsky discovered phase-change memory in the early 1960s, its potential has only recently been realized. Its earliest application was an optical version that yielded rewritable CDs and DVDs, widely popular in the 1980s and ’90s and still in use today. The more important electronic version, which has only recently entered production, has been claimed by Intel and Micron as “a major breakthrough in memory process technology” that promises new advances in computing. Ovshinsky’s career thus spanned the transition from the Industrial Age of the mid-20th century to the Information Age we now inhabit.

But Ovshinsky did not simply join the ascendant information economy or accept the idea that we are living in a “post-industrial” era. He remained connected to his industrial roots and advocated the use of amorphous and disordered materials as the basis for new industries and the manufacturing jobs they could provide. As an emblem of his hopes for that future, he had a poster made in the early 1980s to commemorate the first roll-to-roll machine for mass-producing thin-film photovoltaic material. The poster juxtaposed images of the machine’s long production line with those of Henry Ford’s Model T and its assembly line. Just as Ford had transformed the economy of the 20th century, so Ovshinsky envisioned the transformative effects of the new industries he was working to create.

The Values

That poster also indicates the way Ovshinsky’s work as an inventor was guided by his values. When he and his second wife, Iris Dibner, founded ECD in 1960, they dedicated the company to using science and technology to address social problems. With keen foresight, they chose to focus on energy, especially the industrial world’s dependence on oil, which Ovshinsky already recognized as a cause of both pollution and war. His work thus offered not only a parallel to Ford’s, but also a corrective to the problems caused by automobiles and other fossil fuel technologies. ECD’s solar panels and batteries were its most successful alternative energy technologies, but Ovshinsky also developed others, like a hydrogen-powered car, part of his vision of an economy in which all fossil fuels would be replaced. Near the end of his life, battered by the loss of both Iris and his control of ECD, Ovshinsky continued his quest. With the encouragement of his third wife, Rosa Young, he started a new company to develop his ideas for a way to greatly increase the rate of solar panel production.
in order to make solar power cheaper than coal, a goal he pursued until his death in 2012.

Like his efforts as an inventor, Ovshinsky's social values were rooted in the experiences of his youth. Although he came to the realms of science and advanced technology as an outsider, he grew up inside a strong, cohesive working-class community. He was formed in the culture of politically conscious Eastern European Jews like his father Ben, who had come to America to escape arrest for his activism in Czarist Russia and who helped found the Akron branch of the Workmen's Circle, a fraternal organization dedicated to promoting social justice and creating “a better and more beautiful world.” As a boy, Ovshinsky attended and spoke at meetings of the Workmen's Circle, which often welcomed speakers from New York and elsewhere, many of whom had led Europe to escape the Nazis or the Communists. The meetings were typical expressions of the secular, radical culture of Eastern Europe, to which Ovshinsky later looked back with fondness and regret. “We had a very rich life that won't be duplicated again. It was tremendously cooperative. They stuck together, helped each other. They were all bright and intelligent, even though they were carpenters, toolmakers, painters, rubber workers, shopkeepers, shoemakers, tailors.”

In addition to participating in the Workmen's Circle, Ovshinsky was a leader in the Young Socialists' League while he was still in school. Later, he was a leader in union organizing and other forms of activism in struggles for economic and racial justice. Iris shared his values, influenced by the idealistic philosophical anarchism of her parents, and when she and her husband created ECD, they rooted the goals and culture of their company in their common beliefs. Ovshinsky considered himself a democratic socialist, but for him the point of socialism was practical: “to make a better life for working people, with education and so on.”

Besides its ambitious environmental goals, ECD was dedicated to making life better for all its staff. For Stan and Iris, the ECD community was a social invention as important as any of its technologies. Its staff received generous pay and benefits; they were rewarded for their contributions and given opportunities and support to develop their abilities. Racially and ethnically diverse, ECD also included women at every level (with more women than men serving as vice presidents and equal numbers on the board of directors). “This,” Ovshinsky explained, “was how we believed society ought to be.”

The Legacy

Six years after Ovshinsky's death, we want to briefly reflect on his enduring contributions. The continuing influence of his discoveries and inventions is all around us in the devices we encounter daily, from flat-screen televisions to solar power, from electric and hybrid cars to the memory chips in smart phones. Current versions of these technologies may have moved on from their earlier ones, but they all depend in various ways on the use of amorphous and disordered materials, whose possibilities Ovshinsky first demonstrated.

Some of his inventions may be superseded, while others may become more important, but the larger significance of Ovshinsky's life arises from the way both his technological innovations and his leadership reflected his humanistic values and unquenchable optimism. Unlike many gifted innovators, Ovshinsky was not interested in building an empire or simply getting rich. For him, money was always a tool, a means to realize the Workmen's Circle's aim of creating a better and more beautiful world. His generosity, openness, and the passion with which he pursued his goals to the end of his life remain inspiring and, in our current regressive political moment, are needed more than ever. If there is to be the kind of better future Stanford Ovshinsky envisioned, both his inventions and his example will have helped to make it happen.

Lillian Hoddeson is Professor of History Emerita and Thomas Siebel Chair in the History of Science Emerita at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Peter Garrett is Professor of English Emeritus and former Director of the Unit for Criticism and Theory at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

He harnessed the sun, he reached for the stars.

Stanford R. Ovshinsky
(1922 – 2012)

The night sky over the Paranal Observatory in Chile.
(Photo by Yuri Beletsky/ESO.)